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JOHN T. BUJAK 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S ROGERS, DEPUTY 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 





CASE NO. CR2004-26831 
WITNESS LIST, EXHIBIT LIST 
AND NOTICE OF INTENT 
COMES NOW, ERICA M. KALLIN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Canyon 
County, State of Idaho, and submits the following list of witnesses and exhibits the State intends 
to use at jury trial: 
WITNESS LIST 
Kermit Channell - C/O Identigentix Inc 
Shannon Sorini - Integrity Theraputic Services 
R.W. 
Angelika Miner 
Dr. Michael Sexton - C/O CARES 
Alisa. Ortega - CARES, , 
Kristi Moore - Department Of Health & Welfare 
Gary Mccorkle Pa - Mercy Medical Center 
Sallie Fogg RN - Mercy Medical Ctr 
Carla Finnis Ph.D - Identigenetix Inc 
WITNESS LIST, EXHIBIT LIST 




~ l~, 0.\00 
Claudia Currie-Mills - SANE Solutions 
Mathew Archuleta - Nampa City Police Department 
Angela Weekes - Nampa City Police Department 
Mark Tregellas - Nampa City Police Department 
Brandy Sutherland - Nampa City Police Department 
Chris Rowe - Nampa Police Department, Nampa, ID 83651 
Don Peck - Nampa City Police Department 
Laurie Pearson - Nampa City Police Department 
Phylane Hartley - Nampa City Police Department 
Victor Terry Former NPD officer 
EXHIBIT LIST 
1. Cassette Tape 
2. Photos 
NOTICE OF INTENT 
Notice is hereby given of the State's intent to use the following audio/video (or 
electronic) recordings at trial. 
1. Cassette Tape 
2. Photos 
DATED This ~ day of May, 2010. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was served 
upon the attorney for the defendant, the 
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing 
said instrument in their b,*et at the Clerk's 
Office, on or about the ~ day of May, 
2010 
WITNESS LIST, EXHIBIT LIST 





JOHN T. BUJAK 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
MAY 2 G 2010 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S ROGERS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CASE NO. CR2004-26831 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) STATE'S PROPOSED 
vs. ) JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 




COMES NOW, ERICA M. KALLIN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney and submits 
the following jury instructions in the above referenced case. 
DATED This ~ day of May, 2010. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS I 
J:\SVU Special Victims Unit\Jury Instructions\Lewd Conduct With A Minor Under Sixteen\Watkins Vance L&L_ dunanimity.doc 
0001.96 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the Proposed Jury 
Instructions was delivered to the Defendant's attorney of record by placing said copy in the 
Public Defender's basket in the Clerk's office on or about the.2:2 day of May, 2010. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2 




"ON OR ABOUT" EXPLAINED 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If you 
find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that precise 
date. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\Jury Instructions\Watkins Vance L&L_ C unanimity. doc 
000198 
ICJI929 
LEWD AND LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct, the state must prove 
each of the following: 
1. On or about October 1, 2004. 
2. in the state ofIdaho 
3. the defendant Vance Watkins committed an act of oral-genital contact and/or genital to 
anal contact and/or genital-genital contact or any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body 
ofR.W. (
4. R.W. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and 
5. the defendant committed such act with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify 
the lust or passions or sexual desires of the defendant, of such child, or of some other person. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4 




LEWD CONDUCT -(TOUCHING) 
To constitute lewd and lascivious conduct, it is not necessary that bare skin be touched. 
The touching may be through the clothing. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\Jury Instructions\Watkins Vance L&L_ C unanimity. doc 
000200 
Icn 931 
PASSIONS NEED NOT BE ACTUALLY AROUSED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law does not require as an essential element of the crime that the lust, passions, or 
sexual desires of either the defendant or R.W. ( be actually aroused, appealed 
to, or gratified. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 6 
H:\WORK\CRIMINALVury lnstructions\Watkins Vance L&L_ C unanimity. doc 
000201. 
ICII932 
CONSENT OF VICTIM NO DEFENSE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that it is not a defense to the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor 
Under Sixteen that R.W. (  may have consented to the alleged conduct. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\Jury instructions\Watkins Vance L&L_ C unanimity.doc 
000202 
Icn 308 
EVIDENCE LIMITED AS TO PURPOSE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could not be 
considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it 
was admitted. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 8 
H;\WORK\CRIMINALVury Instructions\Watkins Vance L&L_ C unanimity. doc 
000203 
JURY INSTRUCTION 
During these proceedings you have heard the full name of the alleged victim, however, 
in these instructions only the initials R.W. are used. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 9 
H\WORK\CRIMINAL\Jury Instructions\Watkins Vance L&L_ C unanimity. doc 
000204 
JURY INSTRUCTION 
The State's evidence on the charge of Lewd Conduct With a Minor Under Sixteen, if 
believed, includes more than one act or incident that could constitute the charged crime. In 
order to find the defendant guilty, the jury must unanimously agree which act or incident 
constituted the lewd conduct. 
STATE'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 10 
HIWORKICRIMINAL\Jury InstructionslWatkins Vance L&L_ C unanimity.doc 
000205 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 













CASE NO. CR:299S--26831 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
---------------------------) 
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State 
of Idaho, and hereby submits the following State's Second Brief in Opposition of Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's decision is left to its sound discretion, and the decisions before it are 
whether sufficient legal evidence supports finding of probable cause and whether any 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 1 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_2nd Brief in Opposition of DefMO to DM.doc 
000206 ORIGINAL 
prosecutorial misconduct resulted in such egregious prejudice so as to nullify the independent 
probable cause. State v. Curtiss, 138 Idaho 466, 65 P.3d 207 (Ct. App., 2002).£1] 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
The Defendant raises two broad arguments in his Motion to Dismiss: (a) Due Process 
Violations and (b) Prosecutorial Misconduct. In his memorandum, the Defendant identifies a 
number of issues that fall under one of those two arguments. 
The State would rephrase the issues raised as follows: 
1. Does the Defendant provide a legal basis for his Motion to Dismiss? 
2. Did the grand jury receive legally sufficient evidence supporting its finding of probably 
cause; and 
3. Was the defendant improperly prejudiced by "extreme and outrageous" prosecutorial 
misconduct? 
ARGUMENT 
A grand jury is a body of qualified persons selected and organized for the purpose of 
inquiring into the commission of crimes within the county from which its members are drawn, 
determining the probability of a particular person's guilt, and finding indictments against 
[I] If raised upon appeal, the appellate, court would review the issue in the following manner. When 
hearing a motion to dismiss an indictment, the standard of review an appellate court should apply is the "abuse of 
discretion" standard. State v. Bujanda-Velazquez. 129 Idaho 726, 728, 932 P.2d 354,356 (1997); see also State v. 
McDonald. 872 P.2d 627,638 (Alaska.Ct.App.1994P]; State v. Sulgrove. 19 Wash. App. 860,578 P.2d 74, 76 
(1978)[1]. 
An appellate court when handling a motion to dismiss a grand jury indictment must conduct a multi-tiered 
inquiry. State v. Hedger. 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). First, the court must perceive the issue 
as one of discretion; and second, the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with the 
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and third, the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Bujanda-Velazquez. 129 Idaho at 728,932 P.2d at 356; see also Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600, 768 P.2d at 1333 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 2 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_2nd Brief in Opposition of DefMO to DM.doc 
000207 
supposed offenders. Us. v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181,97 S. Ct. 1814 (1977); Beavers v. 
Henkel, 194 U.S. 73,24 S. Ct. 605 (1904). 
A grand jury is not the final arbiter of guilt or innocence. The grand jury rather is an 
accusing body and not a trial court State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 234, 743 P.2d 459, 463 
(1987). 
Its functions are investigative and charging. The purpose of both a 
grand jury proceeding and a preliminary hearing is to determine 
probable cause. Any advantage that a preliminary hearing affords 
a defendant is purely incidental to that purpose. The independent 
grand jury's function would be duplicated by requiring a 
subsequent preliminary hearing. (emphasis added), Edmonson, 113 
Idaho at 234, 743 P.2d at 463. 
Prosecutors in the State of Idaho have the ability to charge certain crimes through 
presentation to a grand jury rather than';through a preliminary hearing procedure. The seminal 
decision regarding the usage of grand juries in the State of Idaho is State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 
230, 743 P.2d 459 (1987). 
ISSUE 1 
The Defendant fails to provide an appropriate legal standard (or his 
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. 
The Defendant's brief relies upon Idaho Criminal Rule 6 and the case of State v. Jones, 
125 Idaho 477 (1994) both of which rely upon authority that no longer exists. Jones relies upon 
I.C.R. 6 a rule that is no long applicable to the courts and/or grand juries. I.C.R. 6 was repealed 
by the Idaho Legislature and Idaho Criminal Rules 6.1 through 6.9 were adopted on July 1 s\ 
1994, three months after Jones was decided. Thus, the Defendant does not raise in his Motion 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 3 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_2nd Brief in Opposition of DefMO to DM.doc 
000208 
applicable law to move the court to dismiss the indictment, therefore his motion should be denied 
on its face. 
The appropriate rule governing motions to dismiss indictments is LC.R. 6.7.[2] Assuming 
that the Defendant is applying this particular rule to his Motion to Dismiss, it appears that the 
only legal ground upon which he could be basing his motion on is LC.R. 6.7(d) which states as 
follows: .l 
(d) That the indictment was not properly found, indorsed and 
presented as required by these rules or by the statutes of the state 
ofIdaho. 
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate 
or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. 
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S. Ct. 406, 408 (1956). The reason why there is 
a rule providing specific grounds is to eliminate having a so-called preliminary trial to determine 
the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. Id. This is not required by 
the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
[2] Rule 6.7. Motion to dismiss indictment 
Grounds for Motion. A motion to dismiss the indictment may be granted by the district court upon any of the 
following grounds: 
(a) A valid challenge to the array of grand jurors. 
(b) A valid challenge to an individual juror who served upon the grand jury which found the indictment; provided, 
the fmding of the valid challenge to one or more members of the grand jury shall not be grounds for dismissal of the 
indictment if there were twelve or more qualified jurors concurring in the fmding of the indictment. 
(c) That the charge contained within the indictment was previously submitted to a magistrate at preliminary hearing 
and dismissed for lack of probable cause. 
(d) That the indictment was not properly found, indorsed and presented as required by these rules or by the statutes 
of the state ofIdaho. 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 4 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_2nd Brief in Opposition ofDefMO to DM.doc 
000209 
If the Court deems that the Defendant has presented sufficient grounds to raise his 
Motion to Dismiss based on a rule that does not exist (LC.R 6), case law that relies upon a rule 
that does not exist (Jones), and in essence to allow for a preliminary trial defeating the purpose 
of a grand jury as set forth in Castel/a, then the State will address the additional issues raised in 
his brief. 
ISSUE 2 
The State complied with Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2 in all facets thus not committing 
prosecutorial misconduct nor denying the Defendant his Due Process Rights. 
The Defendant in his motion sets forth that the state violated Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2 in 
multiple ways. The State contends that it followed the criminal rules and did not violate the 
Defendant's Due Process rights. 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 5 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_2nd Brief in Opposition ofDefMO to DM.doc 
00021.0 
) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2[3] identifies the powers and duties of the prosecuting attorney 
when presenting cases to a grand jury. This Rule lists forth the powers that shall be available to 
the prosecuting attorney. The Defendant contends that the State violated subsections (d) and (f) 
of this rule, the State disagrees. 
ISSUE 3 
The State established R. W. was competent to testi(v and R. W. testified 
to all o(the essential elements o(the crime. 
The Defendant argues that not only did the State improperly lead R.W. during her 
testimony but that she was not competent to testify as to the elements of the crime. Addressing 
first the leading questions, IRE 611 (c) states leading questions should not be used on 
direct ... except as may be necessary to develop the testimony of the witness. A leading or 
[3] Powers and Duties. The prosecuting attorney of the county wherein the grand jury is sitting, or 
one or more deputies, or a special prosecuting attorney may attend all sessions of the grand jury, 
except during the deliberations of the grand jury after the presentation of evidence. The 
prosecuting attorney shall have the power and duty to: 
(a) Present to the grand jury evidence of any public offense, however, when a prosecutor 
conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which 
directly negates the guilt of the subject of the investigation the prosecutor must present or 
otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury. 
(b) At the commencement of a presentation of an investigation to the grand jury, inquire 
as to whether there are any grounds for disqualification of any grand juror and advise the 
presiding juror of the possible disqualification of a juror. 
(c) List the elements of an offense being investigated by the grand jury, before, during or 
after the testimony of witnesses. 
(d) Advise the grand jury as to the standard for probable cause, and tell them that if a 
person refuses to testify this fact cannot be used against him or her. 
(e) Issue and have served grand jury subpoenas for witnesses. 
(f) Present opening statements and/or instruct jury on applicable law. 
(g) Prepare an indictment for consideration by or at the request of the grand jury. Idaho 
Criminal Rules (I.C.R.), Rule 6.2 (emphasis added). 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 6 
H:\WORK\CRlMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_2nd Brief in Opposition of DefMO to DM.doc 
000211 
· . 
suggestive question is one which suggests the answer to the witness. Idaho Mercantile Co. v. 
Kalanquin, 8 Idaho 101,66 P. 933 (1901). Furthermore, an exception to the rule is made where 
the witness is young and required to testify as to the details of the sex crime. State v. Larson, 42 
Idaho 517,246 P. 313 (1926). Here, RW. was six (6) at the time she testified as to the details 
of sexual abuse at the hands of her father. The prosecutor asked questions so as to develop the 
testimony of the young witness. There were no questions which suggested the answer to the 
witness except as to confirm RW.'s non-verbal response. As such, there was no error during the 
questioning ofRW. 
The Defendant also argues that RW. was not competent to testify, indicating she was 
unable to recollect past events. As has been previously addressed in State's First Brief in 
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, the time when the crime occurred is not an 
essential element of the crime. The prosecution simply has to develop that the child-witness is 
competent. In a crime of a sexual nature, this includes the elements of the crime and the ability 
to distinguish between truth and lies. In State v. Ross, 92 Idaho 709, 449 P.2d 369 (1968) 
(overturned on other grounds), the Court determined that a five-year-old child, whose testimony 
was consistent as to offense charged and who knew difference between telling truth and not 
telling truth, was competent to testify, even though the child may not have understood nature and 
obligation of oath and though her testimony involving relative time and numbers contained 
inconsistencies. 
Here, RW. was able to testify as to the acts the Defendant committed on her without 
leading questions from the State. She testified that the Defendant put his "wienie" inside her 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 7 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_2nd Brief in Opposition ofDefMO to DM.doc 
00021.2 
) 
"pepe" and "butt" and it hurt inside, causing her to cry. She also testified "he makes me put my 
mouth on his wiene." She is clearly able to testify as to the elements of the crime. At the 
beginning of her testimony, she testified she knew the difference between a truth and lie and 
understood there are consequences for telling a lie (she testified she gets spankings.) Because 
the State established the essential elements of the crime and that R.W. was competent to testify, 
the State has met its burden. Furthermore, since corroboration is no longer required in crimes of 
a sexual nature (see State v. Byers, 102 Iaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981)), the Indictment was 
properly issued at the end ofR.W.'s testimony. 
188UE3 
The State did not present inadmissible evidence. nor did it conduct prosecutorial misconduct. 
The court when making an inquiry into the propriety of the grand jury proceeding utilizes 
a two prong approach. First, the court must determine whether, independent of any inadmissible 
evidence, the grand jury received legally sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable 
cause. State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 236, 743 P.2d 459, 465 (1987); State v. Jones, 125 
Idaho 477,483,873 P.2d 122, 128 (1994). The United States Constitution, through the Fifth 
Amendment, does not require a dismissal of an indictment based exclusively on improper 
evidence. Id; See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S. Ct. 406 (1956). The Court 
in Costello was concerned about judicial expediency: 
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that 
there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the. grand 
jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a 
rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could 
STATE'S SECOND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 8 




always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the 
competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. 
This is not required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment 
returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an 
information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough 
to call for trial of the charge on the merits. 
Costello, 350 at 363, 76 S.Ct. at 408-409. 
Thus, an indictment should be sustained if, after excluding the inadmissible evidence, 
there remains sufficient admissible evidence to indict. Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 236, 743 P.2d at 
465; see/or example, Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1981); State v. Miyazaki, 64 
Hawaii 611, 645 P.2d 1340 (1982); State v. Terrell, 283 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 1979); People v. 
Backus, 23 Cal.3d 360, 152 Cal. Rptr. 710, 590 P.2d 837 (1979); Franklin v. State, 89 Nev. 382, 
513 P.2d 1252 (1973); People v. Meegan, 60 A.D.2d 961, 401 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1978), People v. 
Skelton, 109 Cal.App.3d 691, 167 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1980), cert. denied, Curtin v. Us., 450 U.S. 
917, 101 S.Ct. 1361 (1981); and State v. Waste Management o(Wisconsin, Inc .. 81 Wis.2d 555, 
261 N.W.2d 147 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 865,99 S.Ct. 189 (1978). What is extremely 
clear in all of these cases is that the purpose of a grand jury proceeding is to determine whether 
sufficient probable cause exists to bind the defendant over for trial. The determination of guilt or 
innocence is saved for a later day. As long as the grand jury has received legally sufficient 
evidence which in and of itself supports a finding of probable cause then the indictment should 
, 
not be dismissed. Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237, 743 P.2d at 466. 
The second prong is whether the prosecutorial misconduct in improperly submitting 
evidence was so egregious as to be prejudicial. Id. at 237, 743 P.2d at 466; Jones, 125 Idaho at 
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483, 873 P.2d at 128. Generally, prosecutorial misconduct will require dismissal only when it 
reaches the level of a constitutional due process violation. Edmonson, 113 at 237, 743 P.2d at 
466; Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670, 604 P.2d 363 (1979); State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702 
(Iowa 1975), appeal after remand, 249 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822,98 
S.Ct. 66, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977). In order to be entitled to dismissal of an indictment on due 
process grounds, the defendant must affirmatively show prejudice caused by the misconduct. 
State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 606 P.2d 981 (1980); Hall, supra. The courts have held that 
"dismissal is a drastic remedy and should be exercised only in extreme and outrageous 
situations, and therefore, the defendant has a heavy burden." Edmonson, 113 at 237, 743 P.2d at 
466 (emphasis added) 
Establishing this two-prong approach and the law that governs it, the State will apply this 
approach to the arguments raised by the Defendant. 
1. The State did not enter inadmissible evidence to the grand jury and thus did not violate 
the defendant's due process rights 
The Defendant advances several arguments regarding the presentation of improper 
testimony before the Grand Jury. Specifically, the Defendant argues that some of the testimony 
was (a) hearsay; (b) not supported by proper evidentiary foundation; (c) speculative; (d) elicited 
by leading questions; or (e) non-responsive to the question asked. The Defendant argues that all 
of the alleged improper testimony should be stricken and the Indictment should be dismissed for 
lack of probable cause. 
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a. The State did not introduce inadmissible evidence for consideration by the 
Grand JUry 
Currently, a motion to dismiss a Grand Jury indictment may be granted upon several 
grounds; however, the only ground applicable to the Defendant's Motion as it relates to 
evidentiary issues would be, "[t]hat the indictment was not properly found, indorsed and 
presented as required by these rules or by the statutes of the state ofIdaho." I.C.R. 6.7(d) 
(Michie 2008). Unlike the former I.C.R. 6(f), the current Idaho Criminal Rules do not expressly 
forbid the introduction of hearsay evidence before the Grand Jury. The only applicable statute 
that addresses the issue dictates that the Grand Jury may properly consider "legally admissible 
hearsay" evidence. I.C. § 19-1105 (Michie 2008). Accordingly, the question becomes what is 
"legally admissible hearsay" evidence within the context of evidentiary presentations to the 
Grand Jury. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence do not expressly state whether they apply to Grand Jury 
proceedings, but do expressly state that they do not apply to proceedings for the issuance of 
arrest warrants, summonses and search warrants. I.R.E. 101(e)(3) (Michie 2008). In order for a 
court to issue an arrest warrant or a search warrant, there has to be a finding of probable cause. 
When a court makes a probabl~ cause determination for the issuance of an arrest warrant, 
" ... [t]he probable cause hearing is an informal nonadversary proceeding. The fmding of 
probable cause shall be based upon substantial evidence, which may be hearsay in whole or in 
part, provided there is a substantial basis for believing that there is a factual basis for the 
information furnished." I.C.R. 4(e) (Michie 2008). Based upon the information presented, a ... 
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"magistrate may issue a warrant ... only after making a determination that there is probable 
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." I.C.R. 
4(a) (Michie 2008). 
When a court makes a probable cause determination for the issuance of a search warrant, 
" ... [t]he finding of probable cause shall be based upon substantial evidence, which may be 
hearsay in whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, to believe probable cause exists." I.C.R. 41 (c) (Michie 2008). 
When the Grand Jury makes a probable cause determination to find an indictment, the 
standard is as follows: "[p ]robable cause exists when the grand jury has before it such evidence 
as would lead a reasonable person to believe an offense has been committed and that the accused 
party has probably committed the offense." LC.R. 6.6(a) (Michie 2008). There is no express 
prohibition against the Grand Jury considering hearsay evidence and it appears that hearsay 
evidence should be considered at least in some circumstances. For example, the prosecutor 
must, " ... if he is personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of the 
subject of the investigation" present or disclose such evidence to the Grand Jury. I.C.R. 6.2(a) 
(Michie 2008). Presumably, this would include substantial hearsay evidence that directly 
negates guilt. 
A proceeding before the Grand Jury is a non-adversarial proceeding. The Defendant is 
not present and has no right to confrontation. The hearing is akin to a hearing for the issuance of 
an arrest or search warrant in that only one side presents evidence and the finder of fact 
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determines whether or not there is probable cause. For this reason, it makes sense that the Grand 
Jury should be able to consider hearsay in making its determination. 
Since the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not specifically address Grand Jury proceedings, 
one is left to question whether the Idaho Supreme Court desired to move the State grand jury 
system closer to the federal model when it amended the Idaho Criminal Rules regarding grand 
juries in 1994. It is clear that, in federal court, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to 
grand jury proceedings. F.R.E. IIOI(d)(2) (Michie 2008). Accordingly, a federal Grand Jury is 
free to consider hearsay evidence. In fact, it is typical for federal grand juries to hear from only 
the case officer regarding every aspect of a federal criminal case. In Idaho, prior to 1994, the 
Idaho Criminal Rules were very clear that the grand jury could not consider hearsay evidence. 
However, effective July I, 1994, the Idaho Supreme Court removed the express prohibition 
against hearsay evidence from the Idaho Criminal Rules, and since that time, there has been no 
appellate case law addressing the issue of hearsay being presented to the Grand Jury in Idaho. It 
appears that, by amending the Idaho Criminal Rules, the Idaho Supreme Court intended for the 
presentation of hearsay evidence before the grand jury effectively creating a category of "legally 
l, 
admissible hearsay" as contemplated by I.C. § 19-1105. It also makes sense that the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence would not apply during grand jury proceedings since they are not adversarial in 
nature, much like an application for an arrest or search warrant. 
Assuming that the State is correct and that the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not apply to 
grand jury proceedings, then the Defendant's arguments related to the presentation of 
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inadmissible evidence are without merit and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be 
denied accordingly. 
b. Even if the State presented inadmissible evidence for consideration by the 
Grand Jury, the admissible evidence is sufficient to find an indictment. 
Should the Court disagree with the State and determine that the Idaho Rules of Evidence 
do apply to grand jury proceedings, then the Court must next determine whether the presentation 
of evidence contrary to the evidentiary rules is fatal to the Indictment in this case. 
Generally, an indictment should be sustained if, after excluding any inadmissible 
evidence, there remains sufficient admissible evidence to indict. Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 236, 
743 P.2d at 465. In this case, even if the Court were to find that each ofthe Defendant's 
arguments are well-taken and refused to consider the evidence of which he complains, the record 
would still properly reflect that R.W. was sexually touched by the Defendant. Corroboration is 
not required in sex crimes. Byers. Her testimony alone is sufficient not just for probable cause 
but also for a conviction at jury trial. This evidence alone would be sufficient to allow the Grand 
Jury to find probable cause that the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen had 
been committed and that the Defendant had committed said crime. 
2. The State did not conduct outrageous and egregious prosecutorial misconduct that 
would he grounds (or a dismissal ofthe indictment. 
Once again the State refers to the opinion of the Edmonson court. 
To determine whether misconduct gives rise to a dismissal, a 
reviewing court will have to balance the gravity and the 
seriousness of this misconduct with the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the probable cause fmding. At one extreme, the 
misconduct can be so outrageous that regardless of the extent of 
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probable cause evidence, dismissal will be required. At the other 
extreme, the misconduct may be so slight, that it becomes 
unnecessary to question the independent judgment of the grand 
jury. In the middle of these extremes, the court must examine the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether the indictment 
should be dismissed. As stated above, the burden rests with the 
criminal defendant to make an initial showing that the misconduct 
rises to the level of prejudice. Absent the showing of prejudice, a 
reviewing court will not second guess the grand jury. State v. 
Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 237, 743 P.2d 459,466 (Idaho,1987). 
The case law is quite clear that the Defendant is required to affirmatively show prejudice 
caused by any prosecutorial misconduct. In this case the Defendant has not done so. The 
Defendant merely has suggested that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred. 
First, the Defendant argues that Detective Peck's testimony as to how the complaint was 
received is irrelevant and was used to bolster R.W.'s testimony. This evidence was admitted to 
show how law enforcement was involved in the case. It was not offered for the truth of the 
matter or even to bolster R.W. 's testimony. Rather testimony that he received the case because a 
counselor, who has a mandatory reporting requirement, contacted law enforcement. Peck further 
I 
testified that R.W. was seen at CARES. Again, this is information going to his investigation and 
the credibility of the officer and his investigation. 
Additionally, evidence that of the condom and Japanese animated video was properly 
admitted before the Grand Jury. First the condom was lawfully seized (See State's Response to 
Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress) and testimony was properly before the grand jury. 
Regarding the video, the court in State v. Rossignol, 147 Idah0818, 215 P.3d 538 (Idaho App. 
2009) stated that evidence of the existence of pornographic movies is relevant and admissible at 
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trial because not only does it corroborate the victim's testimony but it also goes to the 
Defendant's motive and plan to engage in sexual acts with his daughter. Since that evidence is 
admissible at trial, it only stands to reason it would also be admissible for purposes of a probable 
cause hearing. 
The Defendant has also challenged the testimony regarding the alternative light source. 
Detective Peck testified as to what he discovered during the execution of the search warrant. He 
is familiar with the alternative light source and testified of what he saw. Furthermore, the 
presentation that the light source indicated a positive to bodily fluid, without testimony that it 
was actually semen, was testimony favorable to the defendant, as Peck did not testify as to what 
type of fluid. It should be noted that at trial, Officer Tregallas testified that the bodily fluid was 
actually semen. Detective Peck further testified the alternative light source indicated fluid in 
R.W.'s panties but was clear to indicate to the grand jury the potentially exculpatory evidence 
that they had not been tested yet. The Grand Jury could have asked for the test results prior to 
the finding of the Indictment pursuant to the ICR but chose not to. 
Finally the Defendant challenged his statements made at grand jury. The Defendant's 
interview is admissible (See State's Response to the Defendant's First Motion to Suppress.) He 
indicated that the Defendant did not confess to touching R.W., again potentially exculpatory 
evidence. 
Even if the court deems these comments impermissible, they do not qualify as so 
egregious that the indictment should be dismissed. The court must keep in mind the standard of 
prejudicial effect when determining whether the impermissible statements caused and were 
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designed to appeal to juror prejudice. See State v. Bojorquez, 111 Ariz. 549, 535 P.2d 6 (1975); 
State v. Good, 10 Ariz. 556,460 P.2d 662 (1969); Edmonson supra. The Defendant has not 
shown that the testimony of Detective Peck prejudiced the jury at all, let alone in such an 
egregious manner that they came back with an indictment only because the prosecutor allowed 
his testimony after probable cause had already been established through R. W. The Ninth Circuit 
has established that unless the defendant proves that the conduct by the State is flagrant 
misbehavior, the indictment should not be dismissed. United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 
1085 (9th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 1993)[4]. What 
the Defendant is alleging is neither egregious nor is it a flagrant misbehavior that would provide 
this court with grounds for a dismissal of the indictment. Therefore, the State has not violated 
the Defendant's due process rights nor has it committed prosecutorial misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The grand jury received legally sufficient evidence supporting its finding of probable 
cause. The State respectfully requests this Court to DENY the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as 
the State did not violate the Defendant's due process rights nor commit prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
[4] Holding that even though the government's conduct "may have been negligent, or even grossly negligent," it did 
not rise to the level of flagrant misconduct. 
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DATED This A day of May, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Second Brief 
in Opposition of Defendant's Second BriefIn Opposition of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss 
was served upon the attorney for the Defendant, the Canyon County Public Defender, by placing 
said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office on or about this :241 day of May, 2010 
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• *460 *231 Ned A. Cannon of Smith & Cannon, Lewiston, and John S. Ransom (argued), of Ransom, Blackman & Simson, 
Portland, Or., for defendant-appellant. 
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol.Gen. (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent. 
DONALDSON, Justice. 
Eric Roy Edmonson was indicted by a grand jury in Latah County on the following charges: racketeering; grand theft; 
conspiracy to engage in racketeering; conspiracy to engage in grand theft; and the falsification of corporate books and 
records. Edmonson filed a barrage of motions raising a number of constitutional and procedural arguments alleging error in 
the grand jury indictment and requesting the indictment be set aside. After a hearing, the district court issued an opinion 
denying the motions. Permission to appeal by certification was granted. 
On appeal Edmonson raises five specific arguments, as to why dismissal of the indictment is required. They are: 
1. The prosecutor's use of the grand jury to indict was not based on any systematic set of criteria and therefore violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Idaho Constitution. 
2. The prosecutor's use of hearsay evidence is contrary to I.C. § 19-1105 and I.C.R. 6(f). 
·*461 *2323. The prosecutor's comments on the evidence infringed on the grand jury's ability to exercise its independent 
judgment and therefore violates the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution. 
4. Contrary to statute, unauthorized personnel were present during the grand jury sessions. 
5. I.e. § 18-1905 (the falsification of corporate book statute) is unconstitutional on its face. 
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We reject all of Edmonson's contentions and affirm the trial court's findings. We will discuss each argument separately and 
any additional facts as necessary. 
Equal Protection 
Edmonson contends that the use of a grand jury in this case deprived him of the equal protection of the laws in violation of 
art. 1. § 2 of the Idaho COnstitution. Essentially, relying on several Oregon Supreme Court cases, he argues that the system 
used in Idaho allowing the prosecutor unfettered discretion to initiate criminal proceedings by indictment or information 
without regard to any systematic or coherent policy violates a defendant's right to equal protection. Here, two other 
co-defendants were charged by information rather than by indictment Since the prosecutor did not have any systematic 
coherent policy to decide when to proceed by indictment or information, but rather arbitrarily made that decision, Edmonson 
contends that he was denied the same rights as his co-defendants, namely the right to a preliminary hearing. 
[ 1 ][2][3] Art. I, § 8 of the Id. Const. provides: 
".§J!. Prosecutions only by indictment or information.-No person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal 
offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor, after a 
commitment by a magistrate, except in cases of impeachment, in cases cognizable by probate courts or by justices of the 
peace, and in cases arising in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; provided, that a grand jury 
may be summoned upon the order of the district court in the manner provided by law, and provided further, that after a 
charge has been ignored by a grand jury, no person shall be held to answer, or for trial therefor, upon information of the 
public prosecutor." 
Thus, the prosecutor can use either a grand jury proceeding or a preliminary hearing before an impartial magistrate to initiate 
criminal proceedings. However, the rights afforded the accused in these proceedings are different. A proceeding initiated by 
information entitles the accused the right to a preliminary hearing before an impartial magistrate to determine whether a 
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed it Id. Const., art. I. § 8; 
I.e. § 19-804; I.C.R. 5. J(b); State v. Q'Mealey. 95 Idaho 202, 506 P.2d 99 (] 973). The accused has the right to assistance of 
counsel, (I.C. § 19-801); the right to produce evidence, (I.C. § 19-809), State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 
£..l..21.ll; and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, (I.C. § 19-808). These procedures allow an accused to contest the 
prosecutor's evidence and the right to a finding of probable cause by an impartial and detached judicial officer. 
HI In contrast, an indictment by a grand jury does not afford the accused a right to a preliminary hearing. State v. Taylor, 59 
Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454 (939). Only the prosecutor and witnesses under examination may be present during the grand jury 
proceeding. I.C.R. 6(d). Further, the grand jury is not bound to hear evidence presented by the defendant; however, it is 
required to weigh all evidence submitted to it, and can require additional evidence when necessary. I.C.R. 6(g). 
Edmonson relies on a series of Oregon cases starting with State v. Clark. 291 Or. 231. 630 P.2d 810 (198 J), cert. denied, 
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454 U.S. 1084,102 S.Ct. 640, 70 L.Ed.2d 619 (1981), continuing with **462State v. Edmonson. 291 Or. 251, 630 P.2d 822 
rum, *233 and State v. Freeland. 295 Or. 367. 667 P.2d 509 (1983), to support his argument that a prosecutor must afford 
all similarly situated defendants equal treatment of the laws. In Clark and Edmonson. the defendants were charged by 
indictment and not afforded a preliminary hearing. They did not request a preliminary hearing, but on appeal argued that a 
denial of a preliminary hearing violated their rights to equal protection of the laws because other potential defendants 
charged with the same crime could be charged by an information and allowed a preliminary hearing. The Oregon Supreme 
Cowt rejected this contention, noting that its constitution provides for alternative charging methods (information with a 
preliminary hearing or indictment without one) which are capable of valid administration. However, the court held that a 
choice between indictment and information must "rest on meaningful criteria that indeed make the privileges of a preliminary 
hearing equally available to all persons similarly situated .... " Edmonson. supra. 630 P.2d at 823. In other words, the equal 
protection clause of the Oregon constitution prevents the prosecutor from arbitrarily chosing to proceed by indictment or 
information, but instead, requires the choice be made on a coherent, systematic basis. The court upheld the indictments 
because both Clark and Edmonson failed to show that other defendants in the same situation would be afforded a preliminary 
hearing. 
In Freeland, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury and then requested a preliminary hearing, After it was denied, he 
filed a motion asking for a hearing in which to show that the denial of the preliminary hearing did not meet the Clark and 
Edmonson standards. At the hearing, the district attorney stated that the decision to proceed by indictment or information was 
left up to the individual trial deputy. The trial court then held that such an ad hoc procedure did not meet the constitutional 
requirements as set forth in Clark and Edmonson. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. The court framed the test as 
"whether a prosecutor's use of the two charging procedures adheres to sufficiently consistent standards to represent a 
coherent, systematic policy, even when not promulgated in the form of rules or guidelines." Freeland. supra 667 P.2d at 515. 
In summary, the Oregon Constitution, like the Idaho Constitution, provides for alternative charging procedures, either by 
indictment or by information, If an information is used, the defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing. Like the Idaho 
Constitution, the Oregon Constitution does not, on its face, place any limitation on the prosecutor's choice to proceed by 
either alternative, In Oregon, however, the state Supreme Court has ruled that the state's equal protection clause does require 
the prosecutor to treat similarly situated defendants equally. This is best accomplished by a pre-established, "coherent, 
systematic policy" under which the prosecutor wiII be limited in the choice to proceed by indictment or information. 
Edmonson urges us to adopt the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court. We refuse to do so. 
ill We note that Edmonson did not request a preliminary hearing. He simply argued that the prosecutor must have a 
systematic set of criteria to base a decision on in order to proceed by indictment or information. As noted above, however, 
one substantive difference in the indictment and information procedures is the right to a preliminary hearing when an 
information is used. Edmonson's failure to request a preliminary hearing is dispositive of this case. However, based on the 
important constitutional issues at stake, we will address the arguments raised by Edmonson. 
1§Jl11 It is a well settled rule that an equal protection analysis comes into play when a statute-a legislative enactment-creates 
two classes of individuals who are treated differently. See Stucki v. Loveland. 94 Idaho 621. 495 P.2d 571 (1972). In this 
case, we have two constitutional provisions that need to be construed together, Art. I. § 8 allows for alternative charging 
procedures which are of equal dignity. In **463 re Winn. 28 Idaho 461. 154 P. 497 (1916). Art. 1. § 2 *234 guarantees 
equal rights, privileges and immunities to all persons within the state. Fisher v. Masters, 59 Idaho 366, 83 P.2d 212 (J 938). 
The appellant argues that art. 1. § 2 is a limitation of art. 1. § 8. We disagree. When construing separate constitutional 
provisions, the general principles of statutory construction apply. Lewis v. Woodall. 72 Idaho 16, 236 P.2d 91 (J 951), 
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Statutes must be construed, if at all possible, consistently and harmoniously. State v. Creech. 105 Idaho 362. 670 P.2d 463 
.Ll2.ru, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051. 104 S.Ct. 1327. 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984). Either of the two alternative charging 
procedures can be used, but will be subject to an equal protection analysis. 
Edmonson will have us require that a prosecutor establish charging criteria to insure that similarly situated defendants are 
treated equally. He argues, that in this case, because he was charged by indictment whereas several other co-defendants were 
charged by information, he was arbitrarily and systematically excluded from the right to a prel iminary hearing. 
First we note that the United States Supreme Court has held that a state's refusal to afford a criminal defendant a preliminary 
hearing does not violate the fourteenth amendment through the fifth amendment. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586. 33 S.Ct. 
783. 57 L.Ed.2d 1340 (1913). In a slightly different context (whether a person arrested and held for trial is entitled to a 
judicial determination of probable cause for detention), the Supreme Court also has held the fourth amendment did not apply. 
Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103.95 S.Ct. 854.43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). As the Court stated in Gerstein: 
"The use of an informal procedure is justified not only by the lesser consequences ofa probable cause determination but 
also by the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a 
reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in 
deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a 
Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969). This is not to say that the confrontation and cross-examination might not enhance the 
reliability of probable cause determinations in some cases. In most cases, however, their value would be too slight to 
justifY holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable cause." 1d at 121-122.95 S.Ct. at 867 (footnotes 
omitted). 
Even an informal procedure in which an accused is not given the right to contest the state's evidence, or even put on his own 
evidence is not per se constitutionally infirm. See Lem Woon, supra; Beck v. Washington. 369 U.S. 541. 82 S.Ct. 955. 8 
L. Ed.2d 98 (1962). The primary purpose of a grand jury proceeding is to also determine probable cause. State v. Beck. 56 
Wash.2d 474,349 P.2d 387 (960), affd Beck v. Washington, supra. 
We are fully cognizant that Edmonson urges us to require prosecutors to adopt policies guaranteeing equal protection for all 
similarly situated criminal defendants. In essence, cloaked under an equal protection challenge, we are asked to place a limit 
on prosecutorial discretion. This, the Oregon Supreme Court has done, but in this context we cannot do. 
The grand jury is an accusing body and not a trial court. Its functions are investigative and charging. The purpose of both a 
grand jury proceeding and a preliminary hearing is to determine probable cause. Any advantage that a preliminary hearing 
affords a defendant is purely incidental to that purpose. The independent grand jury's function would be duplicated by 
requiring a subsequent preliminary hearing. 
Professors lafave and Israel have discussed prosecutorial discretion and noted many valid reasons why a prosecutor may 
choose to proceed by either alternative: 
"As a general rule, prosecutors in information jurisdictions make infrequent use **464 *235 of their authority to avoid 
preliminary examinations by utilizing the indictment alternative. The tradition in most information jurisdictions is to 
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prosecute by information in all but a very small group of cases that require the grand jury's investigative authority. 
Prosecutors in several information states do make more frequent use of the grand jury, but even in those jurisdictions most 
prosecutors use the information in over 90% of their felony cases. In most information states, when a prosecutor uses the 
indictment process his basic objective is not to avoid the preliminary hearing, but to utilize some other feature of the 
indictment process. The mooting of the preliminary hearing is simply an incidental byproduct of an unrelated objective that 
required pre-arrest indictment. 
"But prosecutors in other information jurisdictions have been known to use the indictment alternative in certain cases 
mainly because they want to avoid the preliminary hearing. Grounds typically advanced for avoiding the hearing in those 
cases, notwithstanding the prosecutor's usual preference for prosecution by information, include: (1) the desire to save 
time where the preliminary hearing would be protracted due to the number of exhibits or witnesses or the number of 
separate hearings that would have to be held for separate defendants (the grand jury could save time in such situations due 
to the absence of cross-examination, less stringent application of evidentiary rules, and its capacity to consider a series of 
related cases in a single presentation); (2) the desire to preclude the defense discovery inherent in a preliminary hearing, 
particularly where a key witness is an informer whose identity should be shielded until trial; and (3) the desire to limit the 
number of times that a particular complainant (e.g .. a victim of a sex offense) will be required to give testimony in public." 
2 laFave and Israel, Criminal Procedures § 14.2 (1984). 
There are a number of other factors which may influence the prosecutor's choice of indictment or information. Uncertainty of 
the law, credibility of witnesses, the winds of public opinion, the nature of the offense, publicity surrounding the crime and 
the resources of investigation are just some of these factors. We accept the above reasoning as persuasive and hold that a 
prosecutor may proceed by either alternative-indictment or information. 
Uil However, this holding is not as broad as it seems. Edmonson contends that, as to him, the law was applied unequally. For 
Edmonson to prevail on this point, he must show a deliberate and intentional plan of discrimination against him, based on 
some unjustifiable or arbitrary classification. Stale v. Bowman. 104 Idaho 39, 655 P.2d 933 (1982). Selective discrimination 
is difficult to prove. 
"Selective enforcement, without more, does not comprise a constitutional violation under either the Idaho or United States 
Constitutions. [Citations omitted.] The United States Supreme Court and Idaho Supreme Court are in perfect accord in their 
requirement that, in order to establish an instance of discriminatory application of the law such that equal protection 
standards have been violated, there must first be shown a deliberate plan of discrimination based on some unjustifiable 
classification such as race, sex, religion, etc." Henson v. Department orLaw Enforcement. 107 Idaho 19, 23, 684 P.2d 
996,1000 (1984). 
Edmonson has not shown, nor even contended discriminatory intent by the prosecutor in respect to the charging selection. 
The prosecutor did choose to allow similarly situated defendants a preliminary hearing, but without more evidence of a 
deliberate and intentional plan to discriminate, we cannot conclude that the equal protection clause was violated. 
In a similar context, a prosecutor has some discretion in deciding when to charge an accused. As laFave and Israel points 
out. "[tlhe notion that the prosecuting attorney is vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and 
when not to is firmly entrenched in American law." 2 laFave and Israel, Criminal Procedures § 13.2 (1984). The 
prosecutor's exercise of discretion as to **465 *236 whom and when to prosecute does not constitute unlawful 
discrimination. State v. Bowman. supra; State v. Horn. 101 Idaho 192, 610 P.2d 551 (1980). There is a distinction between 
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the permissible "conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement" and an impermissible selec.tion "deliberately based 
upon an Wljustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification." Oyler v. Boles. 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 
S. Ct. 50 I, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962). We do not see any constitutional distinction between deciding whom to charge and 
how to charge. The immense nwnber and variety of factual situations involved preclude a constitutional requirement forcing 
the prosecutor to adopt policies that predetermine the use of an indictment or an information. 
II 
Presentment of Hearsay Evidence to the Grand Jury 
Edmonson, relying on I.e. § 19-1105 and I.C.R. 6(f), argues that the indictment should be dismissed because hearsay 
evidence was presented to the grand jury. I.C. § 19-1105 provides in part: 
"The grand jury can receive none but legal evidence, and the best evidence in degree, to the exclusion of hearsay or 
secondary evidence, ... " 
Similarly, I.C.R.6(f) places like restrictions upon the nature and quality of evidence the grand jury can receive. The trial 
court found that hearsay evidence had been presented to the grand jury but that "exclusive of the hearsay there was adequate 
evidence to support the grand jury's determination that there was probable cause to believe an offense had been committed 
and the accused committed it." Edmonson does not challenge this finding. Thus, the issue that we face today is whether the 
grand jury's receipt of hearsay evidence demands a dismissal of an indictment even where the probable cause finding is 
based on otherwise legally sufficient evidence. FN I 
FNI. We note that the United States Constitution, through the fifth amendment, does not require a dismissal of an 
indictment based exclusively on hearsay evidence. Costello v. United States. 350 u.s. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 
L.Ed. 397 (1956). The Court in Costello was concerned about judicial expediency: 
"If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent 
evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that 
before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the 
competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury." /d .. 350 U.S. at 363. 76 S.Ct. at 408. 
In Idaho, anytime hearsay evidence is used before a grand jury, the mini-trial concern of Costello becomes a 
reality. Despite the rule we announce today, prosecutors should endeavor to preclude any hearsay evidence from 
grand jury proceedings. 
Several states have rules similar to Idaho, thereby excluding hearsay evidence before a grand jury. See for example, 
Gjacomazzi v. State. 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1981); State y. Mivazaki. 64 Hawaii 611. 645 P.2d 1340 (1982); State v. 
Terrell. 283 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 1979); People v. Backus. 23 Cal.3d 360. 152 Cal. Rptr. 710. 590 P.2d 837 (J 979); and 
Franklin v. State. 89 Nev. 382. 513 P.2d 1252(973). However, the presentation of hearsay evidence is not necessarily a 
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f"atal error. The indictment will be sustained if, after excluding the inadmissible evidence, there remains sufficient admissible 
evidence to indict. Giacomazzi, supra; Miyazaki, supra; Terrell, supra; Franklin, supra. See also, People y. Meegan. 60 
AD.2d 961. 401 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1978), People v. Skelton. 109 Cal.App.3d 691. 167 Cal. Rptr. 636 CI980), cert. denied, 
Curtin v. U.S .. 450 U.S. 917.101 S.Ct. 1361. 67 L.Ed.2d 343 (1981); and State v. Waste Management of Wisconsin. Inc .. 
81 Wis.2d 555, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 865.99 S.Ct. 189,58 L.Ed.2d 175 (1978). 
L2.l The rationale used by these courts is readily apparent. The purpose of a grand jury proceeding is to determine whether 
sufficient probable cause exists to bind the defendant over for trial. The determination of guilt or innocence is saved for a 
later day. As long as the grand jury has received legally sufficient evidence which in and of itself supports a finding of**466 
*237 probable cause it is not for an appellate court to set aside the indictment. Therefore, we reject Edmonson's argument 
and hold that where legally sufficient evidence will sustain an indictment, improperly admitted hearsay evidence will not 
overturn the indictment. 
III 
Outrageous Conduct of the Prosecutor 
Edmonson argues that the prosecutor's conduct before the grand jury was so "outrageous" that dismissal of the indictment is 
required. Apparently, Edmonson takes exception to the prosecutor's comments regarding the credibil ity of witnesses and the 
weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Further, he alleges that the prosecutor argued the case fervently before the grand jury. 
[10][11] The trial court acknowledged that the prosecutor commented on the sufficiency of the evidence and on the 
credibility of the witnesses, but "the prosecutor's conduct did not infringe on the grand jury's decision-making function." 
Thus, we must decide whether the prosecutor's misconduct crossed the line from acceptable to unacceptable. Generally, 
prosecutorial misconduct will require dismissal only when it reaches the level of a constitutional due process violation. 
Mqldonado v. State. 93 N.M. 670. 604 P.2d 363 (1979); State y. Hall. 235 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1975), appeal after remand, 
249 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 66. 54 L.Ed.2d 79 CI 977), In order to be entitled to 
dismissal of an indictment on due process grounds, the defendant must affirmatively show prejudice caused by the 
misconduct. State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 606 P.2d 981 (]980); Hall, supra. We note that dismissal is a drastic remedy 
and should be exercised only in extreme and outrageous situations, and therefore, the defendant has a heavy burden. 
In the sense of a grand jury proceeding, "prejudicial effect" means the defendant would not have been indicted but for the 
misconduct. Hall, supra; People v. Jackson, 64 IIl.App.3d 307, 21 I1I.Dec. 238, 381 N.E.2d 316 (J 978). To determine 
whether misconduct gives rise to a dismissal, a reviewing court will have to balance the gravity and the seriousness of this 
misconduct with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the probable cause finding. At one extreme, the misconduct can be 
so outrageous that regardless of the extent of probable cause evidence, dismissal will be required. At the other extreme, the 
misconduct may be so slight, that it becomes unnecessary to question the independent judgment of the grand jury. In the 
middle of these extremes, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the indictment should 
be dismissed. As stated above, the burden rests with the criminal defendant to make an initial showing that the misconduct 
rises to the level of prejudice. Absent the showing of prejudice, a reviewing court will not second guess the grand jury. 
However, once the defendant does affirmatively prove prejudice, the court must dismiss. 
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Ll2l A review of the alleged misconduct leads us to conclude that the prosecutor's actions and comments, though 
inappropriate is so insignificant that we do not need to inquire into the strength of the probable cause evidence. Edmonson 
argues that the prosecutor's statements regarding the evidence are misconduct. Some of these statements are: 
"So, you're going to treat or you're going to view a person who is in a position ofresponsibility, a supervisor, a director, a 
department head, significantly different (than an hourly employee)." 
"What he's doing, he is stealing the money himself ... Once again, this is a situation where he stole from a corporation in 
the State ofldaho and caused an effect in the State ofldaho." 
"Not a lot of events happened prior to mid-January of 1983, and a lot of these events, while in and of themselves are not 
illegal, they are, when taken as a whole, significant Particularly in light of your instructions on conspiracy. Okay? No we 
have to start with the point of departure that there was a desire on the part of Mr. Blackmon and a **467 *238 desire on 
the part of Mr. Edmonson as early as July of 1982, to seat a progressive board of directors. You have to start with that 
article of faith in order for this to work, I think." 
"So, Mr. Edmonson is at least down in Oklahoma City with some money in his pocket buying some money orders and then 
either sending or bringing those money orders back to Moscow for submission for memberships." 
"You have Mr. Scott's transcript Judge for yourself his credibility and his veracity as far as that event is concerned." 
"Ifin fact Eric was putting the touch on all of the department heads to generate money to satisfY what I'm going to call his 
scheme. then why didn't he bring in Mister Milk toast." 
"He conspired with Eric to commit racketeering and that's exactly what they did with that club. They went around the 
country committing crimes in a variety of states, spreading their activity throughout each voting region with the exception 
of territory two and they took control of that club. And they did it ... they did it by using the fimds of the club itself." 
We do not disagree with Edmonson that some of these statements are impermissible. The American Bar Association 
standards provide that the prosecutor, in his appearances before the grand jury, "should not make statements or efforts to 
influence grand jury action in a manner which would be impermissible at trial before a petit jury." 1 A.B.A. Standards for 
Criminal Justice, § 3-3.5 (Second Ed. 1980). However, simply because some of these comments are impermissible, does not 
automatically require dismissal. Keeping in mind the standard of prejudicial effect, we note that impermissible statements 
can only rise to this level when they are designed to appeal to juror prejudice or prod a reluctant jury into voting for 
indictment. See State v. Boiorquez, 111 Ariz. 549, 535 P.2d 6 (1975); Stale v. Good, 10 Ariz. 556, 460 P.2d 662 (1969). 
Grand jurors realize that the case is being presented precisely because the prosecutor believes the grand jury should indict. 
They realize that the prosecutor will make statements on the evidence. 
The comments alleged to be prejudicial were directed to the grand jury over a period of several days. In our perception, the 
prosecutor, by the use of these statements, was attempting to explain the law to the jurors. The prosecutor is expected to act 
as the grand jury's legal advisor, and as such, may appropriately explain the law and express an opinion on the legal 
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significance of the evidence but should give due deference to [the grand jury's] status as an independent legal body." People 
v. Meyers. 617 P.2d 808. 812 (Colo. 1980). quoting ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function § 3-3.5(a) (1979). 
While we deem the prosecutor's intent laudable, he overstepped the bounds of permissible conduct. However, we cannot 
conclude that these statements acted to prejudice the grand jury in any way or infringed upon their independent thought 
process. 
Further, without even considering the evidence used to find probable cause, we note that the prosecutor directed the grand 
jury that it should not indict unless all the elements of an alleged crime are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a much 
higher standard than is required by Idaho law. On balance, we conclude that no prejudicial conduct occurred. 
IV 
Unauthorized Persons 
I.e. § 19-1111 and I.C.R.6(d) provide that no person other than the grand jurors may be present during deliberations and 
voting, while only the jurors, prosecutor, witnesses under examination, and an interpreter, if necessary, may be present 
during any other portion of the proceedings. These sections break down the grand jury proceedings into two parts, 
deliberative sessions-sessions where the grand jurors are expressing opinions or voting-and nondeliberative sessions-
sessions where the evidence is being presented. 
Edmonson seeks dismissal of the indictments because admittedly, during some nondeliberative sessions two individuals not 
**468 *239 authorized by the statute and rule were present-a deputy clerk of the district court and an attorney with the Idaho 
Department of Law Enforcement. Edmonson argues that I.C. § 19-1111 and I.C.R.6( d) were violated, and therefore, the 
indictment must be dismissed. 
LW The purpose of I.C. § 19-1111 and I.C.R.6(d) is quite clear. It is designed to guard the secrecy of the grand jury 
proceedings and assure that the jurors are free from undue influence and intimidation thereby allowing them to make an 
independent determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the presence of any unauthorized person which impedes these 
important ftmctions will require dismissal. However, if an unauthorized person is present, but the grand jury proceedings are 
free from undue influence, an indictment must be sustained. 
Recently the United States Supreme Court case addressed a violation ofF.R.C.P.6(d) (the federal counterpart to I.C.R.6(d» 
and held that any violation of the rule which is harmless will not require dismissal of the indictment. In United States v. 
Mechanik. 475 U.S. 66. 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986), two government witnesses were simultaneously present and 
testified before the grand jury. This error was not discovered until the actual trial proceedings at which the defendants were 
convicted. After conviction, the defendants argued that the indictment should be set aside because of the error in the original 
grand jury proceeding. The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that any error from the violation of Rule 6(d) 
was corrected in the subsequent jury conviction. The Court held that the jury's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
demonstrated that there was probable cause to charge the defendants with the offenses for which they were convicted. The 
Court stated: 
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"We hold only that however diligent the defendants may have been in seeking to discover the basis for the claim violation 
of rule 6(d), the petit jury's verdict rendered harmless any conceivable error in the charging decision that might have 
flowed from the violation. In such a case, the societal costs at retrial after a jury verdict of guilty are far too substantial to 
justifY setting aside the verdict simply because of an error in the earlier grand jury proceedings." Id, 475 U.S. at ----, 106 
S.Ct. at 943. 
LH1 Thus, under the federal rule, the presence of an unauthorized person will not render an indictment invalid, if there is 
sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding by the grand jury acting independently and free from undue influence. 
In Idaho, the rule is similar. The presence of unauthorized personnel does not constitute grounds for attacking the validity of 
an indictment, absent a showing of prejudice. State v. Barber. 13 Idaho 65,88 P. 418 (1907); Gasper v. District Court. 74 
Idaho 388, 264 P.2d 679 (1953). We must inquire whether these two individuals were unauthorized, and ifso, whether their 
presence amounted to prejudice Edmonson. 
[ I Sl[ 16] Edmonson contends that the presence in and of itself of both the deputy clerk and the attorney constitutes grounds for 
dismissing the indictments. He argues that their presence removes from the grand jury the ability to operate in the neutral and 
detached atmosphere that is required; the subtle influence of the presence of court and state personnel would necessarily 
affect the ability of the grand jury to calmly and dispassionately consider the case. Here, the deputy clerk was needed to 
operate the electronic recording equipment, to mark and keep track of exhibits and to perform other administrative and 
clerical functions. Edmonson has not alleged with any specificity how the court clerk prejudiced the independence and 
secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. Nor, can we foresee any situation in which the presence of a person marking exhibits 
would be grounds for overturning a probable cause finding made by the grand jury. Thus, we conclude that the deputy clerk's 
mere presence will not necessitate dismissal. fb!l 
FN2. As here, most grand jury proceedings need to be recorded to preserve a record for a reviewing court to pass 
upon any alleged defects in the proceedings (for example hearsay evidence). A deputy court clerk or court reporter 
operating recording equipment is essential to satisfY this function. Obviously, in such cases, a deputy court clerk or 
a court reporter must be considered an authorized person. 
**4691!1J *240 The attorney with the Department of Law Enforcement was present to assist the Latah County prosecutor in 
the proceedings before the grand jury. The state, contends, relying on State v. Tay/or. 59 Idaho 724. 87 P.2d 454 (1939) that 
his presence was justified. In Tay/or, the indicted defendant challenged the presence of a deputy attorney general during the 
course of grand jury proceedings. The Court first examined several statutes which authorized the attorney general to exercise 
supervisory powers over prosecuting attorneys. Relying on these statutes, the Court held that the attorney general's presence 
before a grand jury would not invalidate an indictment. Ide supra at 731-32. 87 P.2d 454. The attorney general is an 
extension of the prosecutor, and in effect, an authorized person within the meaning of I.C. § 19-1111 and I.C.R. 6( d). 
Therefore, the presence of the state attorney general will not require a dismissal of the indictment. 
v 
Constitutionality of I.C. § 18-1905 
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Edmonson was indicted on the crime of falsification of corporate books in violation of I.C. § 18-1905. The punishment 
provision of this statute provides: 
"is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than three (3) nor more than ten (10) years, or by imprisonment 
in a county jail not exceeding one (1) year or a fine not exceeding $500, or by both such fine and imprisonment." 
I. C. § IS-III distinguishes a felony from a misdemeanor. 
"A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison .... Every other crime [except 
infractions] is a misdemeanor. When a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison is also punishable by a fine or 
imprisonment in a county jail, in the discretion of the court, it shall be deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes after a 
judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment in the state prison." 
Edmonson contends that I.C. § 18-1905 violates the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution for two reasons. 
First, the statute does not delineate between the type of conduct punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor. Second, the statute 
gives the prosecutor unfettered discretion to charge either a misdemeanor or a felony. In support of his contentions, he relies 
on two Oregon Supreme Court cases. In State v. Pirkey. 203 Or. 697, 2S1 P.2d 698 (1955), the court struck down as 
violative of the fourteenth amendment an Oregon statute which gave the grand jury or the magistrate unlimited discretion to 
charge either a felony or a misdemeanor for certain bad check violations. In State v. Cory. 204 Or. 235. 282 P.2d 1054 
Ll..2lli, the same court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute which granted to the district attorney unfettered discretion to 
determine whether or not to file an habitual offender charge against one who had theretofore been convicted of a felony not 
involving personal violence, whereas under another subsection of the same statute, he was required to file habitual offender 
information against a defendant previously convicted in cases of crimes involving violence. Edmonson's argwnent is 
misplaced. 
I.e. § 18-1905, unlike the statutes declared unconstitutional in Pirkey and Cory does not grant the prosecuting attorney or a 
grand jury unbriddled discretion to charge Edmonson either with a felony or with a misdemeanor. In both Pirkey and Cory, 
the applicable statute clearly endowed the grand jury, magistrate or the district attorney with such charging discretion. L.k..§ 
1 8-1905 is silent on the issue of whether this provision is a charging decision or a sentencing decision. However, 1k....§ 
18-1905 must be read in conjunction with I.C. § IS-I 07 which empowers a court to determine punishment: 
**470 *241 "Whenever, in this code, the punishment for a crime is left undetermined between certain limits, the 
punishment to be inflicted in a particular case, must be determined by the court authorized to pass sentence within such 
I imits as may be prescribed by this code." 
The legislature in enacting I.C. § 18-1905 gave the sentencing court a sentencing range. A sentencing court has discretion to 
impose any sentence within the statutory maximwn and minimwn so long as it is reasonable. State v. Snapp. 110 Idaho 269. 
715 P.2d 939 (1986); State v. Nice. 103 Idaho 89. 645 P.2d 323 (1982). 
U1U Edmonson's attack on I.C. § 18-1905 is without merit because it allows for sentenCing discretion and not charging 
discretion. We do not imply that should the facts indicate a statute allows for a charging discretion, we would follow the 
reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court. FN3 That question, should it arise, is better left for a later day. 
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FN3. Pirkey, supra, and Cory, supra, were both overruled in City of Klamath Fa/Is v. Winters. 289 Or. 757. 619 
P.2d 217 (1980), 
VI 
Conclusion 
We have considered all of Edmonson's challenges, both constitutional and statutory, to the grand jury indictment. While 
errors occWTed in the proceedings, none rise to a level which would require dismissal. Therefore, we affirm the district 
court and remand back for trial. 
Costs to respondent. 
No attorney fees on appeal. 
SHEPARD, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur. HUNTLEY, Justice, concWTing specially and dissenting in part. 
I concur in the result reached by the majority and dissent only from the equal protection analysis of Part 1 of the majority 
opinion. 
With respect to the equal protection issue, I agree with the California Supreme Court in its incisive analysis in Hawkins v. 
Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 584, 150 Cal.Rptr. 435. 586 P.2d 916. which opinion is reproduced in full in the dissent herein of 
Justice Bistline. 
I further believe the trial judge, Judge Bengtson, was correct when he wrote: 
Had the defendant in the case at bar sought, following the return of the indictment and before or at the time of the entry of 
his plea, an order granting him a postindictment preliminary hearing (as the defendants did in both Hawkins and Freeland) 
and had the State been unable to demonstrate a coherent, systematic policy relating to the selection of the indictment 
process for the prosecution of the above entitled cases and refused to conduct a preliminary hearing upon defendant's 
motion or application, it is likely that the indictments in these cases would have been dismissed by this Court. 
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting. 
The majority opinion correctly reprints art. I. § 8 of our Idaho Constitution. It reads now as it did when ratified in 1889. A 
fortiori, it reads now as it did in 1947, 1948, about which time Justice Donaldson and myself were studying criminal 
procedure at the College of Law in Moscow. The majority is also to be commended for correctly assess ing the prosecutor's 
conduct as impermissible. There is little else in the majority opinion which will be of much benefit in the future and, to the 
contrary, will be detrimental. 
Chapter 8, Title 19 of the Idaho Code, captioned "Examination of Case and Discharge or Commitment of Accused," provides 
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now, as has been so since 1864, for a probable cause hearing. Under I.C. § 19-814, the magistrate must dismiss where he 
finds no public offense committed, or not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of a public offense. 
On the other hand, I.C. § 19-815 provides: 
**471 *242 19-815. Holding defendant to answer.-If, after hearing the evidence adduced at the preliminary 
examination, the magistrate finds that a public offense has been committed, and that there is probable or sufficient cause to 
believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate shall enter an order holding the defendant to answer to said public 
offense, which order shall be substantially as follows: "It appearing to me that the offense set forth in the complaint (or any 
offense, according to the evidence presented at the preliminary examination, stating generally the nature thereof), has been 
committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within named A.B. guilty thereof, I order that he be held to 
answer the same." 
The 1864 Territorial Criminal Practice Act, § 160, read almost identically: 
Sec. 160. If, however, it appears from the examination that a public offence has been committed, and that there is 
sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate shall, in like manner, endorse on the depositions and 
statement an order signed by him to the following effect: "It appearing to me, by the within depositions and statement (if 
any), that the offence therein mentioned, (or any other offence according to the fact, stating generally the nature thereof), 
has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within named A.B. guilty thereof, 1 order that he be 
held to answer the same." 
In law school, what we were not told was that in territorial days, all prosecutions after commitment were by grand jury 
indictment. There was no alternative provision for prosecution upon a prosecutor's information. Sections 173 through 216 
provided the procedure for impaneling a grand jury, and for a committed defendant to mount any challenge, either to the 
grand jury as a whole, or to any individual juror. The defendants, in jail or out on bail, were aware that a grand jury would 
convene, and would consider the case of each. In fact, the fimction of the grand jury was primarily to consider indictments of 
accused defendants who were either in jail or out on bail. Only if the grand jury returned an indictment would those 
defendants be put on trial. Sections 20 I and 209 required that the grand jury inquire into all public offenses committed or 
triable within the jurisdiction of the court, and that a grandjuror, knowing or having reason to believe that an offense has 
been committed within the court'sjurisdiction, must so inform his fellow jurors, and the grandjuror will investigate. 
What comes out of this documented history is that the grand jury is accusatory only as to charges which have been already 
heard by a magistrate, and a commitment made, and investigatory as to other public offenses brought to its attention, but 
which have not been heard by a magistrate: "An indictment is an accusation in writing, presented by the grand jury to a 
competent court, charging a person with a public offense. Criminal Practice Act, § 202 (1864). Today, 127 years later, I.e. § 
9-1102 is exactly the same as § 202 enacted in 1864. It is upon that accusation of a grand jury, i.e., that a defendant is put on 
trial. 
Similarly, as to the grand jury's investigatory fimction under §§ 201 and 209 of the 1864 Act, a presentment may flow from 
the investigation. A presentment is as defined in the 1864 Act, § 203, and to this day in, I.C. § 19-1105: 
19-1105. Presentment defined.-A presentment is a formal statement in writing, by the grand jury, representing to the 
court that a public offense has been committed which is triable in the county, and that there is reasonable ground for 
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believing that a particular individual named or described therein has committed it. 
A presentment did not and does not result in putting the accused to a trial. Rather, 
If the court deem that the facts stated in the presentment constitute a public offence, triable within the county, it shall direct 
the clerk to issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant. 
CrimPrac.Act, § 220 (1864). 
**472 *243 If the facts stated in the presentment constitute a public offense, triable in the county, the court must direct the 
clerk to issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant. 
I.C. § 19-1203. 
Whereupon, as in 1864, and to this very day 127 years later, the defendant is arrested and taken before a magistrate: 
The magistrate, when the defendant is brought before him, shall proceed to examine the charge contained in the 
presentment, and hold the defendant to answer the same, or discharge him therefrom, in the same manner in all respects, as 
upon a warrant of arrest on complaint. 
Crim.Prac.Act, § 224 (1864). 
The magistrate, when the defendant is brought before him, must proceed upon the charges contained in the presentment, in 
the same manner as upon a warrant of arrest on an information. 
I.C. § 19-1207. 
It is thus seen that the magistrate will, following a presentment and a district court arrest warrant based thereon, decide 
whether there is probable cause to hold a "presentmented" defendant for jury trial on felony charges. It is thus seen on close 
perusal that in territorial days, and after, that, unlike the federal system, there is no procedure for secret grand jury 
proceedings which can result in an indictment. A presentment, yes, but an indictment, no. 
On beginning this historical review, it was expected that this would be so. How else is there any reasonable explanation for 
the statutory provisions-127 years continuously-providing the defendant with the right to make challenge to the grand jury 
panel, and to individual jurors? 
Nothing has been changed over the years as to the procedure tmder which a person may be charged and brought to trial by use 
of an indictment. 
To prosecution under indictment the Constitutional Convention, after considerable debate, added that a committed defendant 
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could also be charged and tried in district court by a prosecutor's information. The discussion at the Convention is 
enlightening. It was largely between members who were lawyers and, accordingly, knowledgeable in the working of grand 
jury proceedings in the days since the territory was created. 
Although art. I. § 8 of the Idaho Constitution is not identical to art. 1. § 8 of the 1879 California Constitution, it is virtually 
the same. Both provisions allow for prosecution of offenses by information of the public prosecutor, or by indictment. Mr. 
Standrod of Oneida County in speaking for the use of an information, as an alternative to an indictment, after first expounding 
on the paucity of crime and the cost to the cmmties of grand jW'ies, FNI specifically referred**473 *244 the Convention to 
what he called the California success: "and in California, that great state, where the sW'vival of the fittest is a maxim that has 
been put into practical use, instead of theory, they have adopted this plan and the prosecutions of this state have been 
successful and they are conducted under a section of this kind." Constitutional Convention, p. 263 (1889). Mr. Claggett also 
spoke favorably of the California constitutional provision. 
FNI. MR. STANDROD. As a member of the committee on the Bill of Rights, I desire to say that this matter was 
discussed among that committee and it was submitted to a great many members of this convention coming from 
different parts of the country. We thought it was better that this clause in this section should be placed there. In 
many of the counties of this territory, there is but little crime committed. In the county from which I come, there are 
perhaps one or two criminal actions dW'ing the year, and I believe for the last two years there has only been one 
criminal prosecution in the county upon the indictment of the grand jury. There is sometimes a case that a slight 
felony has been committed in the county-not a heinous offense-not an offense of any great moment, yet it requires, in 
order to prosecute the criminal that he should be presented by indictment, and in order to do that, it will require, 
before that matter can be brought before a court and tried, an expenditW'e, in order to obtain the grand jury to indict 
him, of at least five or six hundred and from that to a thousand dollars. All this talk about this section being 
unconstitutional is bosh, and gentlemen here say that this committee dared to come here and confront this convention 
with a section of this kind directly in contravention of the constitution of the United States, and are attempting to 
bring before this convention an innovation that was never heard of before. I say this is not true . 
... Furthermore, this clause does not abolish the grand jury system If the district attorney of the county or the 
district should get to play too high a hand, ifhe should undertake to prosecute men where there was no evidence 
against them, and for the mere purpose of prosecuting them, most assW'edly the judge of that district lUlder this 
section has control of all that matter. He can at any time he thinks the district attorney is not performing his duty, 
call a grand jury under this section, and it is very likely the grand jury would be called once a year, or once in 
two years, as it became necessary. But I believe this will save the money of the cOlUlties of this territory, 
hundreds and hundreds of dollars a year in the prosecution of such crimes as horse stealing and cattle stealing 
and things of that natW'e that require to be presented by indictment. I believe there is no innovation in it that will 
be disastrous to the laws of this territory or to the enforcement of the, or whereby any party will be injured. And, 
coming from the section of country I do, and having seen this matter tested, I believe that it will save to my COlUlty 
alone hlUldreds of dollars a year. I trust this convention will adopt the section as it has been reported by this 
committee. 
Constitutional Convention, pp. 262-65 (1889). 
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While I do note that the majority opinion correctly observes that the fimctions of a grand jury are investigatory and accusatory 
(charging), such seems to be about as deep as the majority has explored the problem. Nowhere in the majority is the state of 
California and its development in jurisprudence given any mention. This is exceedingly strange where it is beyond cavil that 
all of us who hold this office are and have been well aware that most of our criminal law and criminal procedure statutes 
were taken directly from California. Our territorial statutes did not materialize out of thin air. 
We have in this Supreme Court building a copy of the laws of the State of California, passed at the second session of the 
legislature in January of 185 I, which session was held at the Pueblo de San Jose. Pertinent to our inquiry here, California at 
that time, prior to the 1879 Constitutional Convention, provided only that publ ic offenses be prosecuted by indictment. § 177, 
p. 232. FOrnlation of the grand jury, and powers of the grand jury, appear to be exactly those which the Idaho Territorial 
Legislature enacted in 1864 in the Criminal Practice Act. The interested, and perhaps the doubting, reader will find attached 
hereto ilie 1851 California statutes, and the 1864 Idaho statutes. (Attachments I and 2.) 
The rule of law in this jurisdiction which applies to such circumstances was recently stated by Justice Bakes in Odenwalt v. 
Zarin~ 102 Idaho I. 624 P.2d 383 (l98 I): 
This court has consistently held that "[a] statute which is adopted from another jurisdiction will be presumed to be adopted 
with the prior construction placed upon it by the courts of such other jurisdiction." Nixon v. Triber. 100 Idaho 198. 200. 
595 P.2d 1093. 1095 (979). State v. Miles. 97 Idaho 396, 545 P.2d 484 (1976); Do~ett v. Electronics Corp. of 
America. 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969). 
It is submitted iliat with Idaho's adoption, and 127 years' retention, of California statutes, and the Idaho Constitutional 
Convention accepting an art. 1. § 8 provision patterned after California's earlier ratified art. 1. § 8, there should be some 
interest on the part of this Court's membership when the same issue arose in California. In truth, I fear that there may be some 
who worry that a result-oriented majority would be naturally curious to know what California's court may have done, and on 
finding the answer, has purposefully forgotten that a great deal of our Idaho law, inclusive of more than the criminal code, 
came to us from California. 
Much as the majority opinion in our case notes that "the rights afforded the accused in these [grand jury or a preliminary 
hearing) proceedings are different," the California Supreme Court opened its discussion with a similar statement: 
It is undeniable that there is a considerable disparity in the procedural rights afforded defendants charged by the 
prosecutor by means of an information and defendants charged by the grand jury in an indictment. 
**474 *245 Hawkins v. Superior Court, Etc .. 22 Cal.3d 584, 150 Cal.Rptr. 435. 436. 586 P.2d 916, 917 (1978) 
(footnote omitted). 
Having said iliat, the California court proceeds to rationally and soundly justiJY its conclusion that an accused is denied equal 
protection of the law when prosecuted by indictment and deprived ofa preliminary hearing and the concomitant rights which 
attach when prosecution is by infornlation: 
"The defendant accused by information 'immediately becomes entitled to an impressive array of procedural rights, including 
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a preliminary hearing before a neutral and legally knowledgeable magistrate, representation by retained or appointed 
counsel, the confrontation and cross-examination of hostile witnesses, and the opportunity to personally appear and 
affirmatively present exculpatory evidence. (Pen Code, § 858 et seq.; Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867, 59 
Cal. Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304 .... )' ( Johnson v. Superior Court (J 975) 15 Cal.3d 248, 256, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 37, 539 P.2d 
792, 799 (conc. opn. by Mosk, J.).) 
"12) In vivid contrast, the indictment procedure omits all the above safeguards: the defendant has no right to appear or be 
represented by cmD1sel, and consequently may not confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, object to evidence 
introduced by the prosecutor, make legal arguments, or present evidence to explain or contradict the charge. Penal Code 
section 939.7 captures the spirit of the proceeding by declaring as a matter of law, 'The grand jury is not required to hear 
evidence for the defendant....' If he is called to testify, the defendant has no right to the presence of counsel, even though, 
because of the absolute secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings, he may be completely unaware of the subject of inquiry 
or his position as a target witness? This remarkable lack of even the most basic rights is compounded by the absence from 
the grand jury room of a neutral and detached magistrate, trained in the law, to rule on the admissibility of evidence and 
insure that the grand jury exercises its indicting function with proper regard for the independence and objectivity so 
necessary if it is to fulfill its purported role of protecting innocent citizens from unfounded accusations, even as it proceeds 
against those who it has probable cause to believe have committed offenses. 
"The Attorney General recognizes, as he must, that vastly different procedures attend these alternative modes of prosecution, 
but maintains that such differences are "more apparent than real." This startling claim is premised on the availability to the 
accused of judicial review of the grand jury's probable cause determination. (Pen. Code, §§ 995, 999a.) The defendant in 
either case, it is urged, is entitled to ajudicial determination that the evidence is sufficient to require trial.3 
"The foregoing argument depends on two erroneous assumptions. It assumes first that the only benefit derived by a defendant 
from an adversarial preliminary hearing lies in obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause. Yet whatever may be 
the Legislature's intent in establishing such a hearing, it serves a number of pragmatic functions for the accused. The United 
States Supreme Court catalogued some of them in Coleman v. Alabama (J 970) 399 U.S. 1, 9-10, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 2003, 26 
L,Ed.2d 387, holding the Alabama preliminary hearing at issue therein to be 'a "critical stage" of the State's criminal 
process' at which the defendant had a right to 'the guiding hand of counsel.' 4 The court observed that a 'skilled interrogation 
of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's 
witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused ofa witness who does not appear at the trial.' It went 
on to recognize the important discovery function served by an adversarial preliminary hearing; such a hearing will assuredly 
provide the defense with valuable information about the case against the accused, enhancing its ability to evaluate the 
desirability of entering a plea or to prepare for trial. The court also noted a less obvious advantage to the defendant accorded 
a preliminary hearing: his counsel may immediately argue before a judge on such matters as the **475 *246 necessity for an 
early psychiatric examination or setting bail. 
"These benefits to the defense which inhere in an adversarial preliminary hearing are either completely denied to a defendant 
charged in a secret, nonadversarial grand jury proceeding, or ultimately realized by such a defendant only to a limited extent. 
It cannot be seriously argued that an indicted defendant enjoys a comparable opportunity to discover the state's case and 
develop evidence because he later obtains a transcript of grand jury proceedings. (Pen. Code, §§ 938.1, 995a.) Such a 
transcript will invariably reflect only what the prosecuting attorney permits it to reflect; it is certainly no substitute for the 
possibility of developing further evidence through a probing cross-examination of prosecution witnesses-a possibility 
foreclosed with the denial of an adversarial proceeding. There is no other effective means for the defense to compel the 
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cooperation ofa hostile witness (see People v. Municipal Court (Runyan) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 523. 143 Cal. Rptr. 609. 574 
P .2d 425); in the unlikely event that all the prosecution witnesses agree to submit to defense interviews, the defense still must 
incur unnecessary expense and hardship which may be substantial. 
"The Attorney General further assumes, in asserting that the differences between indictment and information procedures are 
"more apparent than real," that the likelihood of a probable cause finding is substantially the same whether the screening 
ftmction is performed by the grand jury with subsequent judicial review or by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing. This 
assumption reflects the idealistic concept that the grand jury is an independent body of citizens, standing as a buffer between 
the state and the individual and protecting the innocent from unfounded accusations of crime. Unfortunately, grand jury 
proceedings today are structured in a manner that renders fulfillment of the ideal unattainable. 
"The prosecuting attorney is typically in complete control of the total process in the grand jury room: he calls the witnesses, 
interprets the evidence, states and applies the law, and advises the grand jury on whether a crime has been committed. (See 
Judicial Council of CaL, Annual Rep. (1974) p. 58; Kranitz, The Grand Jury: Past-Present-No Future (1959) 24 
Mo.L.Rev. 318, 328; Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in l/linois, 1966 u.m.L.F. 423, 43 I.) The grand jury 
is independent only in the sense that it is not formally attached to the prosecutor's office; though legally free to vote as they 
please, grand jurors virtually always assent to the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney, a fact borne out by available 
statistical and survey data. (See Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (1931) 10 Ore.L.Rev. 10 I, 153-154, 304, 
325-326; Note, Some Aspects oOhe California Grand Jury System (1956) 8 Stan.L.Rey. 631. 653-654: Note, Evaluating 
the Grand Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa Case Study (1972) 57 Iowa L.Rev. 1354, 1369.) Indeed, 
the fiction of grand jury independence is perhaps best demonstrated by the following fact to which the parties herein have 
stipulated: between January I, 1974, and June 30, 1977, 235 cases were presented to the San Francisco grand jury and 
indictments were returned in all 235. 
"The pervasive prosecutorial influence reflected in such statistics has led an impressive array of commentators to endorse 
the sentiment expressed by United States District Judge William J. Campbell, a former prosecutor: 'Today, the grand jury is 
the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost 
anything, before any grand jury.' (Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury (1973) 64 J.Crim.L. & C. 174.) Another 
distinguished federal jurist, Judge Marvin E. Frankel, put it this way: 'The contemporary grand jury investigates only those 
whom the prosecutor asks to be investigated, and by and large indicts those whom the prosecutor wants to be indicted.' 
(Frankel & Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial (1977) p. 100.) (Also see Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: 
Benighted Supergovernment (1965) 51 A.B.AJ. 153, 154-155; Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indictment **476 Versus 
Prosecution by Information-An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue (1974) 25 Hastings LJ. 997; *247 Graham & 
Letwin,The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations (1971) 18 UCLA 
L.Rev. 635, 680-681; Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Information (1931) 29 Mich.L.Rev. 
403,414-415,430; Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis 
of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1968 (1969) 67 Mich.L.Rev. 1361, 1380; Meshbesher, Right to Counsel 
Bf~.{ore Grand Jury (1966) 41 F.R.D. 189. 189-190: Coates, The Grand Jury, The Prosecutor's Puppet, Wasteful Nonsense 
of Criminal Jurisprudence (1962) 33 Pa.B.A.Q. 311, 314-315; Comment, The Illinois Constitution, Article I, Section 
7-Seeking a Rational Determination of Probable Cause (1975) 24 De Paul L.Rev. 559, 561-565; Note, A Constitutional 
Right to Preliminary Hearings for All Pretrial Detainee's [sic} (1974) 48 SO.CaLL.Rev. 158, 170-173; Boudin, The 
Federal Grand Jury (1972) 61 Geo.LJ. 1,35; Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative 
Agency of the Prosecutor? (1972) 2 N.M.L.Rev. 141, 142; Foster, Grand Jury Practice in the 1970's (1971) 32 Ohio 
St.L.J. 701, 702; Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury (1972) 10 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 701, 703; 
Tigar & Levy, The Grand Jury as the New Inquisition (1971) 50 Mich.St.B.J. 693, 694; Comment, Federal Grand Jury 
Investigation of Political Dissidents (1972) 7 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 432, 438-443; Wise, Criminal Law and Procedure 
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(1974) 20 Wayne L.Rev. 365, 377-378; Gerstein & Robinson, Remedy for the Grand Jury: Retain but Reform (1978) 64 
A.B.A.J. 337, 340.) Justice Douglas put the matter succinctly when he wrote: "It is, indeed, common knowledge that the 
grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive." ( 
United States v. Dionisio (1973) 410 U.S. 1,23.93 S.Ct. 764. 777. 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (dis. opn.).) 
HThe domination of grand jury proceedings by the prosecuting attorney no doubt derives at least in part from the grand jury's 
institutional schizophrenia: it is expected to serve two distinct and largely inconsistent functions-accuser and impartial 
f'actfinder. (See Comment, The Preliminary Hearing Versus the Grand Jury Indictment: 'Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal 
Jurisprudence' Revisited (1974) 26 U.Fla.L.Rev. 825, 836-838, 842-843; Note, Criminal Law-Grand Juries, Exemplars 
and Prosecutors (1973) 22 De Paul L.Rev. 737, 749-750.) In one role, 'Basically the grand jury is a law enforcement 
agency' ( United States v. Cleary (2d Cir.1959) 265 F .2d 459. 461. and cases cited), participating in the prosecutorial task 
of discovering criminal conduct and the perpetrators thereof; putting on its other hat, the grand jury is expected to be a neutral 
body, protective of the individual against prosecutorial abuses. It seenns self-evident that to the extent it succeeds at one 
ftmction it must fail at the other. Almost all observers of the system conclude that this conflict of roles has prevented the 
grand jury from being objective, generally to the detriment of indicted defendants. 
"The problem of excessive prosecutorial influence is not solved by the availability of judicial review, for the same lack of 
objectivity, however inadvertent, which affects the grand jurors when they vote to indict infects the record for purposes of 
review. Excluded from the grand jury room, the defense has no opportunity to conduct the searching cross-examination 
necessary to reveal flaws in the testimony of prosecution witnesses or to expose dubious eyewitness identifications.S This 
lack of defense participation in the development of the reviewable record creates a heavy bias in favor of a finding that the 
grand jury indictment was based on probable cause. For example, in United States v. Bober~ (8th Cir.1977) 565 F.2d 1059, 
the federal appellate court emphasized that the prosecutor's interrogation of the defendant as a witness before the grand jury 
consisted 'almost entirely of leading questions,' and the ensuing indictment rested on the defendant's 'cryptic responses' to 
such questions.**477 *248 The court admonished that 'This kind of interrogation always creates a great risk that the witness 
will misWlderstand the questions or that the prosecutor will put words in the witness' mouth,' and warned all prosecutors that 
it would 'strictly scrutinize for fairness' any similar indictment obtained thereafter. (Jd at pp. 1062-1063.) 
"It is clear from the foregoing that a defendant charged by indictment is seriously disadvantaged in contrast to a defendant 
charged by information. (See also Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage? (1972) 10 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 807, 
814-815; Judicial Council of Cal., Annual Rep. (1974) pp. 47, 52-55.) Indeed, current indictment procedures create what 
can only be characterized as a prosecutor's Eden: he decides what evidence will be heard, how it is to be presented, and then 
advises the grand jury on its admissibility and legal significance. In sharp contrast are information procedures in which the 
defendant is entitled to an adversarial, judicial hearing that yields numerous protections, including a far more meaningful 
probable cause determination. Yet the prosecuting attorney is free in his completely unfettered discretion to choose which 
defendants will be charged by indictment rather than information and consequently which catalogue of rights, widely 
disparate though they may be, a defendant will receive. He may act out of what he believes to be proper law enforcement 
motives, or he may act whinnsicalIy; no case law or statutory guidelines exist to circumscribe his discretion. We examine 
below the constitutionality of permitting the prosecuting attorney to make such discriminatory classifications. 
II 
"131 Under the traditional two-tier test of equal protection, a discriminatory legislative classification that impairs 
fimdamental rights will be subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts, and the state will be required to bear the heavy burden of 
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proving not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the classification but also that the discrimination is necessary 
to promote that interest. (See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (J 976) 18 Cal.3d 728. 761. 135 Cal.Rptr. 345.557 P.2d 929. and cases 
cited.) 
"14) For the reasons stated in Part I, ante, the denial of a postindictment preliminary hearing deprives the defendant of' such 
fundamental rights as counsel, confrontation, the right to personally appear, the right to a hearing before a judicial officer, 
and the right to be free from l.Ulwarranted prosecution. These guarantees are expressly or impliedly grounded in both the state 
and federal Constitutions and must by any test be deemed "fimdamental." , ( Johnson v. Superior Court (J 975) supra. 15 
CaUd 248. 266. 124 Cal.Rptr. 32.44.539 P.2d 792.804 (conc. opn. by Mosk, J.).) 
"The Attorney General fails to discharge his burden of proof l.Ulder this test. His sole attempt to do so is to list in his brief a 
few tactical advantages gained by the prosecutor who chooses to use the indictment procedure.6 But none of these reasons 
amounts to a constitutionally compelling state interest that justifies depriving an indicted defendant of the above-discussed 
fimdarnental rights guaranteed to him in a preliminary hearing. Nor, indeed, does the Attorney General make any effort to 
show that this discrimination is constitutionally 'necessary' to preserve any such advantages. 
"15,61 We conclude that the denial ofa postindictment preliminary hearing deprived defendants herein of equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by article I, section 7. of the California Constitution.7 
1Il 
"171 The appropriate remedy for the constitutionally infirm treatment of indicted defendants is not to eliminate or alter 
radically the general indicting fimction of the grand jury; indeed, that fimction is explicitly sanctioned in the California 
Constitution (art. 1. §§ 14, 2ll and specifically implemented by the Legislature (Pen. Code, § 888 et seq.). Until such time as 
the Legislature may prescribe other appropriate procedures, the remedy most consistent **478 *249 with the state 
Constitution as a whole and least intrusive on the Legislature's prerogative is simply to permit the indictment process to 
continue precisely as it has, but to recognize the right of indicted defendants to demand a postindictment preliminary hearing 
prior to or at the time of entering a plea. If the defendant makes a timely request for such a preliminary hearing, at the 
direction of the court the prosecuting attorney shall refile the indictment as a complaint, thus activating the procedures set 
forth in the Penal Code (see Pen.Code, § 859 et seq.).8 
"[8] The state constitutional provision recognizing the grand jury's indicting fimction-article 1. section 14-is no bar to our 
holding herein. It provides, 'Felonies shall be prosecuted as provided by law, either by indictment or, after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, by information.' The term 'law,' of course, encompasses judicial decisions as well as 
legislative enactments. (Cf.Evid.Code, § 160.) Thus, while the Constitution authorizes the use of grand juries to indict 
criminal defendants, it leaves to the Legislature and the courts the task of developing procedures, consistent with other state 
constitutional provisions, for implementing that mode of initiating prosecutions.9 
"19) Because of previous reliance by the bench and bar on the validity of current postindictment procedures, the rule 
announced herein shall apply only to the present case and to those indicted defendants who have not entered a plea at the time 
this opinion becomes final. (See, e.g., People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67. 99, th. 18, 148 Cal.Rptr. 605, 583 P.2d 130, and 
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cases cited.) 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to proceed in accordance with the views expressed herein. 
"TOBRINER, MANUEL and NEWMAN, JJ., concur. 
"[BIRD, J., specially concurred.] 
FN"2 As one observer put it, a grand jury room with no judge present to protect unrepresented witnesses or 
prospective defendants is 'a threatening physical environment'; it 'possesses coercive characteristics that are 
analogous to a police interrogation room, which the court found to be inherently coercive in Miranda.' (Note, 
Federal GrandJuries;' The Plight of the Target Witness (1977) 11 U.S.F.L.Rev. 672, 685.) 
FN"3 Simultaneously, and inconsistently, the Attorney General argues that the grand jury indicting function is not a 
critical stage in the criminal process, that it is merely investigative. We emphasize that we are not here concerned 
with the true investigative role of the grand jury. In that capacity-citizens probing into and exposing governmental 
ineptitude and inefficient practices-the grand jury serves a valuable and productive purpose. 
FN"4 Although only four members of the court joined the opinion of the court on this issue, a fifth, Justice Black, 
agreed in his concurring opinion with the conclusion that a constitutional right to assistance of counsel obtained in 
the Alabama preliminary hearing. 
FN"5 One advocate has described as follows the value of cross-examination: it 'permits disclosure of 
contradictions, inconsistencies, unsupported conclusions, bizarre descriptions of events, favoritism in testimony, 
motive, bias, slanting of facts, absence of proof, and in some cases even perjury.' (Werchick, Cal. Preparation and 
Trial (2d ed. 1974) p. 727.) 
FN"6 'A prosecutor may proceed by indictment for valid reasons: the prospective defendant cannot be found; 
witnesses may fear testifying in court; the case may have potential for prejudicial pretrial publicity; publicity may 
jeopardize a continuing investigation; a preliminary examination may involve prolonged delay because of the 
number of defendants or the complexity of the case.' 
FN"7 While we held to the contrary in People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 CaI.3d 710,746-747, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385,497 
P.2d 1121, the issue was treated cursorily and was neither argued nor decided in relation to the California 
Constitution. As we have previously stated, '[I]n criminal actions, where life or liberty is at stake, courts should 
not adhere to precedents unjust to the accused. It is never too late to mend.' ( People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 
518, 530, 47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 360, 407 P.2d 265, 272, quoting from United States v. Delli Paoli (2d Cir.1956) 229 
F.2d 319, 323 (dis. opn. of Frank, J.).) To the extent it is contrary to the views herein expressed, Sirhan is 
overruled. 
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FN"8 In People v. Duncan (972),388 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that 
defendants are entitled to a post-indictment preliminary hearing. As a result of Duncan the general procedure we 
recommend here was codified in Michigan Court Rule 788 and is now accepted practice in that state. 
FN"9 Current section 14 represents a streamlined version, not intended to introduce substantive changes, of former 
article I, section 8, which provided: 'Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be 
prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without 
such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law.' (Italics added.) **479 Plainly this predecessor 
section also left to the Legislature and the courts the task of formulating indictment procedures that do not diminish 
other constitutional guarantees. 
"The Attorney General argues that this court is without power to rule invalid indictment procedures, no matter 
how drastically or unreasonably such procedures may undermine other constitutional provisions. This position is 
remarkable in light of long-standing American principles recognizing the role of courts in a constitutional system. 
The principal support cited by the Attorney General is legislative history which is said to leave the development 
of indictment procedures to legislative control. Of course the Legislature in the first instance prescribes 
procedures for grand jury indictments; it is no revelation that history so provides. But the cited legislative history 
does not purport to strip California courts of the power to invalidate a scheme that interferes unreasonably-and 
unnecessarily-with other fundamental constitutional guarantees." 
*250 Hawkins, supra. 150 Cal.Rptr. at 436-41, 586 P.2d at 9) 7-22. 
Not reflecting too creditably upon the majority opinion, it is observed that the district court, the Honorable John H. Bengtson, 
in addition to analyzing the Oregon case of State v. Freeland. 295 Or. 367,667 P.2d 509 (I 983)-which analysis the majority 
opinion appears to have utilized-confronted the Hawkins case: 
In Hawkins vs Superior Court. etc. (Cal.. 1978) [22 Cal.3d 584, 150 Cal.Rptr. 4351. 586 P.2d 916, the Supreme Court 
of California, while recognizing that it is undeniable that there is a considerable disparity in the procedural rights afforded 
defendants charged by the prosecutor by means of an information and defendants charged by the grand jury in an indictment 
(which, as in Idaho, are the two methods for initiating a felony prosecution under the California Constitution) and "that a 
defendant charged by indictment is seriously disadvantaged in contrast to a defendant charged by information," 
nevertheless did not dismiss the indictment against the defendant. The Court concluded not that the defendant was deprived 
of equal protection because he had been charged by indictment rather than by the filing of an information, but rather that it 
was the "denial of a postindictment preliminary hearing' that deprived defendants of equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the California Constitution. The Court stated: 
"The appropriate remedy for the constitutionally infirm treatment of indicted defendants is not to eliminate or alter 
radically the general indicting function of the grand jury; indeed, that function is explicitly sanctioned in the California 
Constitution ... and specifically implemented by the Legislature .... 
Until such time as the Legislature may prescribe other appropriate procedures, the remedy most consistent with the State 
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Constitution as a whole and least intrusive on the Legislature's prerogative is simply to permit the indictment process to 
continue precisely as it has, but to recognize a right of indicted defendants to demand a post-indictment preliminary 
hearing prior to or at the time of entering a plea. If the defendant makes a timely request for such a preliminary hearing, 
at the direction of the Court the prosecuting attorney shall refile the indictment as a complaint, thus activating the 
procedures set forth in the Penal Code .... " 
No cases have been brought to the attention of the Court by the parties, nor has the Court unearthed any cases, in which 
an indictment has been dismissed based upon any equal protection argument, except where an indicted defendant has 
sought, subsequent to the indictment but before or at the time of entry of his plea, an order which would afford him the right 
to a preliminary hearing. 
The Idaho Constitution in Article I, Section 8. clearly authorizes the prosecution of a felony to be commenced by either 
indictment or by information (after the defendant had been afforded the right to a preliminary hearing). This choice of 
alternative proceedings is also authorized by the California and Oregon Constitutions which governed, respectively, 
Hawkins and Freeland 
Had the defendant in the case at bar sought, following the return of the indictment and before or at the time of the entry of 
his plea, an order granting him a postindictment preliminary hearing (as **480 *251 the defendants did in both Hawkins 
and Freeland) and had the State been unable to demonstrate a coherent, systematic policy relating to the selection of the 
indictment process for the prosecution of the above entitled cases and refused to conduct a preliminary hearing upon 
defendant's motion or application, it is likely that the indictments in these cases would have been dismissed by this Court. 
However, defendant Edmonson, represented at all stages thus far by exceptionally able counsel, has not chosen to follow 
the procedures employed by the defendants in Hawkins and Freeland by seeking an order of this Court directing that the 
State provide him with preliminary hearings on any of the charges set forth in the indictments. This Court is therefore of the 
opinion that he has waived whatever right the law affords him to a postindictment preliminary hearing and that it is 
unnecessary for this Court to rule upon the basic constitutional issue raised by the Equal Protection Motions, and such 
motions should be denied. 
Parenthetically, the Court opines that issues such as those raised by these Equal Protection Motions could be avoided 
in thefuture if the Legislature of the State of Idaho would enact a law. or the Supreme Court of Idaho would adopt a 
rule which would clearly provide a defendant charged by indictment with a post indictment preliminary hearing if the 
same is requested by him at or before the entry of his plea. 
R., pp. 48-50. 
The only question which I mount as to the validity of Judge Bengtson's learned written decision, which entails all of the 
issues discussed in the Court's majority opinion (and well might have been adopted as the opinion for the majority), is his 
statement that "it is likely that the indictments in these cases would have been dismissed by this Court" had the defendant 
sought "following the return of the indictment ... an order granting him a post indictment preliminary hearing .... " From that 
stance, Judge Bengtson concluded that the defendant thereby waived such a right, and accordingly it was unnecessary to rule 
upon the constitutional issues. Although today's majority agreed with Judge Bengtson, it still opted to do the constitutional 
bit. I agree with Judge Bengtson that it is an unnecessary exercise and would think such should have been avoided. 
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Judge Bengtson's only misperception in this area, which I see, is his ready and lDlquestioning acceptance as gospel that the 
so-called "indictment" is indeed an indictment because it is labeled an indictment. However, it is not an indictment simply 
because it has been so captioned. In this jurisdiction, we do not exalt form over substance, and the clue in this case occurred 
at oral argument when Justice Donaldson inquired of the solicitor-general as to the difference between an indictment and a 
presentment: 
JUSTICE DONALDSON: Now, tell me the difference between a presentment by the grand jury and an indictment by the 
grand jury, and the standard of proof and what happens, say if a presentment is made by the grand jury? 
MR. THOMAS: I am not sure that I really lDlderstand what the difference between a presentment is. I know that an 
indictment is clearly a charge of criminal violation. It then results in a trial. 
JUSTICE DONALDSON: I lDlderstand that proof required for an indictment is against the presentment? 
MR. THOMAS: My understanding of the standard of proof, the burden of proof, for an indictment is the same as for a 
preliminary hearing-probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed it. 
JUSTICE DONALDSON: I was just reading the statute on presentment, and it says here: "A presentment is a formal 
statement in writing by the grand jury representing to the court that a public offense has been committed which is triable in 
the COlDlty and that there is reasonable ground for believing the particular individual named or described thereon has 
committed it." And then for "indictment" it says, "The grand jury ought to find an indictment where all evidence **481 
*252 before them taken together iflDlexplained or lDlcontradicted would in their judgment warrant a conviction by a trial 
or jury." To me it seems that there might be a different standard of proof involved. There are no cases that I know of on it, 
and we, as you know, we very seldom have any cases on the use of a grand jury in Idaho. Other states and federal 
governments, of course, are quite different. I was just trying to see if you had any further light on that. 
MR. THOMAS: Well, it certainly I suppose could be argued that the suggestion in the part of tl:Je statute relating to 
indictments that to the grand jury should return an indictment, ifit thought a conviction might ensue could be read to suggest 
that there should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
JUSTICE DONALDSON: Of course, that's the standard that the prosecuting attorney used throughout this grand jury was 
that they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt. Which is the same standard that the regular jury does. 
MR. THOMAS: That's correct. But, I would argue against interpreting the statute in that fashion. 
JUSTICE DONALDSON: I am wondering ifhe was correct in his assumption. 
MR. THOMAS: I think he was not. 
It would seem that if the solicitor-general, who to my knowledge is involved exclusively with criminal law and no other 
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field whatever, was wholly maw are of the difference between an indictment and a presentment, there is very good reason to 
believe that Judge Bengtson, who has to be involved in the many complex fields of civil and domestic law, and occasionally 
criminal law and procedure as well, was equally not aware that a presentment is not an indictment-but has for 127 years of 
staMory existence played an entirely separate and distinct part in grand jury proceedings. At the same time, Justice 
Donaldson was not putting the solicitor-general through an academic exercise, but sensed a difference between the two, and 
wanting to be informed from a person from the attorney general's office, received no enlightenment whatever. 
On the other hand, if the solicitor-general did know the difference, he would have had to explain that a presentment arises out 
of a grand jury's investigatory fimction, and, on being delivered to the district court, results in a warrant for arrest made 
returnable before a magistrate: 
A presentment is an informal statement in writing, but the grand jury, representing that a public offense has been 
committed, which is triable within the comty, and that there is reasonable gromds for believing that a particular 
individual, named or described, has committed it 
I.C. § 19-1 102 (1864 Crim.Prac.Act § 203). 
The presentment, when fomd, must be presented by the foreman, in presence of the grand jury, to the court, and must be 
filed with the clerk. 
I.C. § 19-1202 (1864 Crim.Prac.Act § 217). 
If the facts stated in the presentment constitute a public offense, triable in the comty, the court must direct the clerk to issue 
a bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant. 
I.C. § 19-1203 (1864 Crim.Prac.Act § 220). 
I.e. § 19-1205 sets forth the form of the bench warrant, which recites the presentment, and commands any peace officer in the 
state to arrest the person named forthwith and take him before a named magistrate of the comty, "or in case of his inability to 
act or absence, before the nearest and most accessible magistrate in this comty." 
This statute, too, carried over from the 1864 Criminal Practice Act, § 222. 
The magistrate, when the defendant is brought before him, must proceed upon the charges contained in the presentment, in 
the same manner as upon a warrant of arrest on an information. 
I.C. § 19-1207. 
The annotation to this section refers to the proceedings mder I.C. § 19-80 I et seq., and requires first that "the magistrate 
must immediately inform him of the charge **482 *253 against him, and of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the 
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proceedings," following which there must be a preliminary examination to determine if there is probable cause. LC. § 
19-804. 
Knowing all of this, ifhe did, the solicitor-general had to know in turn that the grand jury had not presented the district court 
with an indictment, but with a presentment, and that the defendant, as a matter of law, had to be advised of his right to 
counsel and afforded a preliminary hearing. No demand was necessary. 
It is all as it should be. Forever there has been in Idaho always the involvement ofa neutral and detached magistrate standing 
between the citizenry and the prosecutor. On an indictment, that involvement comes before the grand jury considers indicti!1g 
an accused defendant. On a presentment, however, there is no accused defendant (either in jail or out on bail) simply 
because there has been no arrest and no preliminary examination. The statutory procedure spells out very clearly that the 
district judge, ifsatisfied with the content of the presentment, will issue an arrest warrant which requires the arresting officer 
to take the individual named to a certain named or nearest magistrate. Then the neutral and detached magistrate becomes 
involved and conducts a preliminary examination. The procedure, if not understood by the solicitor-general, is not likely 
well understood by anyone-which is to be expected in view of the little use of grand juries in Idaho, and no knowledge of the 
function of an indictment vis a vis a presentment. 
What is extremely clear, I repeat, is that Idaho, and California, too, and most western states, have forever respected the 
interposition ofa magistrate between the prosecutor and an accused. 
The majority opinion, however, shows little awareness of the involvement of a magistrate-as is well demonstrated by its 
declaration that "an informal procedure in which an accused is not given the right to contest the state's evidence, or even put 
on his own evidence is not per se constitution[allyJ infirm"-said to be predicated upon Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103, 95 
S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54. a 1975 case from which the majority excerpts a lengthy quote, p. 234, 743 P.2d p. 463. 
Regrettably, the majority is not aware that Gerstein's discussion is not of a preliminary hearing or of a grand jury 
proceeding, but a probable cause hearing of some sort which is better than no hearing of any kind. Under Florida law, a 
prosecutor's assessment of probable cause had in Florida been held sufficient for extended pretrial detention. Other than in 
capital cases, where indictments were required, prosecutors were allowed to charge all other crimes by information, without 
a prior preliminary. The holding of the Supreme Court of the United States had naught to do with grand juries, with 
indictments, or with presentments. The clearly stated holding in the case was that the Fourth Amendment requires ajudicial 
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Not having the time to 
review our own decisions since 1975, I am reasonably certain that either Justice Bakes or myself, or both, have written 
relative to Gerstein. and this Court should be better aware of what that case was about. The excerpt quoted was merely in 
explanation that a probable cause hearing before a magistrate as a prerequisite to detaining (confining) an accused is not a 
preliminary hearing, and appointment of counsel is not required for indigent defendants as required under Coleman v . 
.-Ilubama. 399 U.S. I. 90 S.Ct. 1999.26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970). In short, Gerstein has nothing to do with the case before us, and 
the majority ill-serves the trial bench and bar by interposing the Gerstein excerpt with loose language that suggests a grand 
jury is an informal procedure, the purpose of which is to also determine probable cause. A grand jury is, in my mind, at least, 
anything but an informal procedure; the statutory provisions governing its conduct are all-encompassing, leaving little for 
doubt. 
But, if I err in my assessment that the document in question is a presentment, I am nevertheless unable to fathom any 
reason**483 *254 for not according indicted defendants a preliminary hearing. 
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In days not too long ago, accused defendants were taken to preliminary hearings, and, if indigent, had no representation. Only 
on going to trial was cOlBlSel appointed for the indigent accused, who often waived the right. I cannot remember of a case 
where, prior to trial, the district court ever denied appointed counsel's motion to turn back the clock and give the defendant a 
preliminary hearing. In fact, personally, I can remember clients of mine who were allowed that right. Everyone involved 
seemed to be interested in seeing that justice was served. 
A preliminary hearing for indicted defendants who request the same is not spelled out in the Code. For presented defendants, 
it is spelled out. Who is the more in need of a preliminary hearing-the indicted defendant who has already been held to 
answer by a magistrate, or the presented defendant who has not, and was not even aware that his activities were under 
investigation in secret proceedings? 
Then, too, think of the cost-not much. At a preliminary hearing, the prosecutor need not put his entire case, but only so much 
as will result in the defendant being held to answer. Then, too, think of the time delay which has ensued where a preliminary 
was not given, but the question certified for appeal-consuming more valuable time which this Court could better expend on 
other cases. 
There is, too, here, good reason to believe that the prosecutor far overstepped his prescribed rule. So much so that I for one, 
who has read the available transcripts, believe a poor precedent is set by the imprimatur of this Court's stamp of 
approval-even though it reluctantly agrees with my own view. 
Grand juries are impaneled in Idaho pursuant to LC. § 2-50 I, by order of the court filed with the clerk, and shal1 be 
summoned from a master list which is open to public examination. I.C. § 2-206. The court directs the jury commission to 
draw and assign from the master jury wheel the number of qualified jurors for a grand jury. I.C. § 210(2), and the clerk in 
turn notifies the drawnjurors when to report. Sixteen persons constitute a grand jury, twelve of whom constitute a quorum. 
After the drawn grand jurors assemble and are sworn, the jury is charged by the court. I.C. 19-1013. "In doing so, the court 
must give them such information as it may deem proper, or as is required by law, as to their duties, and as to charges for 
public offenses returned to the court or likely to come before the grand jury." I.C. § 19-10 13. These statutes have governed 
Idaho grand juries since 1864. The grand jury must then retire to a private room and inquire into the offenses cognizable by 
them. I.C. § 19-1014. I.e. § 19-1111 provides that the jury may ask the advice of the court, or judge thereof, or of the 
prosecuting attorney. As to the prosecuting attorney, the section is specific "that he may at all times appear before them for 
the purpose of giving them information or advice, and may interrogate witnesses before them whenever he or the jury think it 
necessary." 
The record before us does not contain the court's charge to the jury. When the jury convened on November 13, 1984, at 
Moscow, Idaho, only present were the prosecutor and the jurors. The prosecutor's statement indicated that the court may have 
charged the jury when the prosecutor remarked: "As the judge has indicated, Mr. McCoy has been designated the foreman ... " 
and again, "As you recall, one of the instructions that Judge Maynard read to you is that you have to keep track of the votes on 
the indictments and what have you." The prosecutor, apparently before the jury retired to their room, had already exposed his 
case against the individuals for whom he asked indictments-as witnessed by the remark, "And when I mentioned in my 
preparatory remark in the courtroom that you would be looking at a wide scope of people from the executive category all the 
way down to the wage and hour category." 
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Nothing else in that transcript is remarkable other than that the prosecutor told the jurors that they were a "quotient verdict" 
**484 *255 in that although it took twelve to indict, "there's nothing that compels all of you to be here as long as there's 
always twelve." Tr., p. 25. He explained a theory for that statement which is most unusual: "Because it's a quotient jury, the 
theory is that you rely on the good memories and the wisdom of your fellow jurors in asking them about certain things." Tr., 
p. 25. This "tag-tearn" theory of jury attendance is not, in my view, within the letter of the law. Clearly, this was additional 
grounds invalidating the grand jury proceeding. The transcript demonstrates that at least two of the jurors were interested in 
not even serving. 
The jury apparently received testimony of the witnesses between November 13, 1984 and January 8, 1985. We do not have 
this testimony, and have no way of knowing the extent of the prosecutor's involvement in the interrogations-nor is it anything 
we need to know to decide the issue before us. 
On January 8, 1985, presumably the testimony and exhibits, if any, were all before the jury when it assembled at 10:50 a.m. 
that day. The proceedings of that day commenced with the prosecutor handing out to everyone present a set of20 numbered 
instructions, prestunably drawn by him. He then passed out to each of the jurors one of his proposed and prepared 
indictments. He explained: "The indictments that you wiII be dealing with are the indictments that after viewing the evidence 
from-from my standpOint, I have proposed." Tr., p. 5. He went on to explain the reasoning behind his selective selection of 
indictees: 
There are a number of other events that maybe have occurred during the presentation of this case that would or could 
technically be of a level-evidentiary level to warrant an indictment. There mayor may not be reasons-or there certainly are 
reasons why those indictments are not being requested The reasons may vary from the sublime to the very complex. One 
reason that indictments are not requested in many grand jury cases against certain people is that you want to keep those 
people in a state oflegal limbo. A state oflegal limbo for purposes of possibly utilizing them as witnesses against other 
people. 
Also, there are instances in which if you have a weak case against a person, technically sufficient but presentationally 
weak, then you generally do not want to indict that person because tactically in a multi-defendant case that one will 
invariably be the first one to go to trial. And in a series of trials you don't want to start out with the worst case, the lawyers 
for all of the other defendants are sitting in the courtroom while you're doing the first case. So if you have a weak case, 
then tactically that works to your disadvantage. 
So there are a variety of reasons why there may be some events that you have detected that merit some sort of sanction 
that the indictments are not proposed/or. 
Tr., pp. 5-6 (emphasis added). 
He told the jurors that: "There are also instances in which indictments are not drawn that very simply legally do not merit an 
indictment." Tr., p. 6. He named an example from those being investigated. 
From that point on, until almost 4:00 p.m. that day, the prosecutor argued his instructions and the testimony of the witnesses 
as he viewed it and as he told the jurors that they should believe it. We are not favored with the set of instructions with 
which the prosecutor handed the jurors, so the content of each of the 20 instructions is an unknown. We can, however, read 
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from the prosecutor's conunent that his instruction No.2 invited the jurors to key in on certain people: 
So you're going to treat or you're going to view a person who is in a position ofreponsibility, a supervisor, a director, a 
department head, significantly different You're going to view his activities or her activities significantly different than you 
are the key punch operator sitting out on the floor who makes four dollars an hour and who just does what comes through 
the basket And that's essentially what instruction number two indicates. 
Tr., pp. 14-15. 
**485 *256 He provided the jurors with a history of the grand jury system and explained that "the grand jury system in this 
country and in all countries that have a grand jury system, remains an inquisitorial device." After remarking that "in a true 
inquisitorial system, you are guilty until you prove yourself innocent," the prosecutor also correctly and properly told them: 
"So if you are given an indictment, for instance the one you have before you, __ 's grand theft indictment, then that 
jeopardies out Mr. __ on grand theft. 
Early in his long presentation, on page 18 of 153 pages, the prosecutor suggested to the jurors what the evidence showed: 
During the process of presenting the evidence in the case, 1 think as 1 mentioned before, you probably detected that there 
were a lot of things going on surrounding this case that just didn't seem quite right. And that people were playing fast and 
loose. People were not very honest People were trying to be high rollers in a small pond-a mixed metaphor-and they in 
the end came to no good end for it. 
Tr., p. 18. 
People who commit crimes of passion, they very physically exhibit what they do. But people who are fraudulent and 
people who conspire don't. And-because that's the nature of the crime. You don't go out and announced that you're in the 
middle of a conspiracy. There are conspiracies of silence. There are conspiracies that are effectuated just through-through 
covert power. The best example of that is the military when a person in command says, "I would like something taken care 
of', it gets taken care of without any further explanation from-by the person in command. People can make their desires 
known in a certain way without actually having to express in specific detail what they want done. Conspiracies are like 
that With a look, with a wink, with a nod. With an understanding of unified objectives things can be accomplished. Thafs 
why conspiracies are so tough to prosecute and so tough to prove, because you can't find an eye witness. You can't find any 
real evidence. Conspiracies all occur in minds of people and in the interaction between the two conspirators or the three 
conspirators of the four conspirators. And unless you get a confession from one, you have a very difficult time ever 
proving a conspiracy. 
For that purpose the law has developed an entire body of conspiracy law and if you look back at instruction number 
eighteen you'll find what has developed in this country as being the common sense but again legalistic expression of how 
you can produce evidence to show conspiracy. Most people think in a conspiracy you have to have this conspiratorial 
scenario in which people slink down the street and slide into darken doorways and then sit down in a room with a bare 
light bulb hanging there and plot to do things. Or that drug dealers sit in villas in Miami and plot how to do things over the 
telephone. That's not particularly so. A conspiracy can be formed and take place in a matter of seconds .... Conspiracy as 
the instructions indicate to you on number sixteen is nothing more than an agreement between two or more people to 
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commit a criminal offense. Okay? Each person has to know in order for it to be a conspiracy that they're participating in an 
agreement. They must have intent. Conspiracy is a specific intent crime. And then if any one of them commits an overt act 
in furtherance of that conspiracy, then the conspiracy is a fait d'acompli. It is a completed crime at that time. 
Tr., pp. 23-25. 
In instruction seventeen I think in very brief form most of what I have indicated to you is detailed there in that particuJar 
instructi on. 
Now the instruction number nineteen is the final conspiracy instruction and it is, once again, a very common sense 
instruction, a very common sense objective of the law, because it is the unique conspiracy participant instruction. 
Tr., p. 30 (emphasis added). 
**486 *257 At page 32, he mentioned having brought in, supposedly as a witness, a Mr. Donesley who lectured the jurors on 
the RICO statutes. The Idaho statutes, however, are explicit that only the court and the prosecutor can given legal advice to 
the jurors. His recapitulation of the RICO statutes and purposes encompassed at least ten pages. 
His Instruction No. 6 explained the difference between circumstantial and direct evidence, according to his statement of it. 
Tr., p. 43. His Instruction No. 8 apparently dealt with credibility of witnesses. Tr., pp. 43-45. His Instruction No. 9 
apparently told the jury as being an aider or abettor, of which he said was confusing to people, and then explained it, and in 
doing so lectured the jurors on Idaho's newly enacted comprehensive theft statute. 
Following a break, the prosecutor laboriously perused with the jury his proposed indictments together with his recollection 
and views of the evidence. One could write on and on forever, but enough has been written to establish that the prosecutor's 
summation in this grand jury proceeding was purely that of an advocate pursuing his own goals, wholly unfettered in a totally 
nonadversarial setting which left him at liberty to lead the jury to do his bidding-albeit it is true, from time to time, he told 
the jurors that they were not bound by his views, and whether they wouJd agree to his proposed indictments was up to them 
What I read is fully convincing that this grand jury proceeding was not in compliance with statutory proceedings-not by a 
long shot. It is the function of this office to call things as they are, by which it is meant to convey the thought that what is 
written is not to be taken as critical of the prosecutor. As I see it, there simply is no established body of case law in Idaho 
which is available as guidelines for the convening and conducting of grand juries. The prosecutor without doubt thought that 
the grand jury was a prosecutorial device for the benefit of prosecutors-much as the special inquiry judge-which the 
prosecutor had already utilized, and from which proceeding had gathered most of the leads upon which he followed through 
with the grand jury. 
The solicitor-general even after writing his brief and doing the necessary research work for that effort, did not know at oral 
argument the difference between an indictment and a presentment. 
The solicitor-general at oral argument told us that the prosecutor had been flatly in error in telling the grand jurors that the 
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evidence before them had to convince them beyond a reasonable doubt. 
My present perception as to whether the members of this Court are any more knowledgeable in this area of the law, and 
especially with the statutes which govern such proceedings, leaves me not at all persuaded that the collective knowledge of 
this Court is any better or any worse than the prosecutor's and the solicitor-general's. What the trial bench and bar may well 
fear is that this Court issues its opinion this day without being properly informed, which is to be much regretted. 
As mentioned earlier, reason and practicality dictate that the district court be directed to allow the defendants the 
preliminary hearing which they seek. For the life ofme I cannot understand the solicitor-general's objection. The preliminary 
hearing could have been held and over months ago, and the case pursued in district court. 
In due time, perhaps the trial bar, absent any help from this Court, might deem it wise to reflect upon the grand jury system 
and examine for adequacy and suffering those statutes which have been on the books, unchallenged, sine 1864. In that year, 
we copied California's 1851 statutes, and we stiII had them when we became a state in 1889, and still have them. And, we 
have a constitutional provision, art. I. § 8, patterned after California's art. I, § 8, and we have a 5-2 California opinion which 
holds that indicted defendants are entitled to a preliminary hearing. A preliminary examination has been part and parcel of 
Idaho law ever since there has been an Idaho. Unless I am much mistaken, the jury returned presentments, although the 
prosecutor called his proposed biIls indictments. Under the law, ifsuch are presentments, **487 *258 the statutes require the 
district court to order the accused to be arrested and taken before a magistrate for a preliminary examination-perhaps to be 
held to answer for jury trial. 
A final word, how disturbing it must be to counsel for the defendants to read Part III of the majority opinion. The majority 
commendably sets forth some of the prosecutor's comments to the grand jurors, pp. 237-238, 743 P.2d pp. 466-467, and 
having done so, declares "that these statements are impermissible," and cites the reader to the American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice. The majority states that such impermissibility is irrelevant unless those statements are 
prejudicial-meaning in the majority mind that "they are designed to appeal to jury prejudices or prod a reluctant jury into 
voting for indictment." Then, philosophizes the majority: 
Grand jurors realize that the case is being presented precisely because the prosecutor believes the grand jury should indict. 
They realize that the prosecutor will make statements on the evidence. 
The comments alleged to be prejudicial were directed to the grand jury over a period of several days. In our perception, 
the prosecutor, by the use of these statements, was attempting to explain the law to the jurors. 
Majority op., p. 238, 743 P.2d p. 467. 
The majority finds the prosecutor's intent laudable, and that the grand jurors were wholly unaffected by it. In that manner, the 
majority, speaking for the highest court in Idaho, put the stamp of approval on a grand jury procedure wholly not in 
conformance with the statutes of Idaho, nor with the ABA Standards, and much like a coach of a football team, says: "Good 
going, deemed laudable, way to go in the future. Breaking the rules is okay if you are just over-zealous, and do not possess 
any intent to exert influence over the jurors." 
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Other courts have performed better, as reflected in a very recent case where the same issue was involved. This case, 
although cited and quoted in the defendants' brief, apparently does not fit into the majority's glossing over concededly 
impermissible prosecutorial conduct. The name of the case is United Stales v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.1983), heard 
before Lumbard, Cardamone, and Zomporo. The latter two names are new to me, but Judge Lumbard is well known as one of 
the most outstanding jurists in the United States. The opening paragraph of the opinion in that case should have been the 
opening paragraph of the opinion the Court should be issuing this date: 
On this appeal our principal concern is directed not at the jury trial where the accused were found guilty, but at earlier 
events-those that transpired before the grand jury which indicted the appellants. More than in other cases, the minutes of 
the grand jury proceedings in this case reveal what can happen when the prosecutor is too determined to obtain an 
indictment. The temptations to cut comers, to ignore the rights of an accused, and to toss fair play to the winds gain 
ascendancy. Prosecutors presenting cases to grand juries are firmly subject to due process limitations and bound by ethical 
considerations. While we fully recognize that a court's power to dismiss an indictment following a conviction at trial 
rarely is exercised, the prosecution so violated these limitations and obligations as to mandate this indictmenfs dismissal. 
Here prosecutorial zeal only illuminates anew the insight of the old adage that the ends cannot justity the means. 
Id at 757-58. 
It would be difficult to say that the prosecutorial conduct in the Hogan case was more excessive than that which we see in 
this case. The difference in outcome is the difference in courts. Any person interested in getting grand jury proceedings on 
proper track will want to read Hogan. 
The least, the very bottom of the barrel least, this Court might do this day would not be to look the other way, but, if a 
dismissal is not within its perception, then to award the defendants a preliminary **488 *259 hearing, and call it a sanction-
which, of course, it is not. But it is something. 
ADDENDUM 
Since the foregoing was written, at the cost of considerable time and effort, the majority opinion, p. 234, 743 P.2d p. 463, 
has been rewritten to correctly observe that Gerstein involved, as I wrote, that the probable cause type of hearing there 
involved was to justity any pretrial detention. I appreciate the change. 
A IT ACHMENT I 
For bigamy 
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procuring, promoting, aiding in, or being accessory to the 
commission of the offence, or in abetting the parties 
therein concerned. 
§ 91. When the offence either of bigamy or incest is 
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committed in one county and the defendant is apprehended 
in another, the jurisdiction shall be in either county. 
§ 92. When property feloniously taken in one county 
by burglary, robbery, larceny, or embezzlement, has been 
brought into another, the jurisdiction of the offence shall 
be in either county. But if at any time before the 
conviction of the defendant in the latter he be indicted 
in the former country, the Sheriff of the latter county 
shall, upon demand, deliver him to the Sheri ff of the 
former county, upon being served with a copy of the 
indictment, and upon receipt, endorsed thereon by the 
Sheriff of the former county, of the body of the offender, 
and shall on filing the copy of the indictment and receipt, 
be exonerated from all liability in respect to the custody 
of the offender. 
§ 93. In the case of an accessory before or after the fact 
in the commission of a public offence, the jurisdiction shall 
be in the county where the offence of the accessory was 
committed, notwithstanding the principal offence was 
committed in another county. 
§ 94. When an act charged as a public offence is within 
the jurisdiction of another State or territory as well as of 
this State, a conviction or acquittal thereof in such State 
or territory shall be a bar to a prosecution therefor in this 
State. 
§ 95. When an offence is within the jurisdiction of two 
or more counties, a conviction or acquittal thereof in one 
county shall be a bar to a prosecution or indictment 
therefor in another. 
TITLE II. 
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Of the Complaint and Proceedings thereon, to the 
Commitment inclusive. 
CHAPTER I. 
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Of the time of commencing Criminal Actions. 
§ 96. There shall be no limitation of time within which a 
prosecution for murder must be commenced. It may be 
commenced at any time after the death of the person killed. 
§ 97. An indictment for any other felony than murder 
must be found within three years after its commission. 
§ 98. An indictment for any misdemeanor must be found 
within 
one year after its commission. 
§ 99. Ifwhen the offence is committed the defendant be 
out of the State, the indictment may be found within the term 
herein limited after his coming within the State, and no time 
during which defendant is not an inhabitant of, or usually 
resident within the State, shall be a part of the limitation. 
§ 100. An indictment is found within the meaning of this 
Title, when it is duly presented by the Grand Jury in open 
court, and there received and filed. 
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The Complaint. 
§ 10 I. The complaint is the allegation made to a 
Magistrate that a person has been guilty of some 
designated offence. 
§ 102. A Magistrate is an officer having power to issue 
a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public 
offence. 
§ 103. The following persons are Magistrates: 
I st. The Justices of the Supreme Court; 
2d. The District Judges; 
3d. The COlUlty Judges; 
4th. Justices of the Peace; 
5th. The Recorders of Cities; and, 
6th. The Mayors of Cities, upon whom are conferred 
by law the powers of Justices of the Peace. 
CHAPTER II. 
Warrant of Arrest. 
§ 104. When a complaint is laid before a Magistrate 
of the commission of a public offence, triable within 
the COlUlty, he must examine on oath the complainant or 
prosecutor, and any witnesses he may produce, and take 
their depositions in writing, and cause them to be 
subscribed by the parties making them 
§ 105. The depostion must set forth the facts stated 
by the prosecutor and his witnesses, tending to 
establish the commission of the offence and the guilt 
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§ 106. If the Magistrate be staisfied therefrom 
that the offence c9mplained of has been committed, and 
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the 
defendant has committed it, he shall issue a warrant of 
arrest. 
§ 107. A warrant of arrest is an order in writing 
in the name of the people, signed by a Magistrate, 
commanding the arrest of the defendant, and may be 
substantially in the following form: 
County of 
The People of the State of Cali fomi a to any 
Sheriff, Constable, Marshal, Policeman in this State, 
or the County of 
a complaint upon oath having been this day laid 
me, by A. B., that the crime of (designate it) has 
been committed, and accusing C. D. thereof, you are 
therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above 
named C. D. and bring him before me at (naming the 
place) or in case of my absence or inability to act, 
before the nearest and most accessible Magistrate 
in this County. 












LA WS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
LA WS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
§ lOS. The warrant must specifY the name of the 
defendant, or ifit be unknown to the Magistrate, the 
defendant may be designated therein by any name. 
It must also state the time of issuing it, and the County, 
City, or Town where it is issued, and be signed by the 
Magistrate with his name of office. 
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§ 109. The warrant must be directed to and executed 
by a Peace officer. 
§ 110. Peace officers are Sheriffs of Counties, and 
Constables, Marshals, and Policemen, of cities and towns 
respectively. 
§ Ill. If a warrant be issued by a Justice of the 
Supreme Court, District Judge, or County Judge, it may be 
directed generally to any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal, or 
Policeman, in this State, and may be executed by any of 
those officers to whom it may be delivered. 
§ 112. lfit be issued by any other Magistrate, it may 
by directed generally to any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal, 
or Policeman, in the County in which it is issued, and may 
be executed in that County, or if the defendant be in 
another County it may be executed therein upon the written 
direction of a Magistrate of that County, endorsed 
upon the warrant signed by him, with his name of 
office, and dated at the county, city, or town where it is 
made to the following effect. This warrant may be executed 
in the County of or as the case may (be). 
§ 113. The endorsement mentioned in the last 
section shall not however be made, unless the warrant 
be accompanied with a certificate of the County Clerk, 
under the seal of this Court, as to the official character 
of the Magistrate, or unless upon the oath ofa creditable 
witness in writing, endorsed on or annexed to the warrant 
proving the handwriting of the Magistrate by whom it was 
issued. Upon such proof the Magistrate endorsing the 
warrant shall be exempted from the liability to a civil 
or criminal action, though it afterwards appear that 
the warrant was illegally or improperly issued. 
§ 114. If the offence charged in the warrant be a 
felony, the officer making the arrest must take the 
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§ 118. When by the preceding sections of this 
chapter the defendant is required to be taken before 
the Magistrate who issued the warrant, he may, if the 
Magistrate be absent or unable to act, be taken before 
the nearest or most accessible Magistrate in the same 
county. The officer shall, at the same time, deliver 
to the Magistrate the warrant with his return, endorsed 
and subscribed by him 
http://web2.wes 
defendant before the Magistrate who issued the warrant, 
or some other Magistrate of the same county, as provided in 
section one hundred and eighteen. 
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§ liS. If the offence charged in the warrant be a 
misdemeanor, and the defendant be arrested in another 
county, the officer must, upon being so required by the 
defendant, bring him before a Magistrate of such county, who 
shall admit the defendant to bail. 
§ 116. On admitting the defendant to bail the Magistrate 
shall certifY on the warrant the fact of his having doneso, 
and deliver the warrant and recognizance to the officer 
having charge of the defendant. The officer shall 
forthwith discharge the defendant from arrest, and 
shall without delay deliver the warrant and recognizance to 
the Clerk of the Court at which the defendant is required 
to appear. 
§ 117. If on the admission of the defendant to bail, 
as provided in section one hundred and fifteen, or ifbail be 
not forthwith given, the officer shall take the defendant 
before the Magistrate who issued the warrant, or some other 




to be taken. 
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§ 119. The defendant must in all cases be taken To be without 
before the Magistrate without unnecessary delay. delay. 
§ 120. Ifthe defendant be brought before a When 
Magistrate in the same county other than the one who defendant 
issued the warrant, the affidavits on which the warrant demands 
was granted, if the defendant insist upon an examination, a hearing. 
shall be sent to such Magistrate, or if they cannot be 
procured, the prosecutor and his witnesses shall be 
summoned to give their testimony anew. 
§ 121. When a complaint is laid before a Magistrate Proceedings 
of the commission ofa public offence, triable within on complaint 
some other county of this State, but showing that the for offence 
defendant is in the county where the complaint is laid, triable in 
the same proceedings shall be had as prescribed in this another 
chapter, except that the warrant shall require the county 
defendant to be taken before the nearest or most 
accessible Magistrate of the county in which the 
offence is triable, and the depositions of the 
complainant or prosecutor, and of the witnesses who may 
have been produced, shall be delivered by the 
Magistrate to the officer to whom the warrant is 
delivered. 
§ 122. The officer who executes the warrant shall The like. 
take the defandant before the nearest or most 
accessible Magistrate of the County in which the 
offence is triable, and shall deliver to such 
Magistrate the depositions and the warrant with his 
return endorsed thereon, and such Magistrate shall 
proceed in the same manner as upon a warrant issued 
by himself. 
§ 123. If the offence charged in the warrant issued The like 
pursuant to section one hundred and twenty-one be a 
misdemeanor, the officer shall, upon being so required 
by the defendant, take him before a Magistrate of the 
COlUlty in which the said warrant is issued, who shall 
hold the defendant to bail, and immediately transmit 
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the warrant, depositions, and recognizance, to the 
Clerk of the Cowt in which the defendant is required 
to appear. 
CHAPTER Ill. 
Arrest by an Officer under warrant. 
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§ 124. Arrest is the taking of a person into Arrest 








lAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
§ 125. An arrest may be either: 
1 st. By a peace officer under a warrant. 
2d. By a peace officer without a warrant; or, 
3d. By a private person. 
§ 126. Every person shall aid an officer in the 
execution of a warrant, if the officer require his aid, 
and be present and acting in its execution. 
§ 127. Ifthe offence charged be a felony, the 
arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of the day 
or night. Ifit be a misdemeanor, the arrest shall not be made at 
night, unless upon the direction of the Magistrate endorsed 
upon 
the warrant. 
§ 128. An arrest shall be made by an actual restraint 
of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to 
the custody of an officer. 
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§ 129. The defendant shall not be subjected to any more 
restraint than is necessary for his arrest and 
detention. 
• § 130. The officer shall inform the defendant that he 
acts under the authority of the warrant, and shall 
also show the warrant ifrequired. 
§ 131. If after notice of intention to arrest the 
defendant, he either flee or forcibly resists, the 
officer may use all necessary means to effect the arrest 
§ 132. The officer may break open any outer or inner 
door or window of a dwelling-house, to execute the warrant, 
if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he be refused 
admittance. 
§ 133. An officer may break open any outer or inner 
door or window ofa dwelling-house, for the purpose of 
liberating 
a person who, having entered for the purpose of making an 
arrest, 
is detained therein, or when necessary for his own liberation. 
CHAPTER IV. 
Arrest by an Officer without a warrant. 
§ 134. A peace officer may, without a warrant, 
arrest a person: 
1st. For a public offence, committed or attempted 
in his presence. 
2d. When the person arrested has committed a felony, 
although not in his presence. 
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§ 137. When arresting a person without a warrant 
the officer must inform him of his authority, and the 
cause of the arrest, except when he is in the actual 
commission of a public offence, or when he is pursued 
immediately after an escape. 
§ 138. He may take before a Magistrate any person, 
who, being engaged in a breach of the peace, is 
arrested by a bystander and delivered to him 
§ 139. When a public offence is committed in the 
presence ofa Magistrate he may, by a verbal order, 
command any person to arrest the offender, and may 
thereupon proceed as if the offender had been 
brought before him on a warrant of arrest. 
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3d. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has 
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have 
committed it. 
4th. On a charge made upon a reasonable cause of the 
commission of a felony by the party arrested. 
§ 135. To make an arrest, as provided in the last 
section, the officer may break open any outer or inner 
door or window ofa dwelling-house if, after notice of his 
office and purpose, he be refused admittance. 
§ 136. He may also at night, without a warrant, 
arrest any person whom he has reasonable cause for 
believing to have committed a felony, and is justified in 
making 
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CHAPTER V. 
Arrest by a private Person. 
§ 140. A private person may arrest another: 
First, for a public offence conunitted or attempted 
in his presence. Second, when the person arrested 
has committed a felony, although not in his 
presence. Third, when a felony has been in fact 
committed and he has reasonable cause for believing 
the person arrested to have conunitted it. 
§ 141. He must before making the arrest infonn 
the person to be arrested of the cause thereof, 
and require him to submit except when he is in the 
actual commission of the offence, or when he is 
arrested on pursuit immediately after its conunission. 
§ 142. If the person to be arrested have 
conunitted a felony, and a private person, after 
notice of his intention to make the arrest, be 
refused admittance he may break open any outer or 
inner door or window of a dwelling-house for the 
purpose of making the arrest. 
§ 143. A private person who has arrested 
another for the commission ofa public offence 
must, without unnecessary delay, take him before 
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Retaking after an Escape of Rescue. 
§ 144. If a person arrested escape or be 
rescued, the person from whose custody he escaped 
or was rescued, may immediately pursue and retake 
him at any time and at any place within the State. 
§ 145. To retake the person escaping or rescued 
the person pursuing may, after notice of his 
intention and refusal of admittance, break open any 
outer or inner door or window ofa dwelling-house. 
CHAPTER VII. 
Examination of the Case and Discharge of the Defendant, 
or holding him to answer. 
§ 146. When the defendant is brought before the 
Magistrate upon an arrest, either with or without 
warrant, on a charge of having committed a public 
offence, the Magistrate shall immediately inform 
him of the charge against him, and of his right to the 
aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and 
















LA WS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
§ 147. He shall also allow the defendant a reasonable 
time to send for counsel, and adjourn the examination 
for that purpose, and shall, upon the request of the 
defendant, require a peace officer to take a message to 
such counsel within the township or city as the defendant may 
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name. The officers shall, without delay and without fee, 
perform that duty. 
§ 148. The Magistrate shall immediately after the 
appearance of counsel, or if defendant require the aid 
of counsel after waiting a reasonable time therefor, proceed to 
examine the case. 
§ 149. The examination must be completed at one 
session unless the Magistrate for good cause shown 
adjourn it. The adjournment cannot be for more than 
two days at each time, nor more than six days in all, 
unless by consent or on motion of the defendant. 
§ 150. Ifan adjournment be had for any cause the 
Magistrate shall commit the defendant for examination, admit 
him to bail or discharge him from custody upon the 
deposit of money as provided in this Act, as security 
for his appearance at the time to which the examination 
is adjourned. 
§ 151. The commitment for examination shall be by 
an endorsement signed by the Magistrate on the warrant of 
arrest to the following effect: 
"The within named, A. 8., having been brought before me 
under this warrant, is committed for examination to the 
Sheriff of ------" 
If the Sheriff be not present the defendant may be committed 
to 
the custody ofa peace officer. 
§ 152. At the examination the Magistrate shall in 
the first place read to the defendant the depositions 
of the witnesses examined on the taking of the 
information. He shall also issue subpoenas for 
any witnesses required by the prosecutor or the 
defendant, as provided in section five hundred and 
forty-eight. 
§ 153. The witnesses shall be examined in the 
000273 
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§ 156. If the defendant choose to make a statement, 
the Magistrate shall proceed to take the same in writing 
without oath, and shall put to the defendant the following 
questions only: "What is your name and age? 
Where were you born? Where do you reside, and how 
long have you resided there? What is your business or 
profession? Give any explanation you may think proper 
of the circumstances appearing in the testimony 
against you, and state any facts which you think 
will tend to your exculpation." 
§ 157. The answer of the defendant to each of 
the questions must be distinctly read to him as 
it is taken down. He may thereupon correct, or 
add to his answer, and it shall be corrected until 
http://web2. ntlp,rintstre:am.,asp,x?sv=Spl it&prft=H. 
presence of the defendant, and may be cross-examined in 
his behalf. 
§ 154. When the examination ofwitnesses on the part 
of the people is closed, the Magistrate shall distinctly 
inform the defendant that it is his right to make a 
statement in relation to the charge against him 
(stating to him the nature thereof), that the statement is 
designed to enable him, ifhe see fit, to answer the charge 
and to explain the fact alleged against him. that he is at 
liberty to waive making a statement, and that his waiver 
cannot be used against him on the trial. 
§ 155. If the defendant waive his right to make a 
statement, the Magistrate shaH make a note thereof 
immediately following the depositions of the witnesses 
against the defendant, but the fact of his waiver shall 








be read to 
him 
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it is made conformable to what he declares to be 
the truth. 
§ 158. The statement must be reduced to Statement to 
writing by the Magistrate, or under his direction, be reduced 
and authenticated in the following form: to writing. 
I st. It must set forth in detail that the 
defendant was informed of his rights as provided by 
section one hundred and fifty-four, and that after 
being so informed he made the statement. 
2d. It must contain the questions put to 
him and his answers thereto, as provided in 
section one hundred and fifty-seven, and one hundred 
and fifty-six. 
3d. It may be signed by the defendant, or he 
may refuse to sign it: but ifhe refuse to sign it 
his reason therefor must be stated as he gives it. 
4th. It must be signed and certified by the 
Magistrate. 
§ 159. After the waiver of the defendant to Defendanfs 
make a statement, or after he has made it, his witnesses. 
witnesses, ifhe produce any, shall be sworn 
and examined. 
§ 160. The witnesses produced on the part Witnesses 
either of the people or of the defendant, shall maybe 
not be present at the examination of the defendant, ordered out 
and while a witness is under examination, the of court, & c. 
Magistrate may exclude all witnesses who have not 
been examined. He may also cause the witnesses to 
be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing 
with each other until they are all examined. 
§ 161. The Magistrate shall also upon the request The like. 
of the defendant exclude from the examination every 
person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his 
counsel, the Attorney General, the District Attorney 
of the County, the defendant and his counsel, and 
the officer having the defendant in custody. 
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§ 162. The testimony given by each witness must 
be reduced to writing as a deposition by the 
Magistrate, or under his direction: and 
1st. It must contain the name of the witness, 
his place of residence, and his business, or profession. 
2d. If required by the defendant, or by the 
District Attorney, or prosecutor, it must be taken 
by question and answer, and when so taken each answer 
must be distinctly read to the witness as it is 
taken down, and corrected or added to, until it is 
made conformable to what he declares to be the truth. 
3d. Ifa question put be objected to on either 
side and overruled, of the witness decline answering 
it, that fact with the ground on which the question 
was overruled must be stated. 
4th. It must be signed by the witness, or ifhe 
refuse to sign it, his reason for refusing must be 
stated as he gives it; and 






When to be 
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Testimony 
to be reduced 
to writing. 
LA WS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
§ 163. After hearing the proofs and the statement of the 
defendant, ifhe have made one, ifit appear either 
that a public offence has not been committed, or there is 
no sufficient cause to believe the defendant 
guilty thereof, the Magistrate shall order the 
defendant to be discharged, by an endorsement 
on the depostions and statement signed by him to 
the following effect: "There being no sufficient 
cause to believe the within named A. B. guilty of 
the offence within mentioned, I order him to be 
discharged. " 
§ 164. If, however, it appear from the examination 
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that a public offence has been committed, and there is 
sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, 
the Magistrate shall in like manner endorse on 
the depositions and statement an order signed by 
him to the following effect: "It appearing to me 
by the within depostions (and statement if any) that 
the offence therein mentioned (or any other offence 
according to the fact, stating generally the nature 
thereof), has been committed, and that there is 
sufficient cause to believe the within A. B. guilty 
thereof, I order that he be held to answer to the 
same." 
§ 165. If the offence be not bailable, the following 
words, or words to the same effect, shall be added to 
the endorsement, "and that he be committed to the 
Sheri ff of the County of -----." 
§ 166. If the offence be bailable and bail be taken 
by the Magistrate, the following words, or words to 
the same effect, shall be added to the endorsement, 
"and I have admitted him to bail to answer by the 
recognizance hereto annexed." 
§ 167. If the offence be bailable and the defendant 
be admitted to bail, but bail have not been taken, the 
following words, or words to the same effect, shall be added 
to the endorsement mentioned in section one hundred 
and sixty-four, "and that he be admitted to bail, 
in the sum of ---- dollars, and be commited to 
the Sheriff of the County of ----, until he gives 
such bail." 
§ 168. If the Magistrate order the defendant to 
be committed as provided in section one hundred and 
sixty-five and one hundred and sixty-seven, he shall 
make out a commitment signed by him with his name 
of office and deliver it, with the defendant, 
to the officer to whom he is committed, or if 
that officer be not present, to a peace officer 
000277 5/26/20104:03 PM 




§ 170. On holding the defendant to answer, the 
Magistrate shaH take from each of the material 
witnesses examined before him on the part of the 
people a written recognizance, to the effect that 
he will appear and testifY at the court to which 
the depositions and statements are to be sent, or 
that he will forfeit the swn of Five Hundred 
Dollars. 
§ 171. Whenever the Magistrate shall be 
satisfied by proof on oath that there is reason 
to believe that any such witness will not fulfil 
his recognizances to appear and testifY, unless 
security be required, he may order the witness 
to enter into a written recognizance with such 
sureties and in such swn as he may deem meet 
for his appearance as specified in the last 
section. 
http://web2. 
who shall deliver the defendant into the proper 
custody, together with the commitment. 
§ 169. The commitment must be to the following 
effect, "County of ---- (as the case may be). 
The people of the State of Cali fomi a to the 
Sheriff of the County of ----; An order 
having been this day made by me that A. B. 
be held to answer upon a charge of (stating 
briefly the nature of the offence, and as 
near as may be the time when, and the place 
where the same was committed) you are 
commanded to receive him into your custody, 
and detain him until he be legally discharged. 
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§ 172. Infants and married women, who are The like. 
material witnesses against the defendant, may 
in I ike manner be required to procure sureties 
for their appearance, as provided in the last 
section. 
§ 173. If a witness required to enter into Or be 
recognizance to appear and testifY either with committed. 
or without sureties refuse compliance with the 
order for that purpose, the Magistrate shall 
commit him to prison until he comply or be 
legaIly discharged. 
§ 174. When, however, it shall satisfactorily Witnesses 
appear by the examination on oath of the witness, unable to 
or any other person, that the witness is unable give 
to procure sureties, he may be forthwith security for 
conditionally examined on behalf of the people; appearance, 
such examination shall be by question and to be 
answer, and shall be conducted in the same examined 
manner as the examination before a committing conditionaIly. 
Magistrate is required by this act to be 
conducted, and the witness shall therefore be 
discharged. 
§ 175. The last section shall not apply to Exceptions. 
the prosecutor or to an accomplice in the 
commission of the offence charged. 
§ 176. When a Magistrate has discharged a Magistrate 
defendant, or has held him to answer as to return 
provided in sections one hundred and sixty- warrant, & c. 
four and one hundred and sixty-five, he shall 
return without delay to the Clerk of the Court 
at which the defendant as (is) required to 
appear, the warrant if any, the depositions, 
the statement of the defendatnt, ifhe have 
made one, and all recognizance of bail or for 
the appearance ofwitnesses taken by him. 
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TITLE IV. 
Of Proceedings after Commitment and before Indictment. 
CHAPTER I. 
Preliminary Proceedings. 
LA WS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
§ 177. All public offences prosecuted in the 
District Court and the Courts of Session, must 
be prosecuted by indictment, except as provided in 
the next section. 
§ 178. When the proceedings are had for the 
removal of District, County, or Township officers, 
they may be commenced by an accusation in writing, 
as provided in section seventy and eighty-three. 
§ 179. All accusations against District, County, 
and Township officers, and all indictments must be found in 
the Court of Sessions. 
CHAPTER II. 
Formation of the Grand Jury. 
§ 180. The formation of Grand Juries is prescribed 















by special statutes. 
§ 181. A person held to answer to a charge for a 
public offence, may challenge the panel of the Grand 
Jury, or any individual Grand Juror. 
§ 182. A challenge to the panel may be interposed 
for one or more of the following causes only: 
1st That the requisite number of ballots was not drawn 
from the jury box of the County, as prescribed by law. 
2d. The notice of the drawing of the Grand Jury was not 
as prescribed by law. 
3d. That the drawing was not had in the presence of the 
officers designated by law. 
§ 183. A chal\enge to an individual Grand Juror 
may be interposed for one or more of the following 
causes only: 
1st. That he is a minor. 
2d. That he is an alien. 
3d. That he is insane. 
4th. That he is prosecutor upon a charge 
against the defendant. 
5th. That he is a witness on the part of the 
prosecution, and has been served with process or 
bound by an undertaking as such. 
6th. That he has formed or expressed a 
decided opinion that the defendant is guilty of the 
offence for which he is held to answer. 
§ 184. The challenges mentioned in the three 
sections may be oral, and shall be entered upon the 
minutes, and tried by the Court in the same manner 
as challenges in the case of a Trial Jtu)', which 
are triable by the Court. 
§ 185. The Court shall allow or disallow the 
challenge, and the Clerk shall enter its decisions 
in the minutes. 
it&prft=H ... 
000281. 5/26/20104:03 PM 






§ 188. The Grand Jury shall inform the Court of 
a violation of the last section, and it shall be 
punished by the Court as a contempt. 
§ 189. A person held to answer to a charge for 
a public offence, can take advantage of any 
objection to the panel or to an individual 
Grand Juror, in no other mode than that by 
challenge, as prescribed in the preceding section. 
§ 190. From the persons smnmoned to serve as 
Grand Jurors, and appearing, the Court shaIl 
appoint a foreman. The Court shall also appoint 
a foreman, when the person already appointed is 
excused or discharged before the Grand Jury is 
dismissed. 
§ 191. The following oath shall be administered 
to the foreman of the Grand Jury: "You, as 
foreman of the Grand Jury, shall diligently 
inquire into, and true presentment make, of 
http://web2. intiprintstream.aspx?sv=Sp Ii t&prfi='H .. 
§ 186. If a chaIlenge to the panel be allowed, 
the Grand Jury are prohibited from inquiring into the 
charge against the defendant, by whom the challenge 
was interposed. If they should, notwithstanding, 
do so and find an indictment against him, the 
Court shall direct the indictment to be set aside. 
§ 187. If a challenge to an individual Grand Juror 
be all owed, he shall not be present or take part 
in the consideration of the charge against the 
defendant who interposed the challenge or the 





to jury can 
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all public offences against the people of this 
State, committed or triable within this County, 
of which you have or can obtain legal evidence. 
You shall present no person through malice, hatred, 
or iII-will, nor leave any unpresented through 
fear. favor, or affection, or for any reward, or 
the promise or hope thereof; but in all your 
presentments you shall present the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, according 
to the best of your skill and understanding, so 
help you God." 
§ 192. The following oath shall be immediately 
thereupon administered to the other Grand Jurors 
present. "The same oath which your foreman has now 
taken before you on his part, you and each of you 
shall well and truly observe on your part, so help 
you God." 
§ 193. The Grand Jury being empanelled and 
swom, shall be charged by the Court. In doing 
so, the Court shall give them such information 
as it may deem proper, as to the nature of their 
duties, and any charges for public offences 
returned to the Court or likely to come before 
the Grand Jury. The Court need not, however, 
charge them respecting violations of any 
particular statute. 
§ 194. The Grand Jury shall then withdraw to 
a private room, and inquire into the offences 
cognizable by them. 
§ 195. The Grand Jury on the completion of 
the business before them shall be discharged by 
the Court, but whether the business be completed 
or not, they shall be discharged by the final 
adjournment of the Court. 















the sitting of the Court, after the discharge 
of the Grand Jury, the Court may, in its 
discretion, direct an order to be entered that 
the Sheri ff summon another Grand Jury. 
§ 197. An order shaH thereupon be made out 
by the Clerk and directed to the Sheriff, 
requiring him to summon twenty-four persons 
qualified to serve as Grand Jurors to appear 
forthwith, or at such time as may be appointed 
by the Court. 
§ 198. The Sheriffshall execute the order, 


















Sheri ff to 
execute order 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
§ 199. At the time appointed the list shall be 
called over, and the names of those in attendance 
be written by the Clerk on separate ballots and 
put into a box, from which a Grand Jury shall 
be drawn. 
§ 200. At the first, and at all subsequent terms 
of the Court of Sessions, until an assessment roll in 
each county shall be made out and returned, so that a 
Jury list may be formed and a Jury drawn as required by 
law, the grand Jury and the Trail Jury shall be formed in the 
following manner. 
§ 201. On the first day of the term the Court 
shall, by an entry on the minutes, direct an order to be 
issued to the Sheriff of the county, to summon thirty-six 
persons from the citizens of the county, and not from the 
bystanders, to appear forthwith or at such time as may be 
named. 
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§ 202. The Clerk shalI issue the order, and the 
Sheriffshall execute and return it at the time 
specified, with a list of the names of the persons 
so summoned. Ifhe has been unable to summon the whole 
number 
in the time alIowed, he shaIl return the order with the list of 
names summoned. 
§ 203. The Court may, in its discretion, enlarge 
the time of the return, and direct the Sheriff to summon 
the whole number, or may proceed to empanel a Grand 
Jury from the number summoned. 
§ 204. Upon the return of the order, or upon the 
expiration of the further time allowed, the names of 
the persons summoned shall be calI ed, and the Court shall 
proceed 
to empanel a Grand Jury and a Trial Jury in like manner as if 




Powers and Duties of the Grand Jury. 
§ 205. The Grand Jury has the power, and it is their 
duty to inquire into alI public offences committed or 
triable within the county, and to present them to the Court 
either by presentment or by indictment. 
§ 206. An indictment is an accusation in writing, 
presented by the Grand Jury to a competent Court, 
charging a person with a public offence. 
11t .... ~nr·t1=H ... 
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§ 210. The Grand Jury shall receive none but legal 
evidence, and the best evidence in degree, to the 
exclusion of hearsay or secondary evidence. 
§ 211. The Grand Jury is not bOlmd to hear evidence 
for the defendant; but it is their duty to weigh all the 
evidence submitted to them, and when they have reason 
to believe that other evidence within their reach will 
explain away the charge, they should order such evidence 
to be produced, and for that purpose may require the 
District Attorney to issue process for the witnesses. 
§ 212. The Grand Jury ought to find an indictment, 
when all the evidence before them, taken together, is 
such as in their judgment would, iflmexplained or 
uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial 
Jury. 
§ 213. If a member of the Grand Jury know, or have 
http://web2. 
§ 207. A presentment is an informal statement in 
writing, by the Grand Jury, representing to the Court 
that a public offence has been committed, which is triable 
within the COlmty, and that there is reasonable ground for 
believing that a particular individual named or described, has 
committed it. 
§ 208. The foreman may administer an oath to any 
witness appearing before the Grand Jury. 
§ 209. In the investigation ofa charge, for the purpose 
of either presentment or indictment, the Grand Jury 
shall receive no other evidence than such as is 
given by witnesses procuced and sworn before them, 
or furnished by legal documentary evidence, or the 
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reason to believe that a public offence has been 
committed, which is triable within the County, he must 
declare the same to his fellow Jurors, who shall 
thereupon investigate the same. 
§ 214. The Grand Jury must inquire into the case 
of every person imprisoned in the jail of the County 
on a criminal charge and not indicted; into the 
condition and management of the public prisions 
within the County; and into the wilful and corrupt 
misconduct in office of public Officers of every 
description within the County. 
§ 215. They are also entitled to free access, at 
all reasonable times, to the public prisons, and to 
the examination, without charge, of all public 
records within the County. 
§ 216. The Grand Jury may, at all seasonable 
times, ask the advice of the Court, or any member 
thereof, and of the District Attorney. Unless his 
advice be asked, no member of the Court shall be 
permitted to be present during the sessions of the 
Grand Jury. The District Attorney of the County 
shall be allowed at all times to appear before 
the Grand Jury, on his request, for the purpose of 
giving information or advice relative to any 
matter cognizable by them; and may interrogate 
witnesses before them, when they shall deem it 
necessary. Except the District Attorney, no 
person shall be permitted to be present before 
the Grand Jury besides the witnesses actually 
under examination, and no person shall be permitted 
to be present during the expression of their 
opinions, or the giving of their votes upon any 
matter before them. 
§ 217. Every member of the Grand Jury shall keep 
secret whatever he himself or any other Grand 



















to be kept 
secret. 
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any other Grand Juror may have voted on a 
matter before them 
§ 218. A member of the Grand Jury may, however, 
be required by any Court to disclose the testimony 
of a witness examined before the Grand Jury, for 
the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent 
with that given by the witness before the Court, or 
to disclose the testimony given before them by any 
person, upon a charge against him for perjury in 
giving his testimony, or upon his trial therefor. 
Acts, & c., of 
Grand Jurors 













LA WS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
§ 219. No Grand Juror shall be questioned for 
anything he may say, or any vote he may give in the 
Grand Jury, except for a perjury of which he may have 
been guilty in making an accusation or giving 
testimony to his fellow jurors. 
CHAPTERN. 
Presentment and Proceedings thereon. 
§ 220. A presentment cannot be found without 
the concurrence of at least twelve Grand Jurors. 
When so formed it must be signed by the foreman. 
§ 221. The presentment when found must be presented 
by the foreman, in the presence of the Grand Jury, 
to the Court, and shall be filed by the Clerk. 
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§ 222. No Grand Juror, District Attorney, Clerk, 
Judge, or other officer shall disclose the fact 
ofa presentment having been made for a felony 
until the defendant shall have been arrested. But 
this prohibition shall not extend to disclosure by the 
issuing or in the execution of a warrant to arrest the 
defendant. 
§ 223. A violation of the provisions ofthe last 
section shall be punished as a contempt and as a 
misdemeanor. 
§ 224. If the Court deem that the facts stated in 
the presentment constitute a public offence, triable 
within the county, it shall direct the Clerk to 
issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant 
§ 225. The Clerk, on the application of the 
District Attorney, may accordingly, at any 
time after the order, whether the Court be 
sitting or not, issue a bench warrant under 
his signature and the Seal of the Court into 
one or more counties. 
§ 226. The bench warrant upon presentment shall be 
substantially in the following form: 
"County of 
"The people of the State of California, to 
any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal, or Policeman 
in this State. A presentment having been made 
on the day of ______ _ 
18. to 
the Court of Sessions of the County of ___ _ 
charging C. D. with the crime of (designating 
it generally) you are therefore commanded 
forthwith to arrest the above-named C. D. and 
000289 5126120 I 0 4:03 PM 
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SECOND SESSION. 
§ 227. The bench warrant may be served in any 
county, and the officer serving it shall proceed 
thereon in all respects as upon a warrant of 
arrest on a complaint, except that when served 
in another county it need not be endorsed by a 
Magistrate of that county. 
§ 228. The Magistrate, when the defendant 
is brought before him, shall proceed to examine 
the charges contained in the presentment, and 
hold the defendant to answer the same or 
discharge him therefrom, in the same manner in 
all respects as upon a warrant of arrest on 
complaint: 
TITLEV. 
Of the Indictment. 
CHAPTER V. 
http://web2. com/printiprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft=H 
take him before E. F. a Magistrate of this 
County, or in case of his absence or inability 
to act, before the nearest or most accessible 
Magistr~te in this County. 
"Given under my hand with the Seal of said 
Court affixed, this day of ___ _ 
A.D., 18_ 






"By order of the Court. 
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Finding and Presentation of Indictment. 
§ 229. An indictment cannot be fOWld without 
the concurrence of at least twelve Grand Jurors; 
when so found it shall be entitled "A true bill," 
and the endorsement shall be signed by the foreman 
of the Grand Jury. 
§ 230. If twelve Grand Jurors do not concur 
in finding an indictment against the defendant 
who has been held to answer, the deposition and 
statement, if any transmitted to them, shall be 
returned to the Court with an endorsement thereon 
signed by the foreman, to the effect that the 
charge is dismissed. 
§ 231. The dismissal of the charge shall 
not, however, prevent the charge from being 
again submitted to a Grand Jury, or as often 
as the Court shall so direct. But without 
such direction it shall not be again submitted. 
§ 232. When an indictment is fOWld the 
names ofthe witnesses examined before the 
Grand Jury shall be inserted at the foot 
of the indictment or endorsed thereon 
before it is presented to the Court. 
§ 233. An indictment when fOWld by the 
Grand Jury shall be presented by their 
presence to the Court, and shall be filed 
by the Clerk and remain in his office as 
a public record. 
§ 234. When an indictment has been 
found against a defendant not in custody, 
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prescribed in section two hundred and 
sixty-eight, both inclusive, against a 
defendant who fails to appear for arraigmnent 
CHAPTER II. 
Form of Indictment. 
§ 235. All the forms of pleading in criminal 
actions, and the rules by which the sufficiency 
of pleadings is to be determined, shall be those 
which are prescribed by this act. 
§ 236. The first pleading on the part of the 
indictment. 
§ 237. The indictment shall contain the 
title of the action specifYing the name of the 
Court to which the indictment is presented, and 
the names of the parties; a statement of the 
acts constituting the offence in ordinary and 
concise language, and in such manner as to 
enable a person of common understanding to 
know what is intended. 
Form. 








LA WS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
§ 238. It may be substantially in the following form: 
"The People of the State of Cali fomi a against 
A. B. in the Court of Sessions of the County of 
________ term A. D. 18 A. B. 
is accused by the Grand Jury of the County of 
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________ by this indictment, of the crime of 
(giving its legal appellation, such as murder, 
arson, manslaughter, or the like, as designating 
it as felony or misdemeanor) committed as follows: 
The said A. B., on the day of ___ _ 
A. D. 18 __ at the COLmty of (stating 
the act or omissionconstiMing the offence, in 
the manner prescribed in this chapter, according 
to the forms mentioned in the next section where 
they are applicable.) 
§ 239. The indictment must be direct and 
contain as it regards: 
1st. The party charged. 
2d. The offence charged. 
3d. The particular circlDllStances of the 
offence charged, when they are necessary to 
constiMe a complete offence. 
§ 240. When a defendant is indicted by a fictitious 
or erroneous name, and in any stage of the proceedings 
his true name is discovered, it shall be inserted in 
the subsequent proceedings, referring to the fact of his being 
indicted by the name mentioned in the indictment. 
§ 241. The indictment shall charge but one offence, 
but it may set forth that offence in different forms 
Lmder different COLmts. 
§ 242. The precise time at which it was committed 
need not be stated in the indictment, but it may be 
alleged to have been committed at any time before 
the finding of the same, except when the time is a 
material ingredient of the offence. 
§ 243. When an offence involves the commission, 
or an attempt to commit private injury, and is 
described with sufficient certainty in other respects 
to identifY the act, an erroneous allegation as 
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§ 246. The indictment shall be sufficient ifit can 
be understood therefrom: 
I st. That it is entitled in a Court having 
authority to receive it, though the name of the 
Court be no actually set forth. 
2d. That it was found by a Grand Jury of 
the County in which the Court was held. 
3d. That the defendant is named, or if 
his name cannot be discovered, that he be 
described by a fictitious name, with a statement 
that he has refused to discover his real name. 
4th. That the offence was committed at 
some place within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
except where, as provided by sections eighty-five 
to ninety-three, both inclusive, and as in the 
case of treason, the act, though done without the 
local jurisdiction of the COtUlty, is triable 
therein. 
5th. That the offence was committed at some 
http://web2. comiprintiprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft==H. 
to the person injured, or intended to be injured, 
shall not be deemed material. 
§ 244. The words used in an indictment shall be 
construed in the usual acceptance in common language, 
except such words and phrases as are defined by law, 
which are to be construed according to their 
legal meaning. 
§ 245. Words used in a statute to define a public 
offence, need not be strictly pursued in the 
indictment, but other words conveying the same 
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time prior to the time of finding the indictment. 
6th. That the act or omission charged as the 
offence is clearly and distinctly set forth in 
ordinary and concise language, without repetition, 
and in such a manner as to enable a person of 
common understanding to know what is intended. 
7th. That the act or omission charged as the 
offence is stated with such a degree of certainty 
as to enable the Court to pronounce judgment upon 
a conviction according to the right of the case. 
§ 247. No indictment shall be deemed insufficient, 
nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding 
thereon be affected by reason of any defect or 
imperfection in matters ofform which shall not 
tend to the prejudice of the defendant. 
§ 248. Neither presumption of law, nor matters 
of which judicial notice is taken, need be stated 
in an indictment. 
§ 249. In pleading a judgment or other 
determination of, or proceeding before a Court 
or officer of special jurisdiction, the facts 
conferring jurisdiction need not be stated, 
but it may be stated that the judgment or 
determination was duly made or the proceedings 
duly had before such Court or officer. The 
facts constituting the jurisdiction, however, 
must be established on the trial. 
§ 250. In pleading a private statute or a 
right derived therefrom, it shall be 
sufficient to refer to the Statute by its 
title and the day ofits passage, and the 
court thereupon shall take judicial notice 
thereof. 
§. 251. An indictment for libel need not 
set forth any extrinsic facts, for the purpose 
http://web2. 
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of showing the application to the party 
libelled of the defamatory matter on which the 
indictment is fOlUlded, but it shall be 
sufficient to state generally, that the same 
was published concerning him, and the fact 
that it was so published must be established 
on the trial. 
§ 252. When an instrument which is the 
subject of an indictment for forgery has 
been destroyed or withheld by the act or the 
procurement of the defendant, and the fact of 
such destruction or withholding is alleged in 
the indictment and established on the trial, 
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§ 253. In an indictment for perjury or subornation 
of perjury it shaH be sufficient to set forth the 
substance of the controversy, or matter in 
respect to which the offence was committed, and 
in what Court and before whom the oath alleged 
to be false was taken, and that the Court or the 
person before whom it was taken had authority to 
administer the same with proper allegations to 
the falsity of the matter on which the prejury 
is assigned; but the indictment need not set 
forth the pleadings, record, or proceedings with 
which the oath is connected, nor the commission, 
or the authority of the Court or person before 
whom the perjury was committed. 
§ 254. Upon an indictment against several defendants, 
anyone or more may be convicted or acquitted. 
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§ 255. No distinction shall exist between an 
accessory before the fact and a principal, or between 
principals in the first and second degree, in cases of 
felony, and all persons concerned in the commission 
ofa felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting 
the offence, or aid and abet in its commission, though 
not present, shall hereafter be indicted, tried, 
and punished as principals. 
§ 256. An accessory after the fact to a 
commission of a felony, may be indicted and punished, 
though the principal felon may be neither tried 
nor indicted. 
§ 257. A person may be indicted for having, with 
the knowledge of the commission ofa public offence, 
taken money or property of another, or a 
gratuity or a reward or an agreement or 
understanding express or implied to compound or 
conceal the offence, or to abstain from a 
prosecution therefor, or to withhold any evidence 
thereof, though the persons guilty of the 
original offence have not been indicted or tried. 
CHAPTER III. 
Arraignment of the Defendant. 
§ 258. When the indictment is filed the defendant 
shall be arraigned thereon, before the Court in which it 
is found, except in the cases mentioned in sections 
two hoodred and seventy-nine and two hundred 
and eighty. 
§ 259. If the indictment be for a felony the defendant 
must be personally present, but iffor a misdemeanor 
000297 
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§ 263. The bench warrant upon the indictment shall, 
if the offence be a felony, be substantially in the 
following form: 
"County of __ , The People of the State of 
California to any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal, or 
Policeman in this State, An indictment having been 
found on the __ day of __ A. D. 18_ 
in the Court of Sessions, in the County of--, 
charging C. D. with the crime of __ (designating 
it generally). You are therefore commanded 
forthwith to arrest the above named D. D., and 
bring him before that Court to answer the 
indictment; or if the Court have adjourned for 
http://web2.w .com/printiprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&prfl=H. 
his personal appearance is unnecessary, and he may appear 
upon the arraignment by counsel. 
§ 260. When his personal appearance is necessary, 
ifhe be in custody the Court may direct the officer in 
whose custody he is to bring him before it be be 
arraigned, and the officer shall do so accordingly. 
§ 261. If the defendant has been discharged on 
bail, or has deposited money instead thereof, and 
do not appear to be arraigned, when his personal 
attendance is necessary, the Court in 
addition to the forfeiture of the recognizance, 
or of the money deposited, may direct the Clerk 
to issue a search warrant for his arrest. 
§ 262. The Clerk, on the application of the 
District Attorney, may accordingly at any time after 
the order, whether the Court be sitting or not, issue 
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the term, that you deliver him into the custody of 
the Sheriff of the County of __ . Given under 
my hand with the seal of the Court affixed, this 
the __ day of __ , A. D. 18_ Seal. By 
order of the Court. E. F. Clerk." 
§ 264. The defendant, if the offence be 
punishable with death, when arrested under the 
warrant, shall be held in custody by the 
Sheriffofthe County in which the indictment is 
found, unless admitted to bail, upon an examination 
upon a writ of Habeas Corpus. 
§ 265. If the offence be not capital, the 
bench warrant shall be in a similar form, 
adding to the body thereofa direction to the 
following effect, "Of if he require it, that 
you take him before any Magistrate in that 
County, or in the County in which you arrested 
him, that he may give bail to answer to the 
indictment." 
§ 266. If the offence charged be not capital, 
the Court upon directing the bench warrant to 
issue shall fix the amount of bail, and an 
endorsement shall be made upon the bench warrant 
signed by the Clerk, to the following effect: 
"The defendant is to be admitted to bail in 
the sum of ___ dollars." 
§ 267. The bench warrant may be served in 
any County, in the same manner as a warrant of 
arrest, except that when served in another 
County it need not be endorsed by the 
Magistrate of that County. 
§ 268. If the defendant be brought before 
a Magistrate of another County for the purpose 
of giving bail, the Magistrate shall proceed 
in all respects thereto in the same manner as 
http://web2. 
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if the defendant had been brought before him 
upon a warrant of arrest, and the same 
proceedings may be had thereon, as provided 
in sections one hundred and fourteen to one 
hundred and seventeen, both inclusive. 
§ 269. When the indictment is for a felony, 
and the defendant before the finding thereof 
has given bail for his appearance to answer 
the charge, the Court to which the indictment 
is presented, may order the defendant to be 
committed to actual custody, unless he give 
bail in an increased amount, to be specified 
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§ 270. Ifsuch order be made and the defendant be 
present, he shall be forthwith committed accordingly. 
Ifhe be not present, a bench warrant shall be issued 
and proceeded upon in the manner provided for in this 
chapter. 
§ 271. If the defendant appear for arraignment 
without counsel, he shall be informed by the Court 
that it is his right to have counsel before being 
arraigned, and shall be asked ifhe desire the aid of 
counsel. 
§ 272. The arraignment must be made by the Court, 
or by the Clerk or District Attorney under its direction, 
and consists in reading the indictment to the defendant and 
delivering to him a copy thereof, and of the endorsements 
thereon, including the list of witnesses endorsed on it, 
and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty to 
the indictment. 
000300 
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§ 273. When the defendant is arraigned he shall be 
informed that if the name by which he is indicted be 
not his true name he must then declare his true name, 
or be proceeded against by the name in the indictment. 
§ 274. Ifhe give no other name, the Court may proceed 
accordingly. 
§ 275. Ifhe aIlege that another name is his true 
name, the Court shall direct an entry thereof in the 
minutes of the arraignment, and the subsequent proceedings 
on the indictment may be had against him by that name, 
referring 
also to the name by which he is indicted. 
§ 276. If on the arraignment the defendant require it, 
he shall be allowed until the next day, or such fiuther 
time may be allowed him as the Court may deem reasonable, 
to 
answer the indictment. 
§ 277. If the defendant do not require time as provided 
in the last section, or ifhe do, then on the next day, or at 
such future day as the Court may have allowed him, he may 
answer 
to the arraignment; either move the Court to set aside the 
indictment, or may demur or plead thereto. 
CHAPTERlV. 
Setting aside the Indictment. 
§ 278. The indictment shall be set aside by the Court 
in which the defendant is arraigned, and upon his 
motion in either of the foIlowing cases: 
1st. Where it is not found, endorsed, and 
000301. 
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The like. 
SECOND SESSION. 
§ 280. If the motion to set aside the indictment be 
not made, the defendant shall be precluded from afterwards 
taking the objections mentioned in the two last sections. 
§ 281. The motion shall be heard when it is made, 
unless for good cause the Court shall postpone the 
hearing to another time. 
§ 282. If the motion be denied, the defendant must 
immediately answer the indictment, either by demurring 
or pleading thereto. 
§ 283. If the motion be granted, the Court shall 
order that the defendant, ifin custody, be discharged 
therefrom; or ifadmitted to bail, that his bail be 
exonerated; or if he have deposited money instead of 
bail, that the same shall be refimded to him, unless 
it direct that the case be submitted to the same or 
http://web2. cOI1n1pl'i ntJ'printstrealm.a!) px'?sv'=Sp i t&prft= H. 
presented as prescribed in this Act. 
2d. Where the names of the witnesses 
examined before the Grand JW')', or whose depositions 
may have been read before them, are not inserted at 
the foot of the indictment, or endorsed thereon. 
3d. Where any person is permitted to be present 
during the Session of the Grand JW')', while the 
charge embraced in the indictment is under 
consideration, except as provided in section 
two hundred and sixteen. 
§ 279. When the defendant had not been held to 
answer before the finding of the indictment, he may move to 
set aside, on any ground which would have been good ground 
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another Grand Jury. 
§ 284. If the Court direct that the case be 
re-submitted, the defendant, ifalready in custody, 
shall so remain, unless he be admitted to bail, or 
if already admitted to bail, or money have been 
deposited instead thereof, the bail or money shall 
be answerable for the appearance of the defendant 
to answer a new indictment. 
§ 285. Unless a new indictment be found before the 
next Grand Jury of the County is discharged, the Court 
shall, on the discharge of such Grand Jury, make the order 
prescribed in section two hundred and eighty-three. 
§ 286. An order to set aside an indictment, as 
provided in this chapter, shall be no bar to a future 
prosecution for the same offence. 
CHAPTER V. 
Demurrer. 
§ 287. The onJy pleading on the part of the 
defendant is either a demurrer or a plea. 
§ 288. Both the demurrer and the plea must be put 
in open Court either at the time of the arraignment, 
or at such other time as may be allowed to the 
defendant for that purpose. 
§ 289. The defendant may demur to the indictment 
when it shall appear upon the face thereof, either-
First: That the Grand Jury by which it was found 























'ii?hJ?OIO 4·01 PM 
I of 128 
charged, by reason of its not being within the 
legal jurisdiction of the COtmty. Second: That 
it does not substantially conform to the requirement 
of sections two htmdred and thirty-seven and two 
hundred and thirty-eight. Third: That more than 
one offence has been charged in the indictment. 
Fourth: That the facts stated do not constitute 
a public offence. Fifth: that the indictment 
contains any matter which, if true, would constitute 
a legal justification or excuse of the offence 
charged, or other legal bar to the prosecution. 
§ 290. The demurrer must be in writing, signed 
either by the defendant or his counsil, and filed. 
It must distinctly specify the grounds of objection 
to the indictment, or it shall be disregarded. 
§ 291. Upon the demurrer being filed, the 
argwnent of the objections presented thereby 
shall be had either immediately, or at such 
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§ 292. Upon considering the demurrer, the Court 
shaH give judgment either aHowing or disallowing it, 
and an order to that effect shaH be entered on the minutes. 
§ 293. If the demurrer be allowed, the judgment 
shaH be final upon the indictment demurred to, and 
shall be a bar to another prosecution of the same offence, 
unless the Court being of opinion that the objection 
on which the demurrer is allowed may be avoided in a new 
indictment, direct the case to be re-submitted to the same or 
another Grand Jury. 
000304 ~nnnolo 4·01 PM 
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§ 294. If the Court do not direct the case to be 
re-submitted, the defendant, ifin custody, shall 
be discharged, or if admitted to bail, his bail shall be 
exonerated, or ifhe has deposited money instead of bail, the 
money shall be refimded to him 
§ 295. If the Court direct that the case be 
re-submitted anew, the same proceedings must be 
had thereon as are prescribed in sections two hundred and 
eighty-four and two hundred and eighty-five. 
§ 296. If the demurrer be disallowed, the Court 
shall permit the defendant at his election to plead 
which he must do forthwith, or at such time as the Court 
may allow; if he do not plead, judgment shall be pronounced 
against him. 
§ 297. When the objections mentioned in section 
two hundred and eighty-nine appear upon the face of the 
indictment, they can only be taken advantage of by 
demurrer, except that the objection to the jurisdiction of the 
Court over the subject of the indictment, or that the facts 
stated, do not constitute a public offence, may be taken at the 
trial under the plea of not guilty and in arrest of judgment. 
CHAPTER VI. 
Pleas. 
§ 298. There are three kinds of pleas to an 
indictment a plea of - First: GUlL TY. Second: NOT 
GUILTY. Third: A former judgment of conviction or acquittal 
of the offence charged, which may be pleaded, either with or 
without the plea of "not guilty." 
§ 299. Every plea shall be oral, and shall be entered 
upon the minutes of the Court. 
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§ 301. A plea of guilty can in no place be put in, 
except by the defendant himsel f in open court, unless 
upon indictment against a corporation, in which case 
it may be put by counsel. 
§ 302. The Court may at any time before judgment, 
upon a plea of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn, and 
a plea of not guilty substituted. 
§ 303. The plea of not guilty shall be deemed 
a denial of every material allegation in the indictment. 
§ 304. All matters of fact tending to establish 
a defence other than that specified in the third 
subdivision of section two hundred and ninety-eight, 
may be given in evidence under the plea of not guilty. 
§ 305. If the defendant were formerly acquitted 
http://web2. v=SpJit&prft=H ... 
§ 300. The plea shall be entered in substantially 
the following form: First: if the defendant plead guilty, 
"the defendant pleads that he is guilty of the offence 
charged in this indictment." Second: Ifhe plead not guilty, 
"The defendant pleads that he is not guilty of the offence 
charged in this indictment." Third: Ifhe plead a former 
acquittal or conviction, "the defendant pleads that he has 
already been convicted (or acquitted as the case may be) of 
the 
offences charged in this indictment by the judgment of the 
Court 
of ----- (naming it) rendered at ----- (naming the place) 









be given in 
evidence, 
under plea of 
not guilty. 
What not 
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on the ground ofa variance between the indictment 
and the proof, or upon an objection to the form or 
substance of the indictment, it shall not be deemed 
an acquittal of the same offence. 
§ 306. When, however, he shall have been 
acquitted on the merits, he shall be deemed acquitted 
of the same offence, notwithstanding any defect in 
form or substance in the indictment on which he was 
acquitted. 
§ 307. When the defendant shall have been 
convicted or acquitted upon an indictment, the 
conviction or acquittal shall be a bar to another 
indictment for the offence charged in the former, or 
for an attempt to commit the same, or for an offence 
necessarily included therein, of which he might have 
been convicted under that indictment, as provided in 
section four hundred and twenty-four. 
§ 3D8. If the defendant refuse to answer the 
indictment by demurrer or plea, a plea of not guilty 
shall be entered. 
CHAPTER VII. 
Removal of certain indictments form the Court of 
Sessions to the District Court. 
§ 309. When an indictment is found in the 
Court of Sessions, for murder, manslaughter, or 
arson, it shall be transmitted by the Clerk to 
the District Court, sitting in the county for 
trial, except where the indictment is found against 
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§ 3 10. All indictments found against a member 
of the Court of Sessions, or against any Justice of 
the Peace, shall also be transmitted to the District 
Court sitting in the county for trial. 
§ 311. Upon the filing with the District Court 
of an indictment transmitted from the Court of 
Quarter Sessions, the defendant shall be arraigned 
and the same proceedings had in the District Court 
as are required by this act upon indictments tried 
in the Court of Sessions. 
CHAPTERVIll. 
Removal of the action to another County. 
§ 312. A criminal action prosecuted by 
indictment may be removed from the Court in which 
it is pending, on the application of the defendant, 
on the ground that a fair and impartial trial 
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§ 313. The application must be made in the open 
Court, and in writing verified by the affidavit of the 
defendant, and a copy must be served on the District 
Attorney at least one day before the application is 
made to the Court. 
§ 314. If the Court be satisfied that the 
representation of the defendant is true, an order shall 
be made for the removal of the action to the Court of Sessions 
000308 c:./')t;./')f\1f\ A.f\'l n"A 










http://web2.w printstream.aspx?sv=Spl it&prft=H .. 
ofa COWlty which is free from the like objection, or if the 
indictment has been transmitted to the District Court of the 
County from the Court of Sessions, then the order for removal 
shall be made to the District Court of a COWlty which is free 
from the like objection. 
§ 315. The order of removal shall be entered on the 
minutes, and the clerk shall immediately make out and 
transmit a certified copy of the entry with a certified 
copy of the record, pleadings, and proceedings in the 
action, including the recognizances for the appearance 
of the defendant, and of the witnesses, to the Court to 
which the action is removed. 
§ 316. If the defendant be in custody the order shall 
direct his removal by the sheriff of the COWlty where he 
is imprisoned to the custody of the sheriff of the COWlty 
to which the action is removed, and he shall be forthwith 
removed accordingly. 
§ 317. The Court to which the action is removed 
shall proceed to trial and judgment therein, as if the 
action had been commenced in such Court. If it be 
necessary to have any of the original pleadings or other 
papers before such Court, the Court from which the action 
is removed shall at any time on application of the 
District Attorney, or the defendant, order such papers 
or pleadings to be transmitted by the clerk, a certified 
copy thereof being retained. 
TITLE VI. 
Of the Proceedings on the indictment before Trial. 
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Formation of the Trial Jury and the Criminal Docket. 
§ 321. Trial Juries for criminal actions shall be 
formed in the same manner as trial juries for civil 
actions. 
§ 322. The clerk shall keep a docket of all the 
criminal actions pending in the Court, in which he 
shall enter each indictment according to the date of 
the filing, specifYing opposite the title of each 
action whether it be for a felony or a misdemeanor, 
http://web2. ntlJ:,rinltstr(~aml.asJ)X sv=Split&prft=H ... 
CHAPTER!. 
The Mode of Trial. 
§ 318. An issue of fact arises: 
1st. Upon a plea of not guilty; or, 
2d. Upon a plea of a former conviction or 
acquittal of the same offence. 
§ 319. An issue of fact must be tried by a jury 
of the county in which the indictment was found, unless 
the action be removed by order of the court into some 
other county. 
§ 320. If the indictment be for a misdemeanor, 
the trial may be had in the absence of the defendant; 
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and whether the defendant be in custody or on bail. 
§ 323. The issues on the docket shall be disposed 
of in the following order, unless upon the application 
of ei ther party for good cause shown by affidavit, and 
upon two days' notice to the opposite party with a 
copy of the affidavit in support of the application, 
the Court shall direct an indictment to be tried out 
of its order: 
1st. Indictment for felony when the defendant 
is in custody: 
2d. Indictments for misdemeanor when the 
defendant is in custody. 
3d. Indictments for felony when the defendant 
is on bail; and, 
4th. Indictments for misdemeanor when the 
defendant is on bail. 
§ 324. After his plea, the defendant shall have 
at least two days to prepare for his trial, if he 
require it. 
CHAPTERN. 
Postponement of Trial. 
§ 325. When an indictment is called for trial 
the Court may, upon sufficient cause shown by 
affidavit, direct the trial to be postponed to 
another day of the same term or next term. 
CHAPTER V. 
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§ 326. A challenge is an objection made to the 
trial jurors, and is of two kinds: 
I st. To the panel: 
2d. To an individual juror. 
§ 327. When several defendants are tried 
together, they are not allowed to sever their 
challenges, but must join therein. 
§ 328. The panel is a list of jurors returned 
by a sheriff to serve at a particular Court or for 
the trial of a particular cause. 
§ 329. A challenge to the panel is an 
objection made to all the jurors returned, and 
may be taken by either party. 
§330. A challenge to the panel can only be 
fOlUlded on a material departure from the forms 
pre!K:ribed by statute in respect to the drawing 
and return of the jury, or an intentional 
omission of the sheriff to summon one or more 
of the jurors drawn. 
§ 331. A challenge to a panel must be taken 
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**515 *286 will and consent of such negro, mulatto, Indian or colored person, shall be, in any county in which the offence is 
committed or into or out of which the person upon whom the offence was committed may, in the prosecution of the offence, 
have been brought, or in which an act shall be done by the accessory to the commission of the offence, or in abetting the 
parties therein concerned. 
SEC. 88. When the offence of bigamy or incest is committed in one county, and the defendant is apprehended in another, the 
jurisdiction shall be in either county. 
SEC. 89. When property, feloniously taken in one country, by burglary, robbery, larceny, or embezzlement, has been brought 
into another, the jurisdiction of the offence shall be in either county. But if, at any time before the conviction of the defendant 
in the latter, he be indicted in the former county, the sheriff of the latter county shall, upon being served with a copy of the 
00031.2 5/26/20 I 04:03 PM 
'0 of 128 
http://web2.w ""'TllrlrmlTlprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft=H .. 
indictment, and upon receipt, indorsed thereon by the sheriff of the former county, of the body of the offender, and shall, on 
tiling the copy of the indictment and receipt, be exonerated from all liability in respect to the custody of the offender. 
SEC. 90. In the case of an accessory before or after the fact in the commission ofa public offence, the jurisdiction shall be in 
the county where the offence of the accessory was committed, notwithstandining the principal offence was committed in 
another county. 
SEC. 91. When an act charged as a public offence is within the jurisdiction of another state or territory, as well as of this 
territory, a conviction or acquittal thereof in such territory or state shall be a bar to the prosecution or indictment therefor in 
this territory. 
SEC. 92. When an offence is within the jurisdiction of two or more counties, a conviction or acquittal thereof in one county 
shall be a bar to a prosecution or indictment therefor in another. 
11.-TIME OF COMMENCING CRIMINAL ACTIONS. 
SEC. 93. Murder, no limit to prosecution. 
94. Felony, three years. 
95. Misdemeanor, one year. 
96. Time of absence of defendant from territory not included. 
97. Indictment, when deemed found. 
**516 *287 SEC. 93. There shall be no limitation of time within which a prosecution for murder must be commenced. It may 
be commenced at any time after the death of the person killed. 
SEC. 94. An indictment for any felony other than murder must be found with three years after its commission. 
SEC. 95. An indictment for any misdemeanor must be found within one year after its commission. 
SEC. 96. If, when the offence is committed, the defendant be out of the territory, the indictment may be found within the term 
herein limited after his coming within the territory and no time during which the defendant is not an inhabitant of, or usually 
resident within the territory, shall be a part of the limitation. 
SEC. 97. An indictment is found, within the meaning of this title, when it is duly presented by the grand jury, in open court, 
and there received and filed. 
SEC. 98. In offences committed before the passage of an act, indictments may be found at any time within the limitation 
herein above provided, and the time of limitation shall commence after the passage of this act. 
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Magistrate to examine complaint on 
oath. 
Deposition what to set forth. 
Warrant of arrest, when to issue, form 
of. 
Name of defendant, date and signature 
of warrant. 
How executed, peace officers. 
Warrant, to whom directed. 
When executed in another county, how 
indorsed. 
Proceedings on arrest for felony, same 
for misdemeanor. 
Bail to be certified on warrant. 
Defendant, when to be taken before 
magistrate. 
Same, other than the one who issued the 
warrant. 
Proceedings on complaint for offence, 
triable in other county. 
Duty of officer. 
Arrest, by whom to be made. 
At what time to be made, how made. 
Officer to state authority. 
Resistance of defendant, power of 
officers. 
When may be made without warrant. 
May break open doors, etc., at night. 
Officer to state authority, bystanders. 
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Proceedings after arrest. 
Time to procure counsel, examination. 
Commitment of, form of. 
Depositions to be read, subpoena. 
How witness examined. 
Right of defendant to make statement, 
right to waiver. 
Proceedings when defendant choses to 
make statement, questions. 
Answers, statement to be in writing, 
authentication of form of. 
Defendant's witnesses, examination of, 
separately. 
May be conducted with closed doors. 
When defendant discharged, form of. 
Order to hold defendant to answer, 
form of. 
Offence not bailable, form of order. 
Offences bailable, form of order. 
Commitment, form of. 
Witness to be recognized to appear. 
Fai I ing to recognize to be committed. 
Conditional examination of witness 
unable to give security for 
appearance. 
Magistrate to make return to court. 
**5J7 *288 SEC. 99. The complaint is the allegation made to a magistrate that a person has been guilty of some public 
offence. 
SEC. 100. A magistrate is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offence. 
SEC. 101. The following persons are magistrates: First. The justices of the supreme court. Second. The probate judges. 
Third. Justices of the peace, and others upon whom are conferred by law the powers of the peace. 
SEC. 102. When a complaint is laid before a magistrate, of the commission ofa public offence, triable within the county, he 
must examine, on oath, the complainant or prosecutor, and any witnesses he may produce, and take their depositions in 
writing, and cause them to be subscribed by the parties making them 
SEC. 103. The deposition must set forth the facts stated by **518 *289 the prosecutor and his witnesses, tending to establish 
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the commission of the offence, and the guilt of the defendant. 
SEC. 104. If the magistrate be satisfied therefrom that the offencce complained of has been committed, and that there is 
reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. 
SEC. 105. A warrant of arrest is an order in writing in the name of the people of the United States and territory ofIdaho, 
signed by a magistrate, commanding the arrest of the defendant, and may be substantially in the following form: County of----. 
The people of the United States and territory ofIdaho, to any sheriff, constable, or marshal, or policeman, in this territory or 
in the county of ----: A complaint, upon oath, has been this day laid before me, by A.B., that the crime of (designate it) has 
been committed, and accusing C.D. thereof; you are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above named C.D., and 
bring him before me, at (naming the place) or in case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest or most accessible 
magistrate in this county. 
Dated at ----, this ---- day of ----, 18--. 
SEC. 106. The warrant must specity the name of the defendant; if it be unknown to the magistrate, the defendant may be 
designated therein by any name. It must also state the time of issuing it, and the county, city, or town, where it was issued, and 
be signed by the magistrate, with his name of office. 
SEC. 107. The warrant must be directed to, and executed by a peace officer. 
SEC. 108. Peace officers are sheriffs of counties, and constables, marshals, and policemen of cities and towns respectively. 
SEC. 109. If a warrant be issued by a justice of the supreme court, or probate judge, it may be directed generally to any 
sheriff, constable, marshal or policeman in this territory, and may be executed by any of those officers to whom it may be 
delivered. 
SEC. 110. Ifit be issued by any other magistrate, it may be directed generally to any sheriff, constable, marshal or policeman 
in the county in which it is issued, and may be executed in that county; or if the defendant be in another county, it may be 
executed therein, upon the written direction of a magistrate of that county, indorsed upon the warrant, signed by him, with his 
name of office, and dated at the county, city, or town where it is made, to the following effect: "This **519 *290 warrant 
may be executed in the county of ----," or as the case may be. 
SEC. Ill. If the offence charged in the warrant be a felony, the officer making the arrest must take the defendant before the 
magistrate who issued the warrant, or some other magistrate of the same county, as provided in section one hundred and 
fifteen. 
SEC. 112. If the offence charged in the warrant be a misdemeanor, and the defendant be arrested in another county, the 
officer must, upon being so required by the defendant, bring him before a magistrate of such county, who shall admit the 
defendant to bail. 
0003:16 5/26/20 I 0 4:03 PM 
4 of 128 
http://web2. westI com/printiprintstream.aspx?sv=Spl it&prft=H .. 
SEC. 113. On admitting the defendant to bail, the magistrate shall certifY on the warrant and recognizance to the officer 
having charge of the defendant. The officer shall forthwith discharge the defendant from arrest, and shall, without delay, 
deliver the warrant and recognizance to the clerk of the court at which the defendant is required to appear. 
SEC. 114. If, on the admission of the defendant to bail, as provided in section one hundred and twelve, or if bail be not 
forthwith given, the officer shall take the defendant before the magistrate who issued the warrant, or some other magistrate of 
the same county, as provided in the next section. 
SEC. 115. When by the preceding sections of this act, the defendant is required to be taken before the magistrate who issued 
the warrant, he may, if the magistrate be absent or unable to act, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in 
the same county. The officer shall, at the same time, deliver to the magistrate the warrant, with his return, endorsed and 
subscribed by him 
SEC. 116. The defendant must, in all cases, be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay. 
SEC. 117. If the defendant be brought before a magistrate, in the same county, other than the one who issued the warrant, the 
affidavits on which the warrant was granted if the defendant insist upon an examination, shall be sent to the magistrate, if they 
cannot be procured, the prosecutor and his witnesses shall be summoned to give their testimony anew. 
SEC. 118. When a complaint is laid before the magistrate, of the commission of a public offence, triable within some other 
county of this territory, but showing that the defendant is in the county where the complaint is laid, the same proceedin~ shall 
be .had as prescribed in this act, except that the warrant shaH require the defendant to be taken before the nearest or most 
accessible magistrate of the county in which the offence **520 *291 is triable, and the depositions of the complainant or 
prosecutor, and of the witnesses who may have been produced shaH be delivered by the magistrate to the officer to whom the 
warrant is delivered. 
SEC. 119. The officer who executes the warrant shall take the defendant before the nearest or most accessible magistrate of 
the county in which the offence is triable, and shaH deliver to such magistrate the depositions and the warrant, with his return 
endorsed therein; and such magistrate shall proceed in the same manner as upon a warrant issued by himself. 
SEC. 120. If the offence charged in the warrant, issued pursuant to section one hundred and eighteen, be a misdemeanor, the 
officer shall, upon being so required by the defendant, take him before a magistrate of the county in which the said warrant is 
issued, who shall admit the defendant to bail, and immediately transmit the warrant, depositions and recognizance to the 
clerk of the court in which the defendant is required to appear. 
SEC. 121. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a public offence. 
SEC. 122. An arrest may be wither: First. By a peace officer, under a warrant. Second. By a peace officer, without a 
warrant; or, Third. Bya private person 
00031.7 
5/26/20104:03 PM 
5 of 128 
http://web2. west! om/printiprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft=H. 
SEC. 123. Every person shall aid an officer in the execution of a warrant, if the officer require his aid, and be present, and 
acting in its execution. 
SEC. 124. If the offence charged be a felony, the arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. Ifit be a 
misdem eanor, the arrest shall not be made at night, unless upon the direction of the magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant. 
SEC. 125. An arrest shaH be made by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of 
the officers. 
SEC. 126. The defendant shall not be subjected to any more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and detention. 
SEC. 127. The officer shaH inform the defendant that he acts under the authority of the warrant, and shall also show the 
warrant, ifrequired: 
SEC. 128. If after notice of intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary 
means to effect the arrest. 
SEC. 129. The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window ofa dwelling-house to execute the warrant, ifafter 
notice of his authority and purpose, he be refused admittance. 
**521 *292 SEC. 130. An officer may break open any outer or inner door or window ofa dwelling-house, for the purpose of 
liberating a person who, having entered for the purpose of making an arrest, is detained therein, or when necessary for his 
own liberation. 
SEC. 131. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person: First. For a public offence, committed or attempted in his 
presence. Second. Where the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence. Third. Where a felony has 
in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have commited it. Fourth. On a 
charge made upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested. 
SEC. 132. To make an arrest, as provided in the last section, the officer may break open any outer or inner door or window 
ofa dwelling-house, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance. 
SEC. 133. He may also, at night, without a warrant, arrest any person whom he has reasonable cause for believing to have 
committed a felony, and is justified in making the arrest, though it afterward appear that a felony had not been committed. 
SEC. 134. When arresting a person without a warrant, the officer must inform him of his authority, and the cause of the arrest, 
except when he is in the actual commission ofa public offence, or when he is pursued immediately after an escape. 
SEC. 135. He may take before a magistrate any person, who, being engaged in a breach of the peace, is arrested by a 
bystander and delivered to him. 
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SEC. 136. When a public offence is committed in the presence of a magistrate, he may, by a verbal order, command any 
person to arrest the offender, and may thereupon proceed as if the offender had been brought brought before him on a warrant 
of arrest. 
SEC. 137. A private person may arrest another: First. For a pubic offence committed or attempted in his presence. Second. 
When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence. Third. When a felony has been in fact 
committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it. 
SEC. 138. He must, before making the arrest, inform the person to be arrested of the cause thereof, and require him to submit, 
except when he is in the actual commission of the offence, or when he is arrested on pursuit, immediately after its 
commission. 
SEC. 139. If the person to be arrested have committed a felony, and a private person, after notice of his intention to **522 
*293 make the arrest, be refused admittance, he may break open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house, for 
the purpose of making the arrest. 
SEC. 140. A private person who has arrested another for the commission of a public offence, must, without unnecessary 
delay, take him before a magistrate, or deliver him to a peace officer. 
SEC. 141. If a person arrested escape, or be rescued, the person from whose custody he escaped or was rescued, may 
immediately pursue and retake him at any time and in any place within the territory. 
SEC. 142. To retake the person escaping or rescued, the person pursuing may, after notice of his intention, and refusal of 
admittance, break open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house. 
SEC. 143. When the defendant is brought before the magistrate upon arrest, either with or without warrant, on a charge of 
having committed a public offence, the magistrate shall immediately inform him of the charge against him, and of his right to 
the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and before any further proceedings are had. 
SEC. 144. He shall also allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for counsel, and adjourn the examination for that 
purpose, and shall, upon the request of the defendant, require a peace officer to take a message to such counsel, within the 
township or city, as the defendant may name. The officer shall, without delay and without fee, perform that duty. 
SEC. 145. The magistrate shall, immediately after the appearance of counsel, or if defendant require the aid of counsel after 
waiting a reasonable time therefor, proceed to examine the case. 
SEC. 146. The examination must be completed at one session, unless the magistrate, for good cause shown, adjourn it. The 
adjournment cannot be for more than two days at each time, nor more than six days in all, unless by consent or on motion of 
the defendant. 
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SEC. 147. If an adjournment be had for any cause, the magistrate shall commit the defendant for examination, admit him to 
bail, or discharge him from custody upon the deposit of money, as provided in this act, as security for his appearance at the 
time to which the examination is adjourned. 
SEC. 148. The committee for examination shall be by an indorsement signed by the magistrate on the warrant of arrest, to the 
following effect: "The within named A. B., having been brought before me under this warrant, is committed for examination 
to the sheriff of the countyof __ ." If the **523 *294 sheriff be not present, the defendant may be committed to the custody 
ofa peace officer. 
SEC. 149. At the examination the magistrate shall, in the first place, read to the defendant the depositions of the witnesses 
examined on the taking of the information. He shall issue subpoenas for any witnesses required by the prosecutor or the 
defendant as provided in section five hundred and thirty-five. 
SEC. 150. The witnesses shall be examined in the presence of the defendant, and may be cross-examined in his behalf. 
SEC. 151. When the examination of witnesses on the part of the people is closed, the magistrate shall distinctly inform the 
defendant that it is his right to make a statement in relation to the charge against him (stating to him the nature thereof); that the 
statement is designed to enable him ifhe see fit, to answer the charge and to explain the facts alleged against him; that he is at 
liberty to waive making a statement, and that his waiver cannot be used against him on the trial. 
SEC. 152. If the defendant waive his right to make a statement, the magistrate shall make note thereof immediately following 
the depositions of the witnesses against the defendant, but the fact of his waiver shall not be used against the defendant on the 
trial. 
SEC. 153. If the defendant choose to make a statement, the magistrate shall proceed to take the same in writing, without oath, 
and shall put to the defendant the following questions only: What is your name and age? Where were you born? Where do 
you reside, and how long have you resided there? What is your business or profession? Give any explanation you may think 
proper of the circumstances appearing in the testimony against you, and state any facts which you think will tend to your 
excul pati on. 
SEC. 154. The answer of the defendant to each of the questions must be distinctly read to him as it is taken down. He may 
thereupon correct or add to his answer, and it shall be corrected until it is made conformable to what he declares to be the 
truth. 
SEC. 155. The statement must be reduced to writing by the magistrate, or under his direction, and authenticated in the 
following form: First. It must be set forth in detail that the defendant was informed of his rights, as provided by section one 
hundred and fifty-one, and that, after being so informed, he made the statement. Second. It must contain the questions put to 
him and his answers thereto, as provided in sections one hundred and fifty-three and one hundred and fifty-four. **524 *295 
Third. It may be signed by the defendant, or he may refuse to sign it; but if he refuse to sign it, his reason therefor must be 
stated as he gives it. Fourth. It must be signed and certified by the magistrate. 
SEC. 156. After the waiver of the defendant to make a statement, or after he has made it, his witnesses, if he produce any, 
000320 
)8 of 128 
http://web2. nt/pri ntstream.aspx?sv=Spl i t&prft= H ... 
shall be sworn and examined. 
SEC. 157. The witnesses produced on the part either of the people or of the defendant, shall not be present at the examination 
of the defendant; and while a witness is under examination, the magistrate may exclude all witnesses who have not been 
examined. He may also cause the witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing with each other until 
they are all examined. 
SEC. 158. The magistrate shall also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude from the examination every person except his 
clerk, the prosecutor and his counsel, the attorney-general, the district attorney of the county, the defendant and his counsel 
and the officer having the defendant in custody. 
SEC. 159. After hearing the proofs and the statement of the defendant, if he have made one, ifit appear either that a public 
offence has not been committed, or there is no sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate shall 
order the defendant to be discharged, by an endorsement on the depositions and statement signed by him, to the following 
effect: "There being no sufficient cause to believe the within named A. B. guilty of the offense within mentioned I ordered 
him to be discharged." 
SEC. 160. If, however, it appears from the examination that a public offence has been committed, and that there is a sufficient 
cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate shall, in like manner, endorse on the depositions and statement an 
order signed by him to the following effect: "It appearing to me; by the within depositions and statement (if any), that the 
offence therein mentioned, (or any other offence according to the fact, stating generally the nature thereot), has been 
committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within named A. B. guilty thereof, I order that he be held to answer 
the same." 
SEC. 161. If the offence be not bailable, the following words, or words to the same effect, shall be added to the indorsement: 
"And that he be committed to the sheriff of the county of __ _ 
SEC. 162. If the offense be bailable, and the bail be taken by the magistrate, the following words, or words to the same 
effect, shall be added to the indorsement: "And I have **525 *296 admitted him to bail to answer by the recognizance 
thereto annexed." 
SEC. 163. If the offense be bailable, and the defendant be admitted to bail, but bail have not been taken, the following words, 
or words to the same effect, shall be added to the indorsement mentioned in section one hundred and sixty: "And that he be 
admitted to bail in the sum of ____ dollars, and be committed to the sheriff of the county of _____ , until he gives 
such bail." 
SEC. 164. If the magistrate order the defendant to be committed, as provided in sections one hundred and sixty-one and one 
hundred and sixty-three, he shall make out a commitment signed by him, with his name of office, and deliver it, with the 
defendant, to the officer to whom he is committed; or, if that officer be not present, to a peace officer, who shall deliver the 
defendant into the proper custody, together with the commitment. 
SEC. 165. The commitment must be to the following effect: "County of ____ " (as the case may be). The people of the 
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United States and territory of Idaho, to the sheriff of the cOlmty of : An order having been this day made by me, 
that A. B. be held to answer upon a charge of (stating briefly the nature of the offence, and as near as may be, the time when, 
and the place where the same was committed), you are commanded to receive him into your custody, and to detain him until 
he be legally discharged. Dated this day of , 18_." 
SEC. 166. On holding the defendant to answer, the magistrate shall take from each of the material witnesses examined before 
him on the part of the people, a written recognizance, to the effect that he will appear and testifY at the court to which the 
depositions and statements are to be sent, or that he will forfeit the sum of five hundred dollars. 
SEC. 167. Whenever the magistrate shall be satisfied by proof, on oath, that there is reason to believe that any such witness 
will not fulfill his recognizance to appear and testifY, unless security be required, he may order the witness to enter into a 
written recognizance, with such sureties and in such sum as he may deem meet, for his appearance, as specified in the last 
section. 
SEC. 168. Infants and married women, who are material witnesses against the defendant, may in like manner be required to 
procure sureties for their appearance, as provided in the last section. 
SEC. 169. If a witness required to enter into a recognizance to appear and testifY, either with or without sure **526 ties, 
*297 refuse compliance with the order for that purpose, the magistrate shall commit him to prison until he comply or be 
legally discharged 
SEC. 170. When, however, it shall satisfactorily appear by the examination, on oath, of the witness, or any other person, that 
the witness is unable to procure sureties, he may be forthwith conditionally examined on behalf of the people; such 
examination shall be by question and answer, and shall be conducted in the same manner as the examination before a 
committing magistrate is required by this act to be conducted, and the witness shall thereupon be discharged. 
SEC. 171. The last section shall not apply to the prosecutor, or to an accomplice in the commission of the offence charged. 
SEC. 172. When a magistrate has discharged a defendant, or has held him to answer, a provided in sections on hundred and 
sixty, and one hundred and sixty-one, he shall return, without delay to the clerk of the court at which the defendant is required 
to supply the warrant, if any, the statement of the defendant's, if he has made one, and all recognizances of bail or for the 
appearance ofwitnesses taken by him. 
IV.-PROCEEDINGS AFTER COMMITMENT AND BEFORE 
INDICTMENT. 
SEC. 173. Prosecution by indictment, accusation, where found. 
176. Grand jury, formation of challenge to. 
178. To the panel, to the polls, how made and tried. 
181. Decision on, effect of challenge to panel. 
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183. Effect of challenge to the polis. 
184. Violation, a complaint. 
185. Objection to jury only by challenge. 
186. Foreman of grand jury, oath of. 
188. Oath of others, charge to grand jury. 
190. Sittings, discharge of. 
192. Another grand jury, order for. 
194. Duty of sheriff, how drawn. 
196. Trial jmors, how formed. 
201. Grand jury, powers and duties of. 
202. Indictment, presentment. 
204. Oath to witness, evidence to be received. 
207. For defendant. 
208. Indictment when to be found, information by member of. 
210. Inquiries to be made. 
211. To have free access to prisons, etc. 
212. Advice to, who allowed to be present. 
213. Proceedings to be kept secret. 
214. When may be witness. 
215. Not to be questioned relative to facts. 
216. Presentment, how found, not to be disclosed. 
219. Disclosme, how punished. 
220. Bench warrants, when to issue, form of. 
223. How executed, proceedings on arrest. 
**527 *298 SEC. 173. All public offences prosecuted in the district court must be prosecuted by indictment, except as 
provided in the next section. 
SEC. 174. Where the proceedings are had for the removal of district, county, or township officers, they may be commenced 
by an accusation in writing, as provided in sections sixty-seven and eighty. 
SEC. 175. All accusations against district, county, and township officers, and all indictments, must be found in the district 
court. 
SEC. 176. The formation of grand juries is prescribed by special statutes. 
SEC. 177. A challenge may be taken to the panel of the grand jury, or to any individual grand jmor, in the cases hereinafter 
prescribed, by the people or by the defendant. 
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SEC. 178. A challenge to the panel may be interposed for one or more of the following causes: First. That the requisite 
number of ballots was not drawn form the jury box of the county as prescribed by law. Second. That the notice of the 
drawing of the grand jury was not given as prescribed by law. Third. That the drawing was not had in the presence of the 
officers designated by law. 
SEC. 179. A challenge to an individual grand juror may be interposed for one or more of the following causes only: First. 
That he is a minor. Second. That he is an alien. Third. That he is insane. Fourth. That he is the prosecutor upon a charge 
against the defendant. Fifth. That he is a witness on the part of the prosecution, and has been served with process or bound by 
an undertaking as such. Sixth. That he has formed or expressed a decided opinion that the defendant is guilty of the offence 
for which he is held to answer. 
SEC. 180. The challenges mentioned in the last three sections may be oral, and shall be entered upon the minutes, and tried 
by the court in the same manner as challenges**528 *299 in the case ofa trial jury which are triable by the court. 
SEC. 181. The court shall allow or disallow the challenge, and the clerk shall enter its decisions in the minutes. 
SEC. 182. If a challenge to the panel be allowed, the grand jury are prohibited from inquiring into the charge against the 
defendant by whom the challenge was interposed. If they should, notwithstanding, do so, and find a indictment against him, 
the court shall direct the indictment to be set aside. 
SEC. 183. If a challenge to an individual grand juror be allowed, he shall not be present at, or take part in the consideration 
of the charge against the defendant who interposed the challenge, or the deliberations of the grand jury thereon. 
SEC. 184. The grand jury shall inform the court of a violation of the last section, and it shall be punished by the court as a 
contempt. 
SEC. 185. A person held to answer to a charge for a public offence, can take advantage of any objection to the panel or to an 
individual grand juror, in no other mode than that by challenge, as prescribed in the preceding section. 
SEC. 186. From the persons swnmoned to serve as grand jurors, and appearing, the court shall appoint a foreman. The court 
shall also appoint a foreman when the person already appointed is discharged, or excused, before the grand jury is 
dismissed. 
SEC. 187. The following oath shall be administered to the foreman of the grand jury: "You, as foreman of the grand jury, 
shall diligently inquire into, and true presentment make, of all public offences against the people of the United States in the 
Territory of Idaho, committed or triable within the jurisdiction of this court, of which you shall have or can obtain legal 
evidence. You shall present no person through malice, hatred, or ill will, not leave any unpresented through fear, favor, or 
affection, or for any reward, or the promise or hope thereof; but in all your presentments you shall present the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, according to the best of your skill and understanding, so help you God." 
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SEC. 188. The following oath shall be immediately thereupon administered to the other grand jurors present: "The same oath 
which your foreman has now taken before you on his part, you, and each of you, shall well and truly observe on your part, so 
help you God." 
SEC. 189. The grand jury being empaneled and sworn, shall be charged by the court. In doing so, the court shall **529 *300 
give them such information as it may deem proper, as to the nature of their duties, and any charges for public offences 
returned to the court, or likely to come before the grand jury. The court need not, however, charge them respecting violations 
of any particular staMe. 
SEC. 190. The grand jury shall then retire to a private room, and inquire into the offences cognizable by them. 
SEC. 191. The grand jury, on the completion of the business before them, shall be discharged by the court; but whether the 
business be completed or not, they shall be discharged by the final adjournment of the court. 
SEC. 192. If an offence be committed during the sitting of the court, after the discharge of the grand jury, the court may, in its 
discretion, direct an order to be entered that the sheriff summon another grand jury. 
SEC. 193. An order shall thereupon be made out by the clerk, and directed to the sheriff, requiring him to summon 
twenty-four persons, qualified to serve as grand jurors, to appear forthwith, or at such time as may be named by the court. 
SEC. 194. The sheriffshall execute the order, and return it with a list of the names of the persons summoned. 
SEC. 195. At the time appointed the list shall be called over, and the names of those in attendance be written by the clerk on 
separate ballots, and put into a box, from which a grand jury shall be drawn. 
SEC. 196. For the first, and for all subsequent terms of the district court, until an assessment roll in each county be made out 
and returned, so that a jury list may be formed and a jury drawn as required by law, the grand jury and the trial jury shall be 
formed in the following manner: 
SEC. 197. On or before the first day of the term, the judge shall, by an order to be entered on the minutes, direct the sheri ff of 
the county to summon thirty-six persons from the citizens of the county, to appear forthwith, or at such time as may be named 
in said order. 
SEC. 198. The clerk shall issue the summons, and the sheriff shall execute and return it at the time specified, with a list of the 
names of the persons so summoned. If he has been unable to summon the whole number in the time allowed, he shall return 
the summons with the list of the names summoned. 
SEC. 199. The court may, in its discretion, enlarge the time of the return, and direct the sheriff to summon the whole number, 
or may proceed to empanel a grand jury from the number summoned. 
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**530 *301 SEC. 200. Upon the return of the swnmons, or upon the expiration of the further time allowed, the names of the 
persons swnmoned shall be called, and the court shall proceed to empanel a grand jury and a trial jury, in like manner as if 
such persons had been empaneled upon a regular drawing of a jury. 
SEC. 201. The grand jury has the power, and it is their duty, to inquire into all public offences committed or triable within 
the jurisdiction of the court, and to present them to the court, either by presentment or indictment. 
SEC. 202. An indictment is an accusation in writing, presented by the grand jury to a competent court, charging a person with 
a public offence. 
SEC. 203. A presentment is an informal statement in writing, by the grand jury, representing to the court that a public offence 
has been committed, which is triable within the county, and that there is a reasonable grounds for believing that a particular 
individual, named or described, has committed it. 
SEC. 204. The foreman may administer an oath to any witness appearing before the grand jury. 
SEC. 205. In the investigation ofa charge, for the purpose of either presentment or indictment, the grand jury shall receive no 
other evidence than such as is given by witnesses produced and sworn before them, or furnished by legal documentary 
evidence, or the deposition ofwitnesses taken as provided in this act. 
SEC. 206. The grand jury shall receive none but legal evidence, and the best evidence in degree, to the exclusion of hearsay 
or secondary evidence. 
SEC. 207. The grand jury is not bound to hear evidence for the defendant; but it is their duty to weigh all the evidence 
submitted to them, and when they have reason to believe that other evidence within their reach will explain away the charge, 
they should order such evidence to be produced, and for that purpose may require the district attorney to issue process for the 
witnesses. 
SEC. 208. The grand jury ought to find an indictment, when all the evidence before them, taken together, is such as in their 
judgment would, ifunexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury. 
SEC. 209. Ifa member of the grand jury knows, or have reason to believe, that a public offence has been committed, which is 
triable within the jurisdiction of the court, he must declare the same to his fellow-jurors, who shall thereupon investigate the 
same. 
SEC. 210. The grand jury must inquire into the case of **531 *302 every person imprisoned in the jail of the county, on a 
criminal charge, and not indicated; into the condition and management of the public prisons within the county; and into the 
wilful and corrupt misconduct in office ofpubJic officers of every description within the county. 
SEC. 211. They are also entitled to free access, at all reasonable times, to the public prisons, and to the examinations, 
without charge, of all public records within the county. 
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SEC. 212. The grand jury may, at all reasonable times, ask the advice of the court, or any member thereof, and of the district 
attorney. Unless his advice be asked, no member of the court shall be permitted to be present during the session of the grand 
jury. The district attorney shall be allowed, at all times, to appear before the grand jury, on his request, for the purpose of 
giving information or advice relative to any matter cognizable by them, and may interrogate witnesses before them, when they 
shall deemit necessary. Except the district attorney, no person shall be permitted to be permitted to be present before the 
grand jury, besides the witnesses actually under examination; and no person shall be permitted to be present during the 
expression of their opinions or the giving of their votes upon any matter before them 
SEC. 213. Every member of the grandjury shall keep secret whatever he himself, or any other grand juror, may have said, or 
in w hat manner he, or any other grand juror may have voted on a matter before them 
SEC. 214. A member of the grand jury may, however, be required by the court to disclose the testimony of a witness 
examined before the grand jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that given by the witness before 
the court, or to disclose the testimony given before them by any person, upon a charge against him for perjury in giving his 
testimony, or upon his trial therefor. 
SEC. 215. No grand juror shall be questioned for anything he may say, or any vote he may give in the grand jury, relative to a 
matter legally pending before the jury, except for a perjury of which he may have been guilty, in making an accusation or 
giving testimony to his fellow-jurors. 
SEC. 216. A presentment cannot be found without the concurrence of at least twelve grand jurors. When so found, it must be 
signed by the foreman. 
SEC. 217. The presentment, when found, must be presented by the foreman, in the presence of the grand jury, to the court, and 
shall be filed by the clerk. 
SEC. 218. No grand juror, district attorney, clerk, judge or other officer shall disclose the fact of a presentment having **532 
*303 been made for a felony, until the defendant shall have been arrested. But this prohibition shall not extend to disclosure 
by the issuing or in the execution of a warrant to arrest the defendant. 
SEC. 219. A violation of the provisions of the last section shall be punishable as a contempt. 
SEC. 220. If the court deem that the facts stated in the presentment constitute a public offence, triable within the county, it 
shall direct the clerk to issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant. 
SEC. 221. The clerk, on the application of the district attorney, may accordingly, at any time after the order, whether the 
court be sitting or not, issue a bench warrant, under his signature and the seal of the court, into one or more counties. 
SEC. 222. The bench warrant, upon presentment, shall be substantially in the following form: County of-
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The people of the United States, of the territory ofidaho, to any sheriff, constable, marshal or policeman in this territory: A 
presentment having been made, on the --- day of ---, 18---, to the district court of the district of ------, charging C. D. with the 
crime of ------ (designating it generally); you are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above named C. D., and take 
him before E. F., a magistrate of this county, or in case of his absence or inability to act, before the nearest or most 
accessible magistrate in this county. 
Given under my hand, with the seal of the said court affixed, this ------ day of ------, A. D. 18----. By order of the court. G. 
H., Clerk. 
SEC. 223. The bench warrant may be served in any county, and the officer serving it shall proceed thereon in all respects as 
upon a warrant of arrest on a complaint, except that when served in another county it need not be indorsed by a magistrate of 
that county. 
SEC. 224. The magistrate; when the defendant is brought before him, shall proceed to examine the charge contained in the 
presentment, and hold the defendant to answer the same, or discharge him therefrom, in the same manner in all respects, as 
upon a warrant of arrest on complaint. 
v.-THE INDICTMENT. 
Sec. 
225. How found, dismissal of charge. 
227. Effect of, names ofwitnesses to be inserted. 
229. To be presented to court, against defendant not in custody. 
231. Pleadings, indictment, what to contain, form of 
236. Error in name of defendant. 
237. To charge only one offence. 
238. Manner of stating time of offence. 
239. Erroneous allegations not material. 
240. Construction of indictment. 
24 I. StaMe words not strictly followed. 
242. Indictment, when sufficient. 
243. Matters ofform not vitiated, what need not be stated. 
245. Judgment how pleaded, private staMe, how pleaded. 
247. Indictment for libel, what to set forth. 
248. Misdescription of forged instruments when immaterial. 
249. Perjury, indictment for, whatto set forth. 
250. Indictment against several defendants. 
25 I. No distinction between principal and accessory. 




253. Compounding offence, indictment for. 
254. When defendant to be arraigned, when must appear 
personally. 
256, How arraigned, defendant failing to appear. 
258. Warrant for arrest, form of, proceedings on. 
261. Form of warrant when offence not capital. 
263. Warrant how served, bail in other county. 
265. Defendant may be ordered in custody for further bail. 
266. Defendant to be committed, counsel for defendant. 
268. Arraignment, how made, defendant to declare true name. 
270. Other name, entry of on minutes, time to answer. 
273. Defendant may answer, demur or plead. 
274. Indictment, setting aside. 
276. Motion not made no objection, hearing of. 
278. Motion denied, defendant to answer. 
279. Motion granted, defendant to be discharged. 
280. Case resubmitted, proceedings, order for discharge. 
282. Indictment set aside no bar to future prosecution. 
283. Pleadings by defendant. 
284. Demurrer and plea, when to put in, for what cause, form of, 
etc. 
287. Hearing of, judgment on demurrer. 
288. Effect of allowance of demurrer. 
290. Case not resubmitted, effect of, submitted, proceedings. 
292. Effect of disallowing demurrer, objections to, how taken 
advantage of. 
294. Pleas, kinds of, to be oral, entry of, form of. 
597. Plea of guilty, how put in, may be withdrawn. 
299. Plea of not guilty, effects of, evidence. 
30). Former acquittal, what deemed, effect of, or conviction. 
304. Defendant mute, plea of not guilty. 
305. When criminal action may be removed to other county. 
306. Application, how, when and to what court order made. 
308. Order entered on minutes, copy of record transmitted. 
309. Order to direct removal of defendant, proceedings after 
removal. 
3) I. Issue of fact arrises, how tried, jury trial, how formed. 
314. Docket of action, how kept, issues on docket how disposed 
of. 
316. Time to prepare for trial, postponement of. 
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318. Challengingjury by several defendants, panel. 
321. To the panel, on what founded, when and how to be taken. 
324. Exception to, trial of. 
326. Exception may be withdrawn, amending challenge. 
327. Denial and trial of, witnesses and trial of. 
329. An account of bias of officer summoning. 
330. Effect of allowing, challenge to the polls, kinds of. 
333. When to be taken, peremtory, how taken. 
335. Number of, for cause, general cause of. 
338. Particular causes of, challenge for implied bias. 
340. Exemption not cause for, how taken. 
342. Exceptions to and proceedings thereon, trial of. 
344. Triers, who to be, oath of, juror challenged may be witness. 
347. Other testimony, court to determine law and facts. 
349. Instruction to triers, decision final. 
35). Order of taking challenges, final peremptory challenge. 
**534 *305 SEC. 225. An indictment cannot be found without the concurrence of at least twelve grand jurors; when so 
found, it shall be indorsed "a true bilI," and the indorsement shall be signed by the foreman of the grand jury. 
SEC. 226. If twelve grand jurors do not concur in finding an an indictment against a defendant who has been held to answer, 
the deposition and statement, if any, transmitted to them, shall be returned to the court, with an indorsement thereon, signed by 
the foreman, to the effect that the charge is dismissed. 
SEC. 227. The dismissal of the charge shall not, however, prevent the same charge from being again submitted to a grand 
jury, or as often as the court shall so direct. But without such direction, it shall not be again submitted. 
SEC. 228. When an indictment is found, the names of the witnesses examined before the grand jury shall be inserted at the 
foot of the indictment, or indorsed thereon, before it is presented to the court. 
SEC. 229. An indictment, when found by the grand jury, shall be presented by their foreman, in their presence, to the court, 
and shall be filed with the clerk, and remain in his office as a public record. 
SEC. 230. When an indictment has been found against a defendant not in custody, the same proceedings shall be had as are 
prescribed in sections two hundred and fifty-seven and two hundred and sixty-four, both inclusive, against a defendant who 
fails to appear for arraignment. 
SEC. 231. All the forms of pleading in criminal actions, **535 *306 and the rules by which the sufficiency of pleadings is to 
be determined, shall be those which are prescribed by this act. 
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SEC. 232. The first pleading on the part of the people is the indictment. 
SEC. 233. The indictment shall contain the title of the action, specifYing the name of the cotDt to which the indictment is 
presented, and the names of the parties; a statement of the acts constituting the offence, in ordinary and concise language, and 
in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. 
SEC. 234. It may be substantially in the following form: The people of the United States, of the territory ofIdaho, against A. 
B., in the district cotDt of the judicial district in the county of term, A. D., 18_. A. 8., is accused by 
the grand jury of the county of , by this indictment, of the crime of (giving its legal appellation such as murder, 
arson, manslaughter, or the like, or designating it as felony or misdemeanor), committed as follows: 
The said A. B., on the __ day of ____ , A. D., 18_, at the county of ____ , (stating the act or omission 
constituting the offence, in the ma nner prescribed in this act, according to the forms mentioned in the next secti on, where 
they are applicable)." 
SEC. 235. The indictment must be direct, and contain as it regards: First. The party charged. Second. The offence charged, 
when they are necessary to constitute a complete offence. 
SEC. 236. When a defendant is indicted by a fictitious or erroneous name, and in any stage of the proceeding his true name is 
discovered, it shall be inserted in the subsequent proceedings, referring to the fact of his being indicted by the name 
mentioned in the indictment. 
SEC. 237. The indictment shall charge but one offence, but it may set forth that offence in different forms under different 
courts. 
SEC. 238. The precise time at which it was committed need not be stated in the indictment, but it may be alleged to have 
been committed at any time before the finding of the same, except when the time is a material ingredient of the offence. 
SEC. 239. When an offence involves the commission, or an attempt to commit private irYury, and is described with sufficient 
certainty in other respects to identifY the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person irYured or intended to be injured shall 
not be deemed material. 
SEC. 240. The words used in an indictment shall be construed in the usual acceptance in the common language, except **536 
*307 such words and phrases as are defined by law, which are to be construed according to their legal meaning. 
SEC. 241. Words used in a statute to define a public offence, need not be strictly pursued in the indictment, but other words 
conveying the same meaning may be used. 
SEC. 242. The indictment shall be sufficient if it can be understood therefrom: First. That it is entitled in a court having 
authority to receive it, though the name of the cotDt be not accurately set forth. Second. That it was found by a grand jury of 
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. the county in which the court was held. Third. That the defendant is named, or if his name cannot be discovered, that he be 
described by a fictitious name with a statement that he has refused to disclose his real name. Fourth. That the offence was 
committed at some place within the jurisdiction of the court. Fifth. That the offence was committed at some time prior to the 
time of finding the indictment. Sixth. That the act or omission charged as the offence is clearly and distinctly set forth in 
ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to 
know what is intended. Seventh. That the act or omission charged as the offence is stated with such a degree of certainty as to 
enable the court to pronounce judgment upon a conviction according to the right of the case. 
SEC. 243. No indictment shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon, be affected 
by reason of any defect or imperfection in matters of form which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant. 
SEC. 244. Neither presumption of law, nor matters of which judicial notice is taken, need be stated in the indictment. 
SEC. 245. In pleading a judgment or other determination of, or proceeding before a court or officer of special jurisdiction, 
the facts conferring jurisdiction need not be stated, but it may be stated that the judgment or determination was duly made, or 
the proceeding duly had before such court or officer. The facts constituting the jurisdiction, however, must be established on 
the trial. 
SEC. 246. In pleading a private statute, or a right derived therefrom, it shall be sufficient to refer to the statute by its title and 
the day of its passage, and the court shall, thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
SEC. 247. An indictment for libel need not set forth any extrinsic facts for the purpose of showing the application to the party 
libeled of the defamatory matter on which the indictment is founded, but it shall be sufficient to state generally **537 *308 
that the same was published concerning him, and the fact that it was so published must be established on the trial. 
SEC. 248. When an instrument which is the subject of an indictment for forgery has been destroyed or withheld by the act or 
procurement of the defendant, and the fact of such destruction or withholding is alleged in the indictment, and established on 
the trial, the misdescription of the instrument shall be deemed immaterial. 
SEC. 249. In an indictment for perjury, or subornation of perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the 
controversy, or matter in respect to which the offence was committed, and in what court, or before whom, the oath alleged to 
be false was taken and that the court or person before whom it was taken had authority to administer the same, with proper 
allegations of the falsity of the matter on which the perjury is assigned; but the indictment need not set forth the pleadings, 
record, or proceedings with which the oath is connected, nor the commission, or the authority of the court or person before 
whom the perjury was committed. 
SEC. 250. Upon an indictment against several defendants, anyone or more may be convicted or acquitted. 
SEC. 25 I. No distinction shall exist between an accessory before the fact and a principal, or between principals in the first 
and second degree, in cases offelony; and all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit 
the act constituting the offence, or aid or abet in its commission, though not present, shall hereafter be indicted, tried, and 
punished as principals. 
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SEC. 252. An accessory after the fact to the commission ofa felony, may be indicted and ptmished, though the principal felon 
may be neither tried nor indicted. 
SEC. 253. A person may be indicted for having, with the knowledge of the commission of a public offence, taken money or 
property of another, or a gratuity, or a reward, or an engagement, or tmderstanding, express or implied, to compotmd or 
conceal the offence, or to abstain from the prosecution therefor, or to withhold any evidence thereof, though the person guilty 
of the original offence have not been indicted or tried. 
SEC. 254. When the indictment is filed, the defendant must be arraigned thereon before the court in which it is fotmd, except 
in the cases mentioned in sections two htmdred and seventy-five and two htmdred and seventy-six. 
SEC. 255. If the indictment be for a felony, the defendant must be personally present; but for a misdemeanor, his 
personal**538 *309 appearance is tmnecessary, and he may appear upon the argument by counsel. 
SEC. 256. When his personal appearance is necessary, ifhe be in custody, the court may direct the officer in whose custody 
he is, to bring him before it to be arraigned, and the officer shall do so accordingly. 
SEC. 257. If the defendant have been discharged on bail, or have deposited money instead thereof, and do not appear to be 
arraigned when his personal attendance is necessary, the court, in addition to the forfeiture of the recognizance or of the 
money deposited, may direct the clerk to issue a bench warrant for his arrest. 
SEC. 258. The clerk, on the application of the district attorney, may accordingly, at any time after the order, whether the 
court be sitting or not, issue a bench warrant into one or more counties. 
SEC. 259. The bench warrant upon the indictment shall, if the offence be a felony, be substantially in the following form: 
County of . The people of the United States, of the territory of Idaho, to any sheriff, constable, marshal, or 
pol iceman in this territory: An indictment having been found on the . __ day of , A. D. 18 _, in the district 
court of the judicial district of the COtmty of , charging C. D. with the crime of (designating it 
generally); you are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above named C. D., and bring him before that court to 
answer the indictment; or if the court have adjourned for the term, that you deliver him into the custody of the sheriff of the 
county of . Given under my hand, with the seal of the court affixed, this the __ day of , A. D. 18 
_. [Seal.] By order of the court. E. F., clerk. 
SEC. 260. The defendant, if the offence be punishable with death, when arrested under the warrant, shall be held in custody 
by the sheriff of the COtmty in which the indictment is found. 
SEC. 261. If the offence be not capital, the bench warrant shall be in similar form, adding to the body thereof a direction to 
the following effect: "Or ifhe require it, that you take him before any magistrate in that cotmty, or in the district in which you 
arrested him, that he may give bail to answer to the indictment." 
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• SEC. i62. If the offence charged be- not capital, the court, upon directing the bench warrant to issue, shall fix the amount of 
bail, and an indorsement shall be made upon the bench warrant, signed by the clerk, to the following effect: "The **539 *310 
defendant is to be admitted to bail in the sum of __ dollars." 
lofl28 
SEC. 263. The bench warrant may be served in any county in the same manner as a warrant of arrest, except that when served 
in another county it need not be endorsed by a magistrate of the county. 
SEC. 264. If the defendant be brought before a magistrate of another county for the purpose of giving bail, the magistrate 
shall proceed in all respects thereto in the same manner as if the defendant had been brought before him upon a warrant of 
arrest, and the same proceedings may be had thereon as provided in sections one hundred and eleven and one hundred and 
fourteen, both inclusive. 
SEC. 265. When the indictment is for felony, and the defendant, before the finding thereof, has given bail for his appearance 
to answer the charge, the court to which the indictment is presented may order the defendant to be committed to actual 
custody, unless he give bail in an increased amount, to be specified in the order. 
SEC. 266. If such order be made, and the defendant be present, he shall be forthwith committed accordingly. If he be not 
present, a bench warrant shall be issued and proceeded upon in the manner provided for in this act. 
SEC. 267. If the defendant appear for arraignment without counsel, he shall be informed by the court that is his right to have 
counsel before being arraigned, and shall be asked ifhe desires the aid of counsel. 
SEC. 268. The arraignment must be made by the court, or by the clerk or district attorney, under its direction, and consists in 
reading the indictment to the defendant and delivering to him a copy thereof and of the indorsements thereon, including the 
list of witnesses endorsed on it, and in asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty to the indictment. 
SEC. 269. When the defendant is arraigned he shall be informed that if the name by which he is indicted be not his true name, 
he must then declare his true name or be proceeded against by the name in the indictment. 
SEC. 270. Ifhe give no other name, the court may proceed accordingly. 
SEC. 271. If he alleges that another name is his true name, the court shall direct an entry thereof in the minutes of the 
arraignment, and the subsequent proceedings on the indictment may be had against him by that name, refering. also, to the 
name by which he is indicted. 
SEC. 272. If, on the arraignment, the defendant require it, he shall be allowed until the next day, or such further time **540 
*311 may be allowed him as the court may deem reasonable, to answer the indictment. 
SEC. 273. If the defendant do not require time as provided in the last section, of he do, then, on the next day, or at such 
further day as the court may have allowed him, he may answer to the arraignment, and either move the court to set aside the 
indictment or may demur or plead thereto. 
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SEC. 274. The indictment shall be set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned, and upon his motion, in either of 
the following cases: First. When it is not found, endorsed, and presented as prescribed in this act. Second. When the names 
of the witnesses examined before the grand jury, or whose depositions may have been read before them, are not inserted at 
the foot of the indictment, or endorsed thereon. Third. When any person is permitted to be present during the session of the 
grand jury, while the charge embraced in the indictment is under consideration, except as provided in section two hundred 
and twelve. 
SEC. 275. When the defendant has not been held to answer before the finding of the indictment, he may move to set it aside 
on any ground which would have been good ground for challenge, either to the panel or any individual grand juror. 
SEC. 276. If the motion to set aside the indictment be not made, the defendant shall be precluded from afterwards taking the 
objections mentioned in the last two sections. 
SEC. 277. The motion shall be heard when it is made, unless for good cause the court shall postpone the hearing to another 
time. 
SEC. 278. If the motion be denied, the defendant must immediately answer the indictment, either by demurring or pleading 
thereto. 
SEC. 279. If the motion be granted, the court shall order that the defendant, if in custody, be discharged therefrom; or, if 
admitted to bail, that his bail be exonerated; or, if he have deposited money instead of bail, that the same shall be reftmded to 
him, unless it direct that the case be re-submitted to the same or another grand jury. 
SEC. 280. If the court direct that the case be re-submitted, the defendant, if already in custody, shall so remain, unless he be 
admitted to bail; or, if already admitted to bail, or money have been deposited instead thereof, the bailor money shall be 
answerable for the appearance of the defendant to answer a new indictment. 
SEC. 281. Unless a new indictment be found before the next grand jury of the district is discharged, the court shall,**541 
*312 on the discharge of such grand jury, make the order prescribed in section two hundred and seventy-nine. 
SEC. 282. An order to set aside an indictment, as provided in this act, shall be no bar to a future prosecution for the same 
offence. 
SEC. 283. The only pleading on the part of the defendant is either a demurrer or a plea. 
SEC. 284. Both the demurrer and the plea must be put in, in open court, either at the time of the arraignment, or at such other 
time as may be allowed to the defendant for that purpose. 
SEC. 285. The defendant may demur to the indictment when it shall appear upon the face thereof, either: First. That the grand 
jury by which it was found had no legal authority to inquire into the offence charged, by reason of its not being within the 
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'local j~isdiction of the court. Second. That it does not substantially conform to the requirements of sections two hundred and 
thirty-three and two hundred and thirty-four. Third. That more than one offence has been charged in the indictment. Fourth. 
That the facts stated do not constitute a public offence. Fifth. That the indictment contains any matter which, if true, would 
constitute a legal justification, or excuse of the offense charged, or other bar to the prosecution. 
SEC. 286. The demurer must be in writing, signed either by the defendant or his counsel, and filed. It must distinctly specifY 
the grounds of objection to the indictment, or it shall be disregarded. 
SEC. 287. Upon the demurrer being filed, the objections presented thereby shall be heard either immediately, or at such time 
as the court may appoint. 
SEC. 288. Upon considering the demurer, the court shall give judgment, either allowing or disallowing it, and an order to 
that effect shall be entered on the minutes. 
SEC. 289. If the demurrer is allowed, the judgment shall be final upon the indictment demurred to, and shall be a bar to 
another prosecution of the same offence, unless the court, being of opinion that the objection on which the demurrer is 
allowed may be avoided in a new indictment, direct the case to be resubmitted to the same or another grand jury. 
SEC. 290. If the court do nt direct the case to be resubmitted, the defendant, ifin custody, shall be discharged, or ifadmitted 
to bail, his bail shall be exonerated, or ifhe has deposited money instead of bail, the money shall be refimded to him. 
SEC. 291. If the court direct that the case be resubmitted anew, the same proceedings must be had thereon as are 
prescribed**542 *313 in sections two hundred and eighty and two hundred and eighty-one. 
SEC. 292. If the demurrer is disallowed, the court shall permit the defendant, at his election, to plead, which he must do 
forthwith, or at such time as the court may allow. Ifhe do not plead, the court shall direct the plea of not guilty to be entered 
for him. 
SEC. 293. When the objections mentioned in section two hundred and eighty-five appear upon the face of the indictment, they 
can only be taken advantage of by demurrer, except that the objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the 
indictment, or that the facts stated do not constitute a public offence, may be taken at the trial, under the plea of no guilty, and 
in arrest of judgment. 
SEC. 294. There are three kinds of please to an indictment. A plea of-First. Guilty. Second. Not guilty. Third. A former 
judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offence charged, which may be pleaded either with or without the plea of "not 
guilty." 
SEC. 295. Every plea shall be oral, and shall be entered upon the minutes of the court. 
SEC. 296. The plea shall be entered in substantially the following form: First. If the defendant plead guilty. "the defendant 
pleads that he is guilty of the offence charged in this indictment." Second. Ifhe plead not guilty, "the defendant pleads that he 
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. is not guilty of the offence charged in the indictment." Third. If he plead a former acquittal or conviction, "the defendant 
pleads that he has already been convicted (or acquitted, as the case may be) of the offence charged in the indictment, by the 
140fl28 
judgment of the court of , (naming it) rendered at ,(naming the place) on the __ day of __ ." 
SEC. 297. A plea of guilty can in no case be put in, except by the defendant himself, in open court, unless upon an indictment 
against a corporation, in which case it may be put in by c01.UlSel. 
SEC. 298. The court may, at any time before judgment, upon a plea of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn, and a plea of not 
guilty substituted. 
SEC. 299. The plea of not guilty shaH be deemed a denial of every material allegation in the indictment. 
SEC. 300. All matters of fact, tending to establish a defence, may be given in evidence, under the plea of not guilty. 
SEC. 30 I. If the defendant were formerly acquitted, on the ground of a variance between the indictment and the proof, or 
upon an objection to the form or substance of the indictment" **543 *314 it shaH not be deemed an acquittal of the same 
offence. 
SEC. 302. When, however, he shall have been acquitted on the merits, he shaH be deemed acquitted of the offence, 
notwithstanding any defect, in form or substance, in the indictment on which he was acquitted. 
SEC. 303. When the defendant shaH have been convicted or acquitted upon an indictment, the conviction or acquittal shaH be 
a bar to another indictment for the offence charged in the former, or for an attempt to commit the same, or for an offence 
necessarily included therein, of which he might have been convicted under that indictment, as provided in section four 
hundred and eleven. 
SEC. 304. If the defendant refuse to answer the indictment by demurer or plea, a plea of not guilty shall be entered. 
SEC. 305. A criminal action, prosecuted by indictment, may be removed from the court in which it is pending, on the 
application of the defendant, on the ground that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the indictment is 
pending. 
SEC. 306. The application must be made in open court, and in writing, verified by the affidavit of the defendant, and a copy 
of said affidavit must be served on the district attorney, at least one day before the application is made to the court. 
SEC. 307. If the court be satisfied that the representation of the defendant is true, an order shaH be made for the removal of 
the action to the district court of a county which is free from the like objection. 
SEC. 308. The order of removal shall be entered on the minutes, and the clerk shaH immediately make out and transmit a 
certified copy of the entry, with a certified copy of the record, pleadings, and proceedings in the action, including the 
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. recogniiances for the appearance of the defendant and of the witnesses, to the court to which the action is removed. 
SEC. 309. If the defendant be in custody, the order shall direct his removal by the sheriff of the county where he is 
imprisoned, to the custody of the sheriff of the county to which the action is removed, and he shall be forthwith removed 
accordingly. 
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SEC. 310. The court to which the action is removed shall proceed to trial and judgment therein, as if the action had been 
commenced in such court. If it be necessary to have any of the original pleadings or other papers before such court, the court 
from which the action is removed shall, at any time, on application of the district attorney, or the defendant,,**S44 *315 
order such papers or pleadings to be transmitted by the clerk, a certified copy thereof being retained. 
SEC. 311. An issue of fact arrises-First. Upon a plea of not guilty; or Second. Upon a plea ofa former conviction or acquittal 
of the same offence. 
SEC. 312. An issue of fact must be tried by a jury of the county in which the indictment was found, unless the action be 
removed by order of the court into some other county. 
SEC. 313. Trial juries for criminal actions shall be formed in the same manner as trial juries in civil actions. 
SEC. 314. The clerk shall keep a docket of all the criminal actions pending in the court, in which he shall enter each 
indictment, according to the date of filing, specifYing opposite the title of each action, whether it be for a felony or 
misdemeanor, and whether the defendant be in custody or on bail. 
SEC. 315. The issues on the docket shall be disposed of in the following order, unless upon the application of either party, 
for good cause shown by affidavit, and upon two days' notice to the opposite party, with a copy of the affidavit in support of 
the application, the court shall direct an indictment to be tried out of its order-First. Indictments for felony when the 
defendant is in custody. Second. Indictments for misdemeanor when the defendant is in custody. Third. Indictments for felony 
when the defendant is on bail. and, Fourth, Indictments for misdemeanor when the defendant is on bail. 
SEC. 316. After his plea, the defendant shall have at lease two days to prepare for his trial ifhe require it. 
SEC. 317. When an indictment is called for trial, the court may, upon sufficient cause shown by affidavit, direct the trial to 
be postponed to another day of the same term, or the next term. 
SEC. 318. A challenge is an objection made to the trial jurors, and is of two kinds-First. To the panel. Second. To an 
individual juror. 
SEC. 319. When several defendants are tried together, they are not allowed to sever their challenges, but must join therein. 
SEC. 320. A panel is a list of jurors returned by a sheriff to serve at a particular court, or for the trial ofa particular cause. 
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SEC. 321. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all the jurors returned, and may be taken by either party. 
SEC. 322. A challenge to the panel can only be found on a material departure from the forms described by statute in **545 
*316 respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the intentional omission of the sheriff to swnmon one or more of the 
jurors drawn. 
SEC. 323. A challenge to the panel must be taken before a juror is sworn, and must be in writing, specitying plainly and 
distinctly the facts constituting the grounds of challenge. 
SEC. 324. If the sufficiency of the facts alleged as a ground of challenge be denied, the adverse party may except to the 
challenge. The exception need not be in writing, but shall be entered on the minutes of the court. 
SEC. 325. Upon the exception, the court shall proceed to try the sufficiency of the challenge, assuming the facts alleged 
therein to be true. 
SEC. 326. If, on the exception, the court deem the challenge sufficient, it may, if justice require it, permit the party excepting 
to withdraw his exception, and to deny the facts alleged in the challenge. If the exception be allowed, the court may, in like 
manner, permit an amendment of the challenge. 
SEC. 327. If the challenge be denied, the denial may, in like manner, be oral, and shall be entered on the minutes of the court, 
and the court shall proceed to try the question of fact. 
SEC. 328. Upon such trial, the officers, whether judicial or ministerial, whose irregularity is complained of, as well as any 
other persons, may be examined to prove or disprove the facts alleged as the grounds of challenge. 
SEC. 329. When the panel is formed from persons whose names are not drawn from the grand jury box, a challenge may be 
made to the panel on account of any bias of the officer who swnmoned the jury, which would be good grounds of challenge to 
ajuror. Such objection shall be made in the same form and determined in the same manner as when made to a juror. 
SEC. 330. If, either upon an exception to the challenge or a denial of the fact, the challenge be allowed, the court shall 
discharge the jury, so far as the trial of the indictment in question is concerned. If it be disallowed, the court shall direct the 
jury to be empaneled. 
SEC. 331. Before a juror is called, the defendant must be informed by the court, or under its direction, that if he intend to 
challenge any individual juror, he must do so when the juror appears, and before he is sworn. 
SEC. 332. A challenge to an individual juror is either-First. Peremptory; or Second. For cause. 
SEC. 333. It must be taken when the juror appears, and **546 *317 before he is sworn, but the court may, for good cause, 
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permit it to be taken after the juror is sworn, and before the jury is completed. 
SEC. 334. A peremptory challenge may be taken by either party, and be oral. It is not an objection to a juror, for which no 
reason need be given, but upon which the court shall exclude him 
SEC. 335. If the offence charged be ptmishable with death, or with imprisonment in the territorial prison for life, the 
defendant is entitled to twenty, and the territory to five, peremptory challenges. On a trial for any other offence, the defendant 
is entitled to ten, and the territory to three peremptory challenges. 
SEC. 336. A challenge for cause may be taken by either party. It is an objection to a particular juror, and is either-First. 
General, that the juror is disqualified from serving in any case; or, Second. Particular, that he is disqualified from serving in 
the case on trial. 
SEC. 337. General cases of challenges are-First. A conviction for felony. Second. A want of any of the qualifications 
prescribed by statute to render a person a competent juror. Third. Unsotmdness of mind, or such defect in the faculties of the 
mind, or organs of the body as renders him incapable of performing the duties of a juror. 
SEC. 338. Particular cases of challenge are of two kinds: First. For such a bias as, when the existance of the facts is 
ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror, and which is known in this act as implied bias. Second. For the 
existance of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case which, in the excercise of a sotmd discretion on 
the part of the trier, leads to the inference that he will not act with entire impartiality, and which is known in this act as actual 
bias. 
SEC. 339. A Challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following causes, and for no other: First. 
Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be injured by the offence charged, or on whose 
complaint the prosecution was instituted, or to the defendant. Second. Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, attorney 
and client, master and servant, or landlord and tenant, or being a member of the family of the defendant or of the person 
alleged to be injured by the offence charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, or in his employment on 
wages. Third. Being a party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having complained against, or been accused by him 
in a criminal prosecution. Fourth. **547 *318 Having served on the jury which fotmd the indictment, or on a coroner's jury 
which inquired into the death of a person whose death is the subject of the indictment. Fifth. Having served on a trial jury 
which has tried another person for the offence charged in the indictment. Sixth. Having been one of a jury formerly sworn to 
try the same indictment, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict, after the case was 
submitted to it. Seventh. Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged as an 
offence. Eighth. Having formed or expressed an tmqualified opinion or belief that the prisoner is guilty of the offence 
charged. Ninth. If the offence charged be ptmishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as woud 
preclude his finding the defendant guilty; in which case he shall neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as juror. 
SEC. 340. An exemption from service on a jury is not a cause of challenge, but the privilege of the person exempted. 
SEC. 341. In a challenge for implied bias, one or more of the causes stated in section three htmdred and thirty-nine must be 
alleged. In a challenge for actual bias, ti must be alleged that the juror is biased against the party challenging. In either case 
the challenge may be oral, but must be entered on the minutes of the court. 
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SEC. 342. The adverse party may except to the challenge in the same manner as to a challenge to the panel, and the same 
proceedings shall be had thereon as prescribed in sections three hundred and twenty-four and three hundred and twenty-five, 
except that if the exception be allowed, the juror shall be excluded. He may oraIly deny the facts aIleged as the ground of 
chaIlenge. 
SEC. 343. If the facts be denied, the chaIlenge shaIl be tried as foIlows: First. If it be for implied bias, by the court. Second. 
Ifit be for actual bias, by triers. 
SEC. 344. The triers shall be three impartial persons, not on the jury panel, appointed by the court. AIl challenges for actual 
bias shall be tried by three triers thus appointed, a majority of whom may decide. 
SEC. 345. The triers shall be sworn generaIly to inquire whether or not the several persons who may be challenged, and in 
respect to whom the challenge shall be given to them in charge, are biased against the challenged party, and to decide the 
same truly, according to the evidence. 
SEC. 346. Upon the trial of a chaIlenge to an individual juror, the juror chaIlengedmay be examined as a witness to **548 
*319 prove or disprove the chaIlenge, and shall be compeIled to answer every question pertinent to the inquiry therein. 
SEC. 347. Other witnesses may also be examined on either side, and the rules of evidence applicable to the trial of other 
issues shall govern the admission or exclusion oftestimony, on the trial of the challenge. 
SEC. 348. On the trial of a chaIlenge for implied bias, the court shall determine the law and the facts, and shall either aIlow 
or disallow, the chaIlenge and direct an entry accordingly on the minutes. 
SEC. 349. On the trial ofa challenge for actual bias, when the evidence is concluded, the court shall instruct the triers that it 
is their duty to find the challenge true, if, in their opinion, the evidence warrants the conclusion that the juror has such a bias 
against the party chaIlenging him as to render him not impartial, and that if, from the evidence, they believe him free from 
such a bias, they must find the challenge not true. The court shall give them no other instructions. 
SEC. 350. The triers must thereupon find the challenge either true or not true, and their decision is final. If they find it true, 
the juror shall be excluded. 
SEC. 351. All challenges to an individual juror, except peremptory, must be first taken by the defendant and then by the 
people, and each party must exhaust all his challenges to eachjuror as he is caIled, before the other begins. 
SEC. 352. The challenges of either party need not all be taken at once, but they must be taken separately in the following 
order, including in each challenge all the causes of challenge belonging to the same class: First. To the panel. Second. To an 
individual juror for a general disqualification. Third. To an individual juror for implied bias. Fourth. To an individual juror 
for actual bias. 
000341. 5/26/2010 4:03 PM 
19 of 128 
IILLP;// Wt:D~. wesIlaw .convprmtlprmtstream.aspx?sv=Spl it&prft= ... 
. SEC. 353. If all the challenges on both sides be disallowed, either party may still take a peremptory challenge, unless the 
peremptory challenges be exhausted. 
VI.-TRIAL. 
SEC. 354. Trial, order of. 
355. When prescribed may be departed from. 
356. CmIDsel, number of, innocence presumed. 
358. Reasonable doubt of guilt, degrees of. 
359. When defendant may be tried separately. 
*"'549 *320 ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting. 
The Court denies the petition for a rehearing without any comment. The supporting brief of the appellant's is more deserving. 
Courteously and politely written, it opens with the accurate observation that this case, one of first impression, has presented 
this Court with a unique opportunity to guide the bench and bar for years to come through the intricacies of the grand jury 
process, looking toward a properly balanced interposition of the judiciary between the prosecuting authorities and the 
citizenry. This the appellant pursues not just for the defendant Edmonson. It is therein said, and rightfully so, that this Court 
has eschewed the opportunity. 
A strong point is made that if the Court continues in its ruling that the county prosecutors are blessed with unfettered charging 
discretion, then, at the least in this case Mr. Edmonson should be allowed a preliminary hearing. This is an entirely 
reasonable stance; common sense and common courtesy on the part of the Court should require close consideration before 
brushing the request aside. The opinion for the Court, as it presently stands tells the reader at p. 233, 743 P.2d at 462 that 
Edmonson's appeal is doomed because of his "failure to request a preliminary hearing ... ," which is said to be "dispositive 
of this case." In the same paragraph the statement is made that a "substantive difference in the indictment and information 
procedures is the right to a preliminary hearing when an information is used." That is true, and it is well and good. It has 
been so forever. As appellant has pointed out in the supporting brief, the Court's opinion is stating that if an indicted 
defendant does not request a preliminary hearing, he has waived that right. But a defendant cannot waive a right unless he in 
the first place had that right. 
Once again I may be remiss in my reading abilities, because I am unable to find in the code of criminal procedure or in the 
Court's own promulgated Idaho Criminal Rules any language which states that an indicted accused must request a preliminary 
in order to obtain one. Nor, is there any Idaho case-law so holding. And, entirely to the contrary, Criminal Rule 5 provides 
that when a defendant accused by complaint of a felony is taken before a magistrate for his initial appearance, along with 
other advice which he must be given, he shall be advised of "His right to a preliminary hearing ... the nature of a preliminary 
hearing, and the effect of a waiver thereof." Rule 5(f)(5). The defendant does not have to request a preliminary hearing. He 
will be given a preliminary hearing unless he elects to waive it. It is not a matter treated lightly by defense counsel, and by 
the magistrates who will ordinarily ascertain for certain if a defendant is making a knowing and intelligent waiver. 
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, How, then, is it that the Court's opinion concedes that there is in an indicted defendant a right to a preliminary hearing, but he 
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will receive it if only he thinks to make the request. How, in the name of common sense can such a person be held to a 
procedural requirement which has never found its way into a statute or into a court rule or by case precedent? 
Judge Ben~ton in his considered decisions did make the observation that the defendants Hawkins and Freeland did request 
of the court an order granting a post-indictment preliminary hearing. Truly enough, such requests were made in those two 
cases. But, what those cases do not hold is that failure to make a request amounts to a waiver. Such a holding is yet to come 
from either ofthe Supreme Courts of those two states. What comes out of Hawkins and Freeland is simply that motions were 
made to obtain a right which was being asserted-the right of an indicted defendant to have a preliminary hearing, and thus be 
on an equal footing with defendants who are charged by a felony complaint. When the motion was made in Freeland, counsel 
had before them two earlier companion Oregon cases, Slate v. Clqrk, 291 Or. 231. 630 P.2d 810 (1981), and State v. Hector 
Vjctor Edmonson. 291 Or. 251, 630 P.2d 822 () 98)}' The indicted defendant**550 *321 in Stqte y, Clark. 291 Or. 231, 
630 P.2d 8) 0 (1981) did not move for an order granting him in a preliminary hearing, but moved for a dismissal based on the 
"fai I ure to accord defendant a preliminary hearing after his indictment ... " 630 P.2d at p. 812-exactly like the situation before 
us. In that case there had been a denial of defendant's request for a preliminary hearing after indictment. 630 P.2d at 823. 
Both Clark and Edmonson were authored by Justice Linde who, with his colleagues, saw the same issue squarely before 
them in both cases, although an actual request for preliminary hearing was not made in Clark. Clark was the lead opinion of 
the two and fully discussed the issue. Edmonson merely applied Clark. The indicted defendants in both of those cases relied 
on Hawkins, of which counsel had gained knowledge. 
Defendant's principal argument, however, was predicated on Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 584. 150 Cal.Rptr. 
435.586 P.2d 916 (1978), a decision based entirely on state rather than federal grounds. In any event, he could not have 
excluded issues of state law by pitching his attack on 14th amendment grounds. Cf. State v. Spada. 286 Or. 305. 594 P.2d 
815 (J 979). The case was argued together with State v. Edmonson, also decided today, which presented the same issue of 
equal rights, based in part on art. I, § 20, and there can be no claim that examination of that issue under the Oregon 
Constitution before the 14th amendment took respondent by surprise. 
Clark. 630 P.2d at p. 812, f.n. 1. 
The Hawkins decision held that indicted defendants must be afforded preliminary hearings equally with defendants 
charged by an information in order to meet the equality guarantee of California's constitution. Before turning to the 
Hawkins court's analysis, therefore, it is necessary to review the comparable Oregon guarantee. 
Clark. 630 P.2d at p. 814. 
The Oregon Supreme Court at length reviewed its prior case law which involved art. I. Sec. 20 of the Oregon 
Constitution, FN I and saw that the issue presented was within the scope of the Oregon constitutional provision, and agreed 
with the California court that: 
FNI. Article I, section 20 provides: 
No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the 
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same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens. 
There is no question that the opportunity of a preliminary hearing is a "privilege" within the meaning of the constitutional 
guarantee, and potentially one of great practical importance. The grant or denial of this privilege is controlled by the state's 
choice, acting through the district attorney, to proceed by indictment or by information. 
In the present case, we agree with the California court in Hawkins that the opportunity of a preliminary hearing, with the 
procedural rights described above, offers important advantages over prosecution upon an indictment without a preliminary 
hearing. 
But, the Oregon Court continued to adhere to an earlier opinion, City o(Klamath Fqlls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757. 619 P.2d 
217 () 980), which case was not at all in point on the issue presented in Clark, and in Edmonson, and in this case: 
[18] We do not follow the Hawkins court to the conclusion, however, that this difference between two available 
procedures necessarily represents a denial of equal protection of the laws, regardless of showing which defendants 
receive one or the other procedure. Hawkins reached this conclusion in "classification" terms, by defining as two classes 
those who are indicted and those who are charged by information. But we think this is an example of the "circular" use of 
the concept of "class" mentioned above. The distinction to be tested is the use or nonuse of preliminary hearings. The 
"classes" said to fail the test of equal protection are the "class" of those defendants who receive preliminary**551 *322 
hearings (because charged by information) and the "class" of those who do not (because indicted). But these defendants do 
not exist as categories or as classes with distinguishing characteristics before and apart from a prosecutor's decision how 
to charge one, or some, or all defendants. Aside from the manner in which the decision is made, see City of Klamath 
Falls, supra, 289 Or. at 784-785. 619 P.2d 217 (Lent, J., dissenting), defendants charged under either procedure are 
"classes" only as an effect of the dual procedural scheme itself. As in City of Klamath Falls, supra, "these defendants [i.e. 
those who do not receive a preliminary hearing] are not denied such a 'privilege' as individual persons, but only because 
the are members of a 'class' of persons who are prosecuted [by indictment] as distinct from persons prosecuted [on an 
information]." 289 Or. at 776,619 P.2d 217. 
[19-20] Each of the two procedures, however, is expressly authorized by the constitution itself. Properly administered, 
each satisfies the fourteenth amendment. ... As stated above, the administration of laws and procedures provided in the 
constitution nonetheless must meet other constitutional standards, but the mere coexistence of the two procedures so as to 
limit preliminary hearings to one of them does not constitute forbidden class legislation. Without a showing that the 
administration of Or. Const. art. VIT. § 5 and ORS 135.070-135.185 in fact denied defendant individually, or a class to 
which be [sic] belongs, the equal privilege of a preliminary hearing with other citizens of the state similarly situated, the 
circuit court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. 
However, as with respect to his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack ofa preliminary hearing, defendant has made no 
effort to show that the handling of his case violated those principles. Rather, he attacks the range of the prosecutor's 
discretion without previously stated standards as a denial of equal protection on its face. We do not believe equal 
protection goes so far as to require previously stated standards as long as no discriminatory practice or illegitimate 
motive is shown and the use of discretion has a defensible explanation. 
The Court of Appealsfound that there was such an explanation in this case. 
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The evidence showed that a number of persons were involved in the criminal activities for which defendant was 
indicted. Several of those individuals pleaded guilty to one or two charges and were granted immunity from further 
prosecution in exchange for their testimony against defendant before the grand jury and at his several trials. The 
prosecutor in charge of the cases testified that he treated defendant differently because the investigation showed that 
defendant was the instigator of many of the crimes and had demonstrated that he was a greater threat to society than the 
other individuals. 
47 Or.App. [389J at 392, 615 P.2d 1043. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it was not error to reject the motion to 
dismiss the indictment. 
Clark. 630 P.2d at pp. 817-819 (emphasis added). 
Two words, "Properly administered," plus differently worded provisions of the California and Oregon constitutions, explain 
how the Oregon court could embrace much of what was written in Hawkins, and yet reach an opposite result. 
The quality of being "properly administered" was found fatally missing two years later in Freeland, a graceful flip-flop from 
Clark, and bringing into Oregon criminal procedure the right of an indicted defendant to a preliminary hearing. Even 
dissenting Justice Jones opined that "the goal of the majority opinion is desirable." Freeland 667 P.2d at p. 521. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's holding that where the choice between prosecution by information-with 
**552 *323 right of preliminary hearing-or by indictment: 
is made primarily at the discretion of the prosecution [sic, prosecutor] who makes his decision upon' logistical' and 
'tactical' criteria, the choice of procedure is administered purely haphazardly or otherwise on terms that have no 
satisfactory explanation under art. 1. Sec. 20 .... 
and, " ... defendant has been denied an equal privilege and equal protection ... " 667 P.2d at 519. 
Whereas the trial court had dismissed the indictment for failure to accord the indicted defendant a preliminary hearing, the 
Supreme Court did not, as a generality, approve of the dismissal of the indictment as a remedy for not according a 
preliminary hearing: 
[13] There remains the question whether the court's order dismissing the indictment was a correct remedy for what the 
court found to be an unconstitutional denial of a preliminary hearing. 
Defendant does not claim that there is any flaw in the indictment or that it was not found by proper grand jury procedure. 
What is challenged here on grounds of constitutionally unequal administration is not that the prosecution obtained an 
indictment but that it refused a preliminary hearing. The two steps are not intrinsically incompatible. See. Model Code of 
Pre-Arraignment Procedure, supra n. 3. What defendant requested, first in the district court and then in the circuit court, 
was a preliminary hearing. He moved for dismissal of the indictment only as an alternative in case the preliminary hearing 
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was not provided. The circuit court first signed an order on September 28, 1981 "that the state must schedule and hold a 
preliminary hearing within thirty (30) days of this date or the indictment will be dismissed." Upon a further motion of the 
defendant stating that by October 28, 1981, no preliminary hearing had been held, the court ordered the indictment 
dismissed. 
There was considerable discussion of this procedure between the prosecutor and the circuit court. As the indictment 
itself was not challenged, the correct procedure, rather than dismissing the indictment, would have been to stay further 
proceedings under it until the state proceeded with a preliminary hearing or the defendant waived such a hearing. 
Dismissal then would be governed by the standards of ORS 135.747 and 135.750. In the circuit court, the prosecutor 
expressly stated at the beginning of the hearing that dismissal would be proper if the court agreed with defendanfs position 
and the state decided not to proceed with a preliminary hearing. The court followed the suggestion of the parties, and the 
question was not pursued on appeal. It therefore is not before us for decision. 
667 P.2d at p, 520. (Emphasis added). 
Unlike Freeland, where the Supreme Court noted that there were no claims of error or impropriety in the proceedings 
leading to the indictment, the record here is replete with such. This, of course, was well displayed in my earlier opinion, and 
the claims defended against in the majority opinion by agreeing that there were violations of statutory provisions, and other 
improprieties-but nothing to get excited about. 
That ground was well-plowed, and won't now be disked. It is only fitting to mention the dismay caused to able counsel who, 
notwithstanding, nicely tell it like it is: 
"Prosecutor Hamlett has been casually censured by Judge Bengtson and by this Court for his improprieties before the Grand 
Jury, yet heads have simply turned away. This Court has thus far missed an opportunity to provide a stable framework for the 
Idaho grand jury system, whi ch, although in its infancy, has now become very attractive as a prosecutor's vehicle. 
"The third circuit case of United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, speaks to prosecutor abuses by finding: 
'We recognize that dismissal of an indictment may impose important costs upon the prosecution and the pUblic. At a 
minimum, the government will be required**553 *324 to present its evidence to a grand jury unaffected by bias or 
prejudice. But the costs of continued unchecked prosecutorial misconduct are also substantial. This is particularly so 
before the grand jury, where the prosecutor operates without the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary, and 
virtually immune from public scrutiny. The prosecutor's abuse of his special relationship to the grand jury poses an 
enormous risk to defendants as well. For while in theory a trial provides the defendant with a full opportunity to contest 
and disprove the charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment will often have a devastating persona) 
and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo. Where the potential for abuse is so great, and 
the consequences of a mistaken indictment so serious, the ethical responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of 
the judiciary to protect against even the appearance of unfairness, are correspondingly heightened. We suspect that 
dismissal of an indictment may be virtually the only effective way to encourage compliance with these ethical 
standards, and to protect defendants from abuse of the grand jury process'. (Emphasis mine) 
United States v. Serubo 
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6Q4 E.2d 807, at 817 
"The prosecutor abuses involved in this case are varied, numerous and pervasive throughout each issue presented on appeal. 
"Mr. Hamlett utilized a magnitude of hearsay before the grand jury, the same including newspaper articles, letters, unsworn 
statements taken by State investigators, transcribed testimony from earlier hearings (Magistrate's Inquiry), and his own 
arguments. 
"Federal Courts, having previously and ineffectively admonished prosecutors, are taking notice and pursuing corrective 
measures which are presently available to this Court. The Court in United States v. Estepa. 471 F.2d 1132, held: 
'The many opinions in which we have affirmed convictions despite the Government's needless reliance on hearsay before 
the grand jury show how loathe we have been to open up a new road for attacking convictions on grounds unrelated to the 
merits. We have been willing to aIlow ample, many doubtless think too ample, latitude in the needless use of hearsay, 
subject to only two provisos-that the prosecutor does not deceive grand jurors as to "the shoddy merchandise they are 
getting so they can seek something better if they wish." , 
United States v. Estepa, 
471 F.2d at 1137. 
"Estepa continued: 
'Here the Assistant United States Attorney, whether wittingly or unwittingly-we prefer to think the latter, clearly violated 
the first of these provisos. We cannot, with proper respect for the discharge of our duties, content ourselves with yet 
another admonition; a reversal with instructions to dismiss the indictment may help to translate the assurances of the United 
States Attorneys into consistent performance by their assistants.' 
United States v. Estepa, 
Supra at 1137 
"In summarizing Estepa, supra, the Court, in United States v. Gallo. 394 F.Supp. 310. stated: 
'Disturbed at the apparent disregard of its warnings to prosecutors in this Circuit concerning the widespread use of 
hearsay evidence before grand juries, the Court of Appeals felt compelled in Estepa to reverse the judgments of conviction 
because in the proper exercise of its judicial duties, it could not content itselfwith "yet another admonition". United States 
v. Estepa, supra at 1137.' 
United States v. Gallo, 
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394 f.Supp. at 309-310 (315] 
"This Court recognized that much hearsay was presented to the 'Edmonson' Grand Jury, yet has apparently chosen to ignore, 
and thus allow the Prosecutor to ignore, the clear dictates oflCR 6(t) and Idaho Code 19-1105. It is a concern to this writer 
that prosecutors have been 'turned loose' to pursue their own ends. This **554 *325 Court is perpetuating such eventuality 
by recognizing the problem and simply giving Mr. Hamlett and others similarly situated a slight tap on the wrist. Footnote I 
on Page 236, 743 P.2d 465, of this Court's majority opinion in this case states: 'Despite the rule we announce today, 
prosecutors should endeavor to preclude any hearsay evidence from grand jury proceedings.' Such an admonition seems 
hollow following this Court's tacit approval of the material Mr. Hamlett presented to the Latah County Grand Jury. 
"In addition to hearsay, Mr. Hamlett presented the Grand Jury with his instructions, his arguments, his recollection and view 
of the evidence, his opinion on how many of them should always be present, and his view on witnesses credibility. The 
majority opinion agrees with Edmonson that some of Mr. Hamlett's statements are impermissible. Notwithstanding this 
Court's statement that: '... he (Mr. Hamlett) overstepped the bounds of permissible conduct', the Court ratified such 
impermissible conduct by concluding such conduct did not act to prejudice the Grand Jury in any way or infringe upon their 
independent thought process. It is difficult to grasp the continuity of such thought; the Court tells Hamlett to keep his hand out 
of the cookie jar as it hands him a cookie. 
"The question of unauthorized persons being present before the Grand Jury also ties itself to Mr. Hamlett's conduct. As noted 
in this Court's opinion in the case at bar, 'the purpose of Idaho Code § 19-II II and I.C.R. 6(d), is quite clear. It is designed 
to guard the secrecy of the Grand Jury proceedings and to assure that the jurors are free from undue influence and 
intimidation thereby allowing them to make an independent determination of probable cause'. 1987 Opinion # 59, p. 16. By 
analogy, the case of United States v. Pignatie//o, 582 F.Supp. 251 provides a good discussion on a Rule 6(d) violation for 
which the Court dismissed an indictment. In Pignatie//o, an SEC attorney attended a grand jury proceeding as a special 
assistant to the United States Attorney. Although Federal statutes were involved, the similar circumstances to the case at bar 
are obvious. The Court found that because the government SEC lawyer was not properly sworn in as a government Attorney 
General Assistant, her presence was violative of (ICR) Rule 6(d), and warranted application of a per se rule mandating 
indictment dismissal. 
"Notwithstanding ICR 6(d) and Idaho Code § 19-1111, Mr. Hamlett brought Mr. Brian Donesley, a Department of Law 
Enforcement Attorney, before the Grand Jury to testifY and/or advise and/or argue the applicability ofIdaho RICO statutes. 
"Either as indicating additional prosecutor misconduct or as simply violative of ICR 6( d) and Idaho Code § 19-1 III, Mr. 
Donesley's presence further removed the Grand Jury from its intended purpose of an independent, unprejudiced body. See 
also, United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757. 
"The Hogan case, supra, provides an excellent discussion on balancing the actions of a prosecutor before a Grand Jury and 
the rights of an accused. The Hogan Court stated: 
'Interposing a grand jury between the individual and the government serves the intended purpose of limiting indictments 
for higher crimes to those offenses charged by a group of one's fellow citizens acting independently of the prosecution and 
the court. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). In this independent 
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• position, a grand jury performs two distinct roles. It serves as an accuser sworn to investigate and present for trial persons 
260f 128 
suspected of wrongdoing. At the same time-and equally important-it fimctions as a shield, standing between the accuser 
and the accused, protecting the individual citizen against oppressive and unfounded government prosecution'. 
United States v. Hogan, 
712 F.2d 757 
"In conclusion, it is submitted that by allowing and tacitly approving the actions of Prosecutor Hamlett this Court threatens to 
remove the independent status of Grand Juries in Idaho and effectively destroy their intended purpose as shields of 
individuals**555 *326 like Mr. Edmonson and similar persons with the misfortune of facing a prosecutor and his/her 
'personal indictment panel'. 
"By reconsidering the majority opinion and holding prosecutors to constitutionally mandated standards, values and actions, 
this Court can present Idaho with a Grand Jury system which is well conceived, well guided and capable of providing justice 
which preserves and protects the rights of individuals and the citizenry." 
In conclusion, it is urged upon those members of this court who might be inclined to brush this petition aside, that as a Court 
we have accomplished nothing by the disposition of this appeal which is contained in our opinion for the Court. What 
substance is there in it which will serve to guide the trial bench? Little that I can find. There is a discussion of the Oregon 
cases of Clark, Edmonson, and Freeland, followed by a conclusion that Oregon's Supreme Court has ruled that that state's 
equal protection clause requires a prosecutor to treat similarly situated defendants equally. The discussion is immediately 
rendered meaningless by the majority'S ipse dixit that we refuse to adopt the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court. 
There follows an equally vapid discussion as to equal rights in general, which concludes that in Idaho we do have "two 
alternative charging procedures," either of which can be used, but "subject to an equal protection analysis." (p. 234, 743 
P.2d p. 463). The opinion mentions Edmonson's challenge to being subjected to a secret grand jury proceeding resulting in an 
indictment, whereas other co-defendants were charged by information (probably following felony criminal complaint filed in 
a magistrate court), and Edmonson's systematic exclusion from the right to a preliminary hearing. (p. 234, 743 P.2d p. 463). 
Then the majority jumps to the Lem Woon v. Oregon case, a 1913 case from the High Court in Washington, D.C. The holding 
of that case, as set forth in the majority opinion (p. 234, 743 P.2d p. 463) is less than meaningless. It is a nothing. We are 
involved with a state of Idaho criminal prosecution, state of Idaho criminal procedure, and the right to a preliminary hearing 
under Idaho law. As I stated at the outset, where the majority decrees that Edmonson has waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing-which it declares dispositive-impliedly the majority has recognized such a right-a first in Idaho, except for Judge 
Bengston actually being first in time. 
Probably the most outstanding statement by the majority is that "any advantage that a preliminary hearing affords a defendant 
is purely incidental to that purpose." (p. 234, 743 P.2d p. 463). If you can bring me two hundred lawyers who will accept 
that premise, I will show you two hundred lawyers who are entirely unversed in the criminal practice. That statement in the 
majority opinion shows that those in the majority have either not read the Oregon cases of Clark and Freeland, or the 
California Hawkins case, or perhaps see the opinions of those courts as being ill-advised, incompetent, and of no persuasion. 
Clark, quoted supra, at 233-234, 743 P.2d at 462-463. 
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. In concluding its Part I, the Court demonstrates that, while acknowledging that the prosecutor elected to differentiate between 
the charging procedures against Edmonson as against the other defendants, he has produced insufficient "evidence of a 
deliberate and intentional plan to discriminate ... " (p. 235, 743 P.2d p. 464). Exactly what evidence the majority expects and 
wants is an unknown. In actuality it is a pure case of res ipsa loquitur, and the prosecutor should be made to assume and 
bear the burden of explaining away the facial differentiation in handling persons accused jointly of the same criminal 
conduct. 
27 of 128 
My May 29, 1987, opinion contained a paragraph which, on denial of petition for rehearing is needful of repeating. Four 
months have elapsed since I wrote that passage. The case against Ray Edmonson passed out of district court jurisdiction 
January 15, 1987, now almost nine months ago. Presumably the state of Idaho wants to take Roy Edmonson to trial, convict 
him, and jail him. And, perhaps he has been injail all of this time. 
**556 *327 In the paragraph above alluded to, this is what was written, short, and to the point: 
As mentioned earlier, reason and practicality dictate that the district court be directed to allow the defendants the 
preliminary hearing which they seek. For the life of me I cannot understand the solicitor-general's objection. The 
preliminary hearing could have been held and over months ago, and the case pursued in district court. 
Judge Bengston, from what he wrote, in all likelihood would have granted Edmonson a preliminary hearing had one been 
requested. Perhaps had he had the benefit of having it drawn specifically to his attention that in the Clark case there was no 
specific motion for a preliminary hearing, a preliminary hearing would have been given Edmonson, a trial would have 
shortly thereafter taken place, and this Court would not have concerned itself with an appeal which, insofar as it will guide 
the trial bench and bar, is a futile gesture. 
Judge Bengston also favored us with a view that the legislature or the court should come up with a rule allowing an indicted 
felony defendant the right of a preliminary hearing, specifically. 
This case served to provide the vehicle for doing so. Unfortunately as has been earlier noted, other than in the Minich FN2 
case, this Court has fallen into the notion that rule by case-law is outmoded. Instead committees have to be formed, chaired 
by an interested member of the Court, gathered together from all parts of Idaho into Boise, and thereafter the Court gives birth 
to another rule. 
FN2. Minich v. Gem State Developers. Inc.! 991daho 911,591 P.2d 1078 (1979). 
Particularly, though, as was mentioned back in May of this year, I cited another much earlier case-law rule which Justice 
Bakes used to an advantage in Odenwalt v. Irving, all of which is found in my May Opinion, p. 244, 743 P.2d p. 473. 
Continuing to be the most perplexing problem is the majority's absolute abstention from observing the Hawkins case from 
California. Even now on rehearing it obdurately does not deign to discuss it and is equally oblivious to Judge Bengston's 
discussion of and near persuasion to it. The trial bench and bar will be at a loss to accept such as responsible appellate 
practice. Justice Bakes was undoubtedly sincere when he cited prior authority from Wisconsin as the backbone of his 
Odenwalt decision. But where is he now, when the same principles necessarily require that we adopt and/or utilize the 
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As a final comment, since our May opinion was released, a grand jury was convened in Twin Falls County. It indicted a 
number of defendants after considerable hearings. Thereafter, District Judge Hurlbutt and District Judge Meehl dismissed the 
indictments because of irregularities in the process-probably not an inexpensive loss of time and money and judicial 
resources. 
Where we are today, so far as is readily discernible, is no better educated in grand jury proceedings than we were a year go, 
or five years ago. Before the turn of the century it was otherwise. 
As of now the Solicitor-General may know the distinction between an indictment and a presentment. But if he does, he 
learned from the May 1987 opinions, not including the majority. If grand jury proceedings are going to be the wave of the 
future (apparently the intention of the Twin Falls prosecutor) this Court in disposing of the Edmonson appeal has done little 
to be of any assistance, and nothing in the way of guidance. 
Idaho, 1987. 
State v. Edmonson 
113 Idaho 230, 743 P.2d 459 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Idaho. 
STATE ofIdaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Arthur ROSS, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 10121. 
Dec. 31, 1968. 
Defendant was convicted before the Third Judicial District Court, Canyon County, Robert B. Dunlap, J., on three counts of 
committing lewd acts upon minor children and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Smith, C. 1., held that where trial judge 
overruled objection of counsel to admission of defendant's statements allegedly made during interrogation, and there was 
direct evidence of defendant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights, finding that there was explicit waiver would not be 
disturbed on appeal but that total indeterminate sentence of30 years was unduly harsh and would be modified to provide that 
ten-year sentences imposed on each count run concurrently. 
Affirmed as modified and remanded with instructions. 
West Headnotes 
ill Witnesses 410 (::::::;>40(1) 
ill Witnesses 
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{JJlli Competency 
..j IOIl(A) Capacity and Qualifications in General 
41 Ok40 Age and Maturity of Mind 
41 Ok40( I ) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Witnesses 410 €;::::::>45(2) 
410 Witnesses 
41011 Competency 
41 OIl(A) Capacity and Qualifications in General 
41 Ok45 Obligation of Oath 
41 Ok45(2) k. Children. Most Cited Cases 
http://web2.westlaw.comlprintlprintstream.aspx?sv=Spl it&prtt= H 
Five-year-old child, whose testimony was consistent as to offense charged, and who knew difference between telling truth 
and not telling truth, was competent to testifY, in prosecution for committing lewd acts upon minor child, though child may not 
have understood nature and obligation of oath and though her testimony involving relative time and numbers contained 
inconsistencies. I.e. §§ 9-202, 18-6607. 
ill Witnesses 410 €;::::::>40(1) 
410 Witnesses 
41011 Competency 
4101UA) Capacity and Qualifications in General 
41 Ok40 Age and Maturity of Mind 
4 J Ok40( I) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Six-year-old child, whose testimony was consistent as to offense charged, was competent to testifY, in prosecution for 
committing lewd acts upon minor child, though her testimony was inconsistent as to time of day at which events occurred and 
though she had testified at preliminary hearing that she had yelled at time of alleged incident but at trial did not mention any 
outcry: I.C. §§ 9-202, 18-6607. 
ill Criminal Law 110 £=;>1159.3(3.1) 
ill Criminal Law 
I I OXXIV Review 
II OXXIVCP) Verdicts 
II Okl159 Conclusiveness of Verdict 
I lOki 159.3 Conflicting Evidence 
II Okl 159.3(3) Verdict Supported by Evidence 
I lOki 159.3(3.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly I lOki 159.3(3» 
Criminal Law 110 €;::::::> 1159.4(2) 
ill Criminal Law 
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II OXXlV Review 
II OXXIV(P) Verdicts 
IIOkl159 Conclusiveness of Verdict 
II Ok1159.4 Credibility of Witnesses 
11 OkI159.4(2) k. Province of Jury or Trial Court. Most Cited Cases 
Credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded their testimony is exclusively for jury, and where there is competent, 
though contlicting, evidence to sustain a verdict, Supreme Court cannot reweigh evidence or disturb verdict. 
.l::!l Criminal Law 110 ~1159.4(3) 
J.lQ Criminal Law 
IIOXXIV Review 
IIOXXIV(P) Verdicts 
II Okl159 Conclusiveness of Verdict 
II Ok1159.4 Credibility of Witnesses 
IIOkI159.4(3) k. Character of Witnesses or Testimony in General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly IIOkI59(4» 
It is not for Supreme Court to review minor inconsistencies in testimony of children, providing inconsistencies could have 
been considered by jury and there was no abuse of discretion by trial judge in admitting testimony. 
ill Infants 211 €;:;:::>20 
21 I Infants 
:2 I III Protection 
211 k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Corroboration of prosecutrix' testimony is necessary to sustain conviction under statute proscribing commission of lewd acts 
upon minor child. I.C. § 18-6607. 
1M Infants 211 €;:;:::>20 
21 I Infants 
211JI Protection 
211 k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's admissions of committing lewd acts upon children furnished sufficient corroboration of testimony of victims. 1£ 
§ 18-6607. 
ill Criminal Law 110 ~414 
ill Criminal Law 
I I OXVII Evidence 
II OXVIl{M) Declarations 
II Ok411 Declarations by Accused 
I I Ok414 k. Proof and Effect. Most Cited Cases 
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If suspect is questioned while no lawyer is present to represent him, state must affirmatively show that suspect made knowing 
and affirmative waiver of his rights. 
Uil Criminal Law 110 ~4J2.2(3) 
ll.Q Criminal Law 
.11 OXVII Evidence 
I I OXVII( M) Declarations 
I I Ok411 Declarations by Accused 
II Ok412.2 Right to Counsel; Caution 
II Ok412.2(3) k. Informing Accused as to His Rights. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €=;:>412.2(5) 
ill Criminal Law 
I I OX VII Evidence 
IIOXVII(M) Declarations 
II Ok411 Declarations by Accused 
I I Ok412.2 Right to Counsel; Caution 
II Ok412.2(5) k. Failure to Request Counsel; Waiver. Most Cited Cases 
Correct warnings of accused's rights and positive waiver are absolute prerequisites to admissibility of any statement made 
by suspect during interrogation without presence oflawyer. 
ill Criminal Law 110 ~412.2(3) 
lJ.Q Criminal Law 
I I OXVII Evidence 
IIOXVII(M) Declarations 
II Ok411 Declarations by Accused 
II Ok412.2 Right to Counsel; Caution 
II Ok4 I 2.2(3 ) k. Informing Accused as to His Rights. Most Cited Cases 
Once suspect has been taken into custody, police must warn him prior to interrogation of his right to remain silent, of 
possible consequences of waiver of his right to remain silent, of his right to consult with lawyer and to have lawyers with 
him during interrogation and that ifhe cannot afford attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning. 
J..!ill Criminal Law 110 ~414 
ill Criminal Law 
I I OXVII Evidence 
I 10XVII(M) Declarations 
I I Ok411 Declarations by Accused 
II Ok414 k. Proof and Effect. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's testimony that prior to interrogation he was told that he was not obliged to answer any questions, that anything he 
000355 5/26/201011:01 AM 
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said would be used against him, that he could have attorney before he answered questions and that if he could not afford an 
attorney the state would furnish him one established that required warnings were completely and competently given to 
detendant prior to interrogation. 
l1!l Criminal Law 110 €=>1I58.13 
llQ Criminal Law 
I I OXXIV Review 
I IOXXIV(O) Questions of Fact and Findings 
J IOkI15S.S Evidence 
II Ok 1158.13 k. Admission, Statements, and Confessions. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly I lOki 158(4), IIOkI5S(4» 
Where trial judge overruled objection of cOlUlsel to admission of defendant's statements allegedly made during interrogation, 
and there was direct evidence of defendant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights, finding that there was explicit waiver 
would not be disturbed on appeal. 
lillinfants 211 <£;:;;;;;> 13 
ill Infants 
2 I III Protection 
211 k 13 k. Protection of Health and Morals. Most Cited Cases 
Intent is element of crime ofcommitting lewd acts upon minor child. I.C. § 18-6607. 
l..Ql Infants 211 ~20 
ill. Infants 
:2 I III Protection 
211 k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Instructions which defined crime of committing lewd acts upon minor child and which informed jury that direct proof of 
intent necessary to commit crime was not required but that intent could be derived from and established by facts and 
circumstances, and by defendant's conduct sufficiently covered intent necessary to commit offense. I.e. § IS-6607. 
l.!1J. Infa nts 211 <£;:;;;;;> 20 
ill Infants 
:2 I III Protection 
211 k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence supported finding that defendant had intent necessary for offense of committing lewd acts on minor chi Idren. I.e. § 
IS-6607. 
ll..S Criminal Law 110 €=>778(2) 
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ill Criminal Law 
IIOXX Trial 
IIOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency 
IIOk778 Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
II Ok778(2) k. Sufficiency in General. Most Cited Cases 
Statement that every person of sound mind is presumed to intend natural and probable consequences of his act, included in 
instructions concerning intent necessary for offense oflewd acts upon minors child, was proper. I.e. § 18-6607. 
l1..Ql Criminal Law 11 0 ~572 
ill Criminal Law 
I loxvn Evidence 
II0XVIUy) Weight and Sufficiency 
II Ok572 k. Alibi. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's alibi testimony that he was at work at time of alleged offenses, that he had punched in and punched out of work at 
normal times on days of alleged offenses and that he was not missed at work and always ate lunch with a friend was not 
conclusive as to defendant's whereabouts at times of alleged commission oflewd acts upon minor children and was merely 
evidence to be weighed together with other evidence by jury in arriving at its verdict. LC. § 18-6607. 
ll1llnfants 2 J J ~20 
211 Infants 
lll!.! Protection 
211 k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's evidence that possible alternative motive existed for his prosecution for alleged commission of lewd acts upon 
minor children in that there had been problems between defendant's family and family of prosecution's witnesses was issue 
to be resolved by jury. LC. § 18-6607. 
J.llJ. Criminal Law 110 ~1159.3(4) 
JlQ Criminal Law 
II OXXIV Review 
IIOXXIV(P) Verdicts 
II Okl159 Conclusiveness of Verdict 
II Ok 1159.3 Conflicting Evidence 
II OkI159.3(3) Verdict Supported by Evidence 
II OkI159.3(4) k. Substantial Evidence; "Some" or "Any" Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
. (Formerly IIOkI59(3» 
Where there is substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence to sustain verdict, Supreme Court cannot reweigh 
evidence or disturb verdict. 
.l!2.l Sentencing and Punishment 350H ~1877 
000357 5/26/201011:01 AM 
'of 16 
J2Qtl Sentencing and Punishment 
350HIX Probation and Related Dispositions 
350HIX(D) Factors Related to Offender 
350Hk1877 k. Mental Illness or Incapacity. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly II Ok982.3(3» 
COmlprinVprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft=H 
Denial of probation was not abuse of discretion where trial court caused psychiatric studies and evaluations to be made of 
detendant and caused to be made available for review his police records from various sources. I.e. § 19-260 I. 
1201 Criminal Law 110 €::::::> 1184(4.1) 
ill Criminal Law 
I I OXXIV Review 
II0XXIWlJ) Determination and Disposition of Cause 
I 10k 1184 Modification or Correction of Judgment or Sentence 
II Ok 1184(4) Sentence or Punishment 
II Ok 1184( 4.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly I lOkI 183, IlOk183) 
Total indeterminate sentence of 30 years of penal servitude was unduly harsh and would be modified to provide that 
sentences of ten years on each of three counts of commission of lewd acts upon minor child run concurrently. ~ 
18-6607, 19-2821. 
*710 **370 Gigray, Boyd & Downen, Caldwell, for defendant-appellant. 
*711 **371 Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., and Roger B. Wright, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, C. Robert Yost, Pros. Atty., 
Caldwell, for plaintiff-respondent. 
SMITH, Chief Justice. 
Appellant has appealed from a judgment of conviction on three counts each charging the commission of' a lewd act upon and 
with a part of the body ofa minor child * * * under the age ofl6 years.' LC. s 18-6607.[FNIJ 
FN 1. 18-6607. Lewd conduct with minor or child under sixteen.-Any person who shall wilfully and lewdly commit 
any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor or child under 
the age of sixteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifYing the lust or passions or sexual desires 
of such person or of such minor or child, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the State Prison for a 
term of not more than life. 
The circumstances of the charged offenses were the same or similar on all three occasions. The record indicates that on July 
26, 1966, appellant either enticed or coerced into his garage five year old Tammy my -- (count I), and on that date and on 
August 8, 1966, six year old Tracy -- (counts 2 and 3) and then placed his hand inside the panties of each child and fondled 
her 'private parts.' Each incident supposedly occurred about the noon hour. The children suffered no physical harm. 
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Appellant was arrested and charged with the offenses. He was interrogated by the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of Canyon 
County. The detai Is and procedure of this interrogation are later discussed. 
Alter the jury found appellant guilty on all three cOlU1tS, and after a pre-sentence investigation, the court entered its judgment 
of conviction. The court then meted out concurrent sentences of penal servitude often years on each of the three c0lU1ts.[FN2] 
FN2. Although the judgment of conviction makes no mention whether the sentences are to rlU1 concurrently or 
consecutively, I.e. s 18-308 provides: 
'Successive terms ofimprisonment.-When any person is convicted of two or more crimes before sentence has been 
pronounced upon him for either, the imprisonment to which he is sentenced upon the second or other subsequent 
conviction must commence at the termination of the first term of imprisonment to which he shall be adjudged, or at 
the termination of the second or other subsequent term of imprisonment, as the case may be.' 
Appellant assigns error committed by the trial court: 
I. In denying appellant's motion for a new trial because of insufficiency of the evidence to show that appellant had committed 
a criminal act because of,-
Incompetency, inconsistency and insufficient corroboration of the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses; 
Appellant's defense or an alibi was not rebutted by the state; 
Appellant established a possible ulterior motive for the prosecution. 
2. In denying a motion for a new trial because the state's evidence failed to establish the necessary element of 'intent' 
required by I.e. s 18-6607. 
3. In refusing to exclude statements which appellant made to the sheriff on the grolU1d that appellant's guaranteed 
constitutional rights had been violated. 
4. In givingjury instruction No.6. 
5. In denying appellant's request for probation. 
6. In sentencing appellant to 30 years servitude in the penitentiary. 
Appellant contends that the two girls-prosecution's witnesses-were not competent to testifY in that they were lU1der 10 years 
of age and appeared 'incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts *712 **372 respecting which they are examined, or 
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of relating them truly,' citing I.e. s 9-202.[FN3] Appellant argues that if that testimony is stricken, or is given the merited 
minimal weight, then the state has not met its burden of proof of the charged offenses. 
FN3. '9-202. Who may not testifY.-The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
2. Children under ten (10) years of age, who appear incapable of receiving j ust impressions of the facts respecting 
which they are examined, or of relating them truly. 
Estate v, AI len, 70 Wash,2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967), dealt with RCW 5.60.50, which in pertinent part is the same as .LC." 
s ')-202. In that case the supreme court of Washington established the following test for competency in deciding that a six 
year old girl could testifY as prosecuting witness regarding the defendant having taken indecent liberties with her person: 
'The true test of the competency of a young child as a witness consists of the following: (I) an understanding of the 
obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is 
to testifY, to receive an accurate impression of it, (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the 
occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple 
questions about it.' 
'The determination of the witness's (sic) ability to meet the requirements of this test and the allowance or disallowance of 
leading questions (citation) rest primarily with the trial judge who sees the witness, notices his manner, and considers his 
capacity and intelligence. These are matters that are not reflected in the written record for appellate review. Their 
determination lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of proof of 
a manifest abuse of discretion. * * *.' 
See also State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965); see State v. Harp, 31 Idaho 597,173 P. 1148 (1918). 
ill Turning first to Tammy's testimony, we find no error in allowing its admission. Her testimony was halting and sometimes 
contradictory, and in instances the record indicates 'no response,' but nevertheless, it was consistent as regards the offense 
in question. Appellant asserts that the child did not know the difference between telling the truth and not telling the truth or 
between right and wrong. But when questioned as to what she spoke, when she related something which actually happened, 
she replied, 'The truth.' And she responded that it was 'a lie' ifshe told 'something that just didn't happen.' She stated that 
she knew what had happened and was telling the truth, and the fact that she may not have understood the nature and obligation 
of an oath would not render her incapable of testifYing. State v. Harp, supra. 
Most of the inconsistencies in the testimony of both children involved quantitative analyses. How many times had you been 
present on appellant's property? How long did appellant hold his hands on you? How many times did your family go on 
picnics? What time of the day did the events take place-morning or noon? These classifY into the categories of numbers and 
relative time. It is not surprising that the testimony of the children was somewhat confused and inconsistent as to those 
matters. 
However, as to the events constiMing the statutory offense in question, the testimony of Tammy was quite consistent. Her 
crucial testimony was as follows: 
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'Q. What did he do? 
'A. Put his hands down my pants. 
'q. And then what did he do? 
'A. On my crotch. 
*713 **373 'Q. Where is your crotch? 
'A. Between my legs. 
'Q. (W)as the hand inside or outside of the tmderpanties? 
'A. Inside. 
'Q. And what did he do with his hand while his hand was between your legs? 
'A. He rubbed my crotch.' 
ill Regarding the testimony of Tracy, appellant raises the same basic objections. Here again, the inconsistencies concern the 
time of day at which the events occurred, but not the facts essential to the crimes. In the preliminary hearing, Tracy testified 
that she yelled, that appellant held his hand over her mouth, and that he cautioned her to tell no one about the incident. At the 
trial she repeated that testimony, but omitted mention of any outcry. These inconsistencies did not make her incapable of 
testifYing, within the meaning of I.C. s 9-202. If anything, although the yotmger of the two children, her testimony was the 
more concise of the two. It would serve no purpose to produce extracts of that testimony here. We hold that she, too, was 
competent to testifY. 
llJI:U Given the admitted inconsistencies in the testimony of the minor children-the prosecution's witnesses-appellant 
contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that a crime was committed or that it was committed on these 
witnesses. This court, however, has repeatedly held that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their 
testimony is exclusively for the jury, and where there is competent, though conflicting, evidence to sustain a verdict, the court 
cannot reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict. State v. Pruett. 91 Idaho 537. 428 P.2d 43 (1967); State v. Booton, 85 
Idaho 51. 375 P.2d 536 (1962); State v. Harp, supra; State v. Berry, 101 Ariz. 310. 419 P.2d 337 (1966). It is not for this 
court to review the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of children, provided the inconsistencies could have been 
considered by the jury and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in admitting the testimony. People v. Cook, 
136 Cal.App.2d 442. 288 P.2d 602 (1955); People v. Cox. 104 Cal.App.2d 218.231 P.2d 91 (1951); Cf. State v. Harp, 
supra. 
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WIQl Appellant then asserts that even if the testimony of the girls is admissible, there could be no conviction based on it 
since the corroboration thereof was insufficient. Cases decided by this court establish the proposition that corroboration of 
the prosecutrix' testimony is necessary to sustain a conviction tmder I.C. s \8-6607. State v. Tope. 86 Idaho 462, 387 P.ld 
888 ( 1963); State v. Madrid, 74 Idaho 200,259 P.2d 1044 (1953); State v. Elsen. 68 Idaho 50, 187 P.2d 976 (1947); State v. 
Short, 39 Idaho 446, 228 P. 274 (l924). State v. Elsen, supra, annotmces the rule: 
'If the character or reputation of the prosecutrix for truth and chastity is unimpeached, and her testimony is not contradictory 
nor (sic) inconsistent with the admitted facts of the case, and is not inherently improbable nor (sic) incredible, there can be 
either direct evidence corroborating her testimony, or evidence of surrotmding circumstances clearly corroborating her 
statements. Either will suffice. If, however, her character or reputation for truth and chastity, or either, is impeached, or her 
testimony is contradictory or is inconsistent with the admitted facts of the case, or is inherently improbable or incredible, 
then there must be direct evidence corroborating her testimony.' fFN4) 
FN4. For a commentary questioning the wisdom of such detailed definition of the corroboration necessary, see 7 
Wigmore on Evidence ss 2061-2062 (3d ed., 1940). 
The sheriff testified as to certain admissions which appellant made during an August 15, 1966, interrogation before the *714 
**374 prosecuting attorney and the sheriff. As set out below, they furnish sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the 
girls. See 1 Wigmore on Evidence, s 25 (3d ed., 1940): 
'Q. Will you state what that conversation was? 
'A. There was conversation as to where it occurred. He (appellant) said it was at his garage when he was living out on South 
Tenth Street, or out there at Winchester's * * * He said that he hadn't did (sic) this in a long time, and he wouldn't have done 
it any more even ifhe hadn't been arrested. He was very sorry that he did it, and he was asked ifhe, ifhis family knew about 
it, ifhis wife knew about, and he said, 'no,' he hadn't said anything because he didn't think he would ever have done it any 
more. He said he didn't really do it to injure the children and that he didn't mean any harm by it. There was a conversation as 
to what he (appellant) did. He said that he put his hand down inside their panties, and played with them. He was asked ifhe 
played with their private parts, and he said, 'Yes." 
The state, on oral argument, recognized that in order for this conviction to stand, the sheriffs testimony as to appellant's 
admissions must be held as admissible tmder the standard established by Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
10 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). 
Il.1ill The Miranda and contemporary cases establish certain general standards. Once a suspect has been taken into custody 
(i. e., once the police have in any way detained him), he must be warned of his rights; but that is not all. If the suspect is 
questioned while no lawyer is present to represent him, then the state must affirmatively show that the suspect made a 
knowing and affirmative waiver of his rights. Correct warnings and positive waiver-these are absolute prerequisites to the 
admissibility of any statement made by a suspect during interrogation without the presence of a lawyer. Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren's words, entmciated in Miranda, leave no room for doubt as to what is required: 
'The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not 
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simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation. 
'The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully 
elfective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn 
between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to 'admissions' of part or all of an 
of Tense.! FN5] The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in 
any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination.' 384 U.S. 436, 476,86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629. 
FN5. The statements by appellant in the case at bar fall into the second ofthese categories. 
Given this basic standard, we now turn to the question of what constitutes compliance, as a practical matter, by police in 
beginning the interrogation process. 
The supreme court of the United States, in the Miranda case, provided its own general summary: 
'To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities 
in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural 
safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notity the person 
of his right of silence *715 **375 and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following 
measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says 
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning ifhe so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be 
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the 
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless 
and unti I such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of 
interrogation can be used against him.' 384 U.S. at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. 
I2l The four warnings which must be given prior to the interrogation are: (1) the accused must be told that he has the right to 
remain silent, and that he is under no compulsion to discuss anything with the officers ifhe does not so desire; (2) he must be 
informed that if he does say anything to the officers, such may be used as evidence against him in a court of law. This is to 
apprise him of the possible consequences of the waiver of his right to remain silent; (3) he must be informed that he has the 
right to consult with a lawyer, and that he may have the lawyer with him during the interrogation. There is no prerequisite that 
the accused make a request to bring this right into play; the police must inform him of this right; (4) and finally, the police 
must inform him that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him free of charge prior to any 
questioning.[FN6] 
FN6. For the discussion of the warnings set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States, see the Miranda case, 
384 U.S. 436, 468-472,86 S.Ct. 1602. 
llQ.l Appellant's testimony as regards the interrogation in the sheriffs office appears as follows: 
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. 1\. * * * I wasn't obligated to answer any questions. You (the prosecuting attorney) told me so yourself 
'Q. And you remember then that you were told by both the Sheriff and I (sic) that you need not talk to us? 
'A. Yes, both of you told me that. 
'Q. Did we not also, or did not the Sheriff tell you that anything that you said would be used against you in a court oflaw? 
'A. That could have been said, * * * 
'Q. And did you remember that the Sheriff advised you that you could call an attorney before you talked to us and that you 
had a right for (sic) an attorney? 
'A. I believe that's true, yes, but I wasn't given an opportunity to call one. 
'Q. Did you ask to call an attorney? 
'A. I don't remember having said that, * * * 
'Q. Now, what did the Sheriff tell you as to your rights as an accused person? 
'A. He said, 'I will have to tell you that you're entitled to an attorney,' and that was all. There wasn't any elaboration on that. 
He said if! couldn't afford one the State ofIdaho would furnish one, and that was all.' 
In short, appellant's admissions demonstrate conclusively that the required Miranda warnings were completely and 
competently*716 **376 given. His testimony also indicated that he amply understood their content and meaning. 
Turning to the question whether appellant waived his fifth amendment privilege, one finds the following language in the 
Miranda case: 
'If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the 
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and 
his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14, 84 S.C!. 1758, 1764, 12 
L.Ed.2d 977. 986. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. 
Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461. 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), and we re-assert these standards as appl ied to 
in-custody interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the 
interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during 
incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders. 
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'An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a 
statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after 
warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. A statement we made in Camle:t 
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516. 82 S.Ct. 884. 890. 8 L.Ed.2d 70. 77 (1962), is applicable here: 
"Presuming waiver from a si lent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence 
which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the ofter. Anything less is not 
waiver.' 
Lll1 Here, the record is far from silent as to waiver. In fact, as the district judge pointed out, it became a question of 
credibility of witnesses. The sheriff testified that at the conclusion of the above mentioned warnings, appellant said, 'I don't 
need an attorney. I did it.' When asked at the trial whether he had indeed made such a statement, appellant testified 'That's 
ridiculous. I wouldn't make a statement like that.' He also stated had he known that he had a right to a lawyer during the 
interrogation, he certainly would have had one, since he had sufficient funds, Since the trial judge overruled the objection of 
counsel to the admission into evidence of appellant's statements allegedly made during interrogation, and since there is direct 
evidence in the record of his waiver, the finding of the trial court that there was an explicit waiver will not be disturbed on 
appeal. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458. 58 S.Ct. 1019.82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938); Abercrombie v. State. 91 
IdahQ 586. 428 P.2d 505 (1967). 
In short. we hold that the Miranda requirements were met; therefore, appellant's admissions made while under interrogation 
were properly admitted into evidence. It appears herein that the law enforcement officers admirably complied with 
constitutional procedural standards in the courts. 
[12][13lfI4] Appellant contends that there was no showing that the alleged lewd conduct was committed 'with the intent of 
arousing, appealing to, or gratifYing the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such minor or child,' as 
required for conviction under I.C. s 18-6607 (see footnote 1). Appellant argues that intent is the essence of the crime. Intent, 
of course, is an element of an offense defined by I.C. s 18-6607. In the case at bar, there was ample testimony as to the events 
themselves. This court has ruled, in State v. Johnson. 74 Idaho 269.261 P.2d 638 (1953)' a case which involved an offense 
charged *717 **377 under I.e. s 18-6607, that intent may be shown from the commission of the acts and the surrounding 
circumstances. We held there as follows: 
'A person necessarily intends the probable, natural consequences of his own voluntary acts. The only yardstick by which 
one's intent can be determined is his external acts and conduct, what he does and what he says, and one cannot excuse the 
probable consequences of one's own voluntary act by claiming that he had a mental reservation and performed the act or acts 
voluntarily done without an intent. Intent is manifest by the sound mind and discretion of the person accused, and the intent of 
appellant to do what the jury found he did, is sufficiently established by the commission of the acts and the circumstances 
surrounding them.' 
See also State v. Rutten, 73 Idaho 25, 245 P.2d 778 (I952); Cf. State v. Booton, supra. The trial court gave two jury 
instructions concerning intent, [FN7] and they sufficiently covered the subject. As in State v. Johnson, supra, the intent of the 
accused is amply shown by the acts and surrounding circumstances, and the jury by its verdict, found that the requisite intent 
existed. We see no reason to overrule that finding. 
000365 5/26/2010 11:01 AM 
5 of 16 
http://web2. .com/pri nt/pri ntstream. aspx?sv=S p Ii t& pr 11= 1-
FN7. 'INSTRUCTION NO.5. The laws of the State ofldaho provide that any person who shall wilfully and lewdly 
commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereofofa minor or child 
under the age of sixteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifYing the lust or passions or sexual 
desires of such person or of such minor or child, shall be guilty of a felony.' 
'INSTRUCTION NO.6. In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and 
intent, or criminal negligence. 
'The intent with which an act is committed being but a mental state of the party committing it, direct proof of such 
intent is not required, but the intent is generally derived from and establ ished by the attending facts and 
circumstances, and the conduct of the defendant, as shown by the evidence. 
'The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and 
discretion of the accused. All persons are of sound mind who are neither idiots nor lunatics, nor affected with 
insanity. 
'Every person ofsotmd mind is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.' 
LUl Appellant asserts error in the giving of jury instruction No.6 (see footnote 7) by including therein the statement that 
'every person of sound mind is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.' Appellant's arguments 
are answered by State v. Johnson, supra, and particularly by the hereinbefore quoted portion of that decision. The instruction 
was proper. 
LLQl Appellant asserts that his alibi, i. e., that he was at work at the time of the alleged offenses, was not properly 
considered. The jury heard the testimony that appellant did 'punch in' and 'punch out' at work at the normal times on the days 
in question, that he was not missed at work and that he always ate lunch with a friend. However, the alibi was not conclusive 
as to the appellant's whereabouts at the times and on the dates in question, and indeed appellant does not so contend. In such 
an instance the alibi is merely evidence to be weighed together with other evidence by the jury in arriving at its verdict. 
[ill Appellant also argues that he established 'a possible alternative motive' for his prosecution in that there had been 
problems and occurrences of certain incidents between appellant's family and the family of the prosecution's witnesses. 
Again however, this was an issue which the jury resolved against appellant. 
LlID As we have already stated, where there is substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence to sustain a verdict, 
this court cannot reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict. State v. Pruett, supra; State v. Booton, supra; State v. Johnson, 
supra. 
*718 **378 Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. The court may in its discretion 
place a defendant on probation. I.e. s 19-2601.rFN8] 
FN 8. 19-260 I. 'Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any district court of 
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the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the State, except those of treason or murder, the court in its 
discretion, may: 
3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may place the defendant 
ll2.l The record shows that the court caused psychiatric studies and evaluations to be made of appellant, and caused to be 
made available for review his police records from various sources. After review of those records, we cannot say that the 
court abused its discretion in denying probation to appellant. See Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291,392 P.2d 552 (1964); State 
v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115,289 P.ld 315 (1915). 
f:.?O] Appellant assigns error committed by the trial court in sentencing him to 30 years servitude in the penitentiary. 
The court, by its judgment of conviction, sentenced appellant to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed IO years on each of 
the three counts. I.C. s 18·308 (see footnote I) would require these sentences to run consecutively; and the judgment does 
not provide that they run concurrently. Under all of the circumstances of this case it is the consensus oftms court that a total 
indeterminate sentence of30 years of penal servitude is unduly harsh and that the sentences on each of the three counts should 
run concurrently. I.C. s 19-282 J.[FN9] 
FN9. 19-2821. 'Disposition of appeal.-The court may reverse, affirm, or modity the judgment or order appealed 
from, and may set aside, affirm or modity any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such 
judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial.' 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed, but the sentence structure thereof is ordered modified to provide that the sentences of 
10 years penal servitude on each of the three counts run concurrently. 
Judgment affirmed as so modified and cause remanded with instructions to enter modification of the judgment accordingly. 
TAYLOR, McQUADE, McFADDEN and SPEAR, J1., concur. 
Idaho 1968. 
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